Event Notification Report for November 15, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/14/2014 - 11/15/2014
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50618
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRANNON PAYNE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRANNON PAYNE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 11/15/2014
Notification Time: 08:14 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2014
Event Time: 03:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/15/2014
Notification Time: 08:14 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2014
Event Time: 03:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/15/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Standby |
VALID ACTUATION OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR ABNORMAL ROD POSITION INDICATION
"This notification is being made as required by 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to control room operators opening the Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 reactor trip breakers via the main control board hand switch during reactor startup procedures. This is a valid actuation of the reactor protection system. The reactor was not critical at the time the reactor trip breakers were opened.
"While withdrawing control rods for reactor startup and low power physics testing with control bank C at approximately 50 steps, Digital Rod Position indication for one of the control rods (M12) changed to 90 steps. The control room operators stopped withdrawing rods and entered FNP-2-AOP-19 (Malfunction of the Rod Control System). The reactor trip breakers were opened at 0353 CST. All rods inserted as expected. All other systems functioned normally. The plant is stable at normal operating pressure and temperature.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"This notification is being made as required by 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to control room operators opening the Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 reactor trip breakers via the main control board hand switch during reactor startup procedures. This is a valid actuation of the reactor protection system. The reactor was not critical at the time the reactor trip breakers were opened.
"While withdrawing control rods for reactor startup and low power physics testing with control bank C at approximately 50 steps, Digital Rod Position indication for one of the control rods (M12) changed to 90 steps. The control room operators stopped withdrawing rods and entered FNP-2-AOP-19 (Malfunction of the Rod Control System). The reactor trip breakers were opened at 0353 CST. All rods inserted as expected. All other systems functioned normally. The plant is stable at normal operating pressure and temperature.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50720
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SLIETER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SLIETER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 01/07/2015
Notification Time: 12:27 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2014
Event Time: 23:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2015
Notification Time: 12:27 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2014
Event Time: 23:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL F. KING (R2DO)
MICHAEL F. KING (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 17 | Power Operation | 17 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF 1A EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG)
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the 1A EDG. The 1A EDG start resulted from a degraded component during the testing of the 1A Emergency Load Sequencer.
"At 2355 [EST] on November 15, 2014, the 1A EDG auto started during performance of the monthly 1A Emergency Load Sequencer test. The test was terminated by personnel prior to a full actuation of the Emergency Load Sequencer due to the unexpected response of the sequencer. The 1A EDG started and functioned normally. Troubleshooting identified a degraded relay downstream of the under voltage sensing circuit which made up the invalid 2/3 logic necessary to start the EDG. There were NO actual plant conditions or parameters (i.e. under voltage, degraded voltage, safety injection or manual initiation) involved in this actuation. The degraded relay would NOT have prevented the 1A Emergency Load Sequencer or the EDG from performing their safety related functions.
"Following troubleshooting, replacement of the relay and an evaluation for extent of condition, the 1A Emergency Load Sequencer and EDG were returned to service.
"The health and safety of the public was not affected by this issue.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the 1A EDG. The 1A EDG start resulted from a degraded component during the testing of the 1A Emergency Load Sequencer.
"At 2355 [EST] on November 15, 2014, the 1A EDG auto started during performance of the monthly 1A Emergency Load Sequencer test. The test was terminated by personnel prior to a full actuation of the Emergency Load Sequencer due to the unexpected response of the sequencer. The 1A EDG started and functioned normally. Troubleshooting identified a degraded relay downstream of the under voltage sensing circuit which made up the invalid 2/3 logic necessary to start the EDG. There were NO actual plant conditions or parameters (i.e. under voltage, degraded voltage, safety injection or manual initiation) involved in this actuation. The degraded relay would NOT have prevented the 1A Emergency Load Sequencer or the EDG from performing their safety related functions.
"Following troubleshooting, replacement of the relay and an evaluation for extent of condition, the 1A Emergency Load Sequencer and EDG were returned to service.
"The health and safety of the public was not affected by this issue.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."