Event Notification Report for November 12, 2014

NO FUNCTIONAL SMOKE DETECTION CAPABILITY IN CONTAINMENT

"At 0202 [CST] on November 12, 2014, it was determined that Unit 2 had no functional smoke detection capability in the containment. During post modification testing on the smoke detection system, it was discovered that both trains of detection were not functional. Required compensatory measures have been established. Since a fire in the containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered an unplanned loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"[Farley] Condition Report: 892818.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL

A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. His access to the facility was terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOWERING STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL

"On November 12, 2014 at 1548 [EST], Unit 2 was manually tripped due to a lowering 2B steam generator level caused by the spurious (slow) closure of 2B Main Feedwater Isolation Valve, HCV-09-2B.

"All CEAs [control element assemblies] fully inserted into the core. All safety systems responded as expected with the 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Channel 2 (AFAS 2) actuating on low 2B steam generator level. Decay heat removal is from main feedwater to the 2A steam generator and manual control of auxiliary feedwater to the 2B steam generator, with steam bypass to the main condenser.

"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the AFAS 2 actuation."

During the transient, no relief or safety valves lifted. The grid is stable and the plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup at normal operating pressure and temperature. The cause of the feedwater isolation valve malfunction is under investigation. There was no effect on Unit 1.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- LOST AND THEN FOUND RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On November 13, 2014, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services, Radiation Branch] that on November 12, 2014, at approximately [1500 CST] it was notified by local law enforcement that one of its industrial radiography cameras had been found on the side of a road approximately 3 miles from the licensee's facility. The licensee determined that the SPEC 150 camera containing a 38 Curie Iridium-192 source had fallen from one of its trucks at approximately [1245 CST] while in route to a temporary job site. The camera had not been secured inside the truck before it left the licensee's facility but had been left on the tailgate. The licensee retrieved the camera and there was no apparent damage to the device. There are no known exposures resulting from this event. Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA- 300."

Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA and EPA. Notified FDA, NuclearSSA and DNDO-JAC via email.

Texas Incident: I-9251

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST I-125 SEED IN STRAND LAB

The following information was provided by the State of Georgia via facsimile:

"Theragenics was packing radioactive seeds for transport to customer when one of the seeds was lost in the strand lab and could not be found. This was an Iodine 125 seed manufactured by Medi-Physics, model Oconoseed 6711. At the time of production the seed had a radioactivity of 0.696 mCi, but by the time of the report had decayed to 0.492 mCi radioactivity.

"On November 12, 2014, licensee personnel were filling an order for stranded seeds when a seed could not be accounted for. After searching the lab area continually and personnel when they left the lab (portal monitor scanning), the seed still has not been found. The licensee made a report via phone notification of the missing seed on December 12, 2014.

"License has conducted refresher training for employees who work in the lab areas. An emphasis was noted on handling technique, especially during mid-late October through November, when the change in weather and humidity have traditionally resulted in an increase of seed-handling errors, i.e., seeds 'popping' out of tweezers during manipulation. Additionally, the strand lab is scheduled for its semi-annual cleaning (per General Lab Practice) on December 19-20, 2014. During that process, crews will look for this seed and the one that was reported missing from September 2014."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf