Event Notification Report for November 05, 2014

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NON-CONSERVATIVE RADIOLOGICAL SCAN FOR BUILDINGS RELEASED FOR USE

The following report was received via e-mail:

"The Department of the Navy has provided the California Department of Public Health with a cover letter and report dealing with nonconservative scan speeds being used for the release of buildings on the Hunters Point Naval Facility. Some of the buildings involved are under NRC jurisdiction and some under State of California jurisdiction. The buildings involved that are NRC jurisdiction are Parcel B (103, 113, 113A, 130, 140, 146), Parcel C (203, 214, 241, 271, 272), Parcel E (half of Bldg 439, half of Bldg 810), and Parcel G (351, 351A, 365, 366, 401, 411). We are informing NRC of this issue so you can independently review this report and take whatever action they deem necessary.

The buildings that are under State jurisdiction are all in Parcel E (406, 414, 521, half of Bldg 439, and half of Bldg 810). RHB will schedule additional surveys as required to verify the safety of release of these buildings. RHB does not perceive any particular threat to the public or workers from these buildings but an evaluation should be done just to be sure."

California Event #: 111414

* * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN FASSELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1308 EST ON 11/17/14 * * *

This event is being retracted, because it has been determined that it is not a 24-hr reportable event.

Notified R1DO (Jackson), R4DO (Hagar), NMSS Events Notification (Email).

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ZONES 2 AND 3 UNINTENTIONALLY CROSSTIED

"On November 5, 2014 at 1115 [EST], Secondary Containment Zone 3 (Unit 1 & 2 Reactor Building) was unintentionally crosstied to Secondary Containment Zone 2 (Unit 2 Reactor Building) for several seconds during passage of personnel through a personnel airlock. Secondary Containment Zone 2 & Zone 3 ventilation remained in service and stable.

"LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered and exited based on the prohibited crosstie of Secondary Containment Zones. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires that at least one door remain closed for airlocks where two doors are provided when an access opening between Secondary Containment Zones is being used for exit and entry.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNANALYZED CONDITION REGARDING APPENDIX R PROCEDURES

"On November 5, 2014, during a review of recommended procedure changes, TVA determined procedures for Appendix R fires did not include all the required operator manual actions to address inadvertent opening of the pressurizer spray valves. Failure to secure the reactor coolant pumps or auxiliary spray would invalidate Appendix R assumptions for not overfilling the pressurizer during an Appendix R event. Failure to take all the required actions would place WBN [Watts Bar Nuclear] Unit 1 in an unanalyzed condition.

"The three affected procedures have been revised on 11/5/2014, to correct the condition.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition."

SIX UNIT 2 CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNITS INOPERABLE

"Six (6) U2 CRD [Control Rod Drive] HCU [Hydraulic Control Unit] accumulators were identified with riser brackets that were installed incorrectly. This issue impacts U2 CRD HCU accumulators only. The incorrect riser bracket installation could challenge the ability of the CRD hydraulic control unit to perform its design function during a seismic event.

"Identified U2 control rods associated with HCU accumulators that had riser brackets installed incorrectly were declared inoperable. This condition has been corrected since initial identification, restoring all control rods to operable status. Reference IR 2407342.

"This notification is made pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) regarding the reportability of multiple failures that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM MATT SEELEY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1144 EST ON 12/22/14 * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on November 6, 2014 (ENS 50597). An Engineering Evaluation has determined that the function of the affected U2 CRD HCU Accumulators was not affected as discussed in Chapters 6 and 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function was not met (NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R3DO (Dickson).

FITNESS FOR DUTY - LICENSED OPERATOR IN VIOLATION OF THE FITNESS FOR DUTY POLICY

A licensed operator has been found in violation of the Northern States Power Minnesota Fitness for Duty Policy. The individual's access to the plant has been suspended and the operator has been removed from duty. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AND RECOVERED RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The following was received from the State of Oklahoma via email:

"Hi-Tech Testing Service, an Oklahoma industrial radiography licensee based in Mustang, Oklahoma, reports that they temporarily lost custody of an industrial radiography camera containing an iridium source. At about 1:40 PM today, the Hi-Tech RSO reported by phone to DEQ [Department of Environmental Quality] that while doing radiography overnight at a compressor station near Perkins, Oklahoma, radiographers unintentionally left the radiography camera (with source inside) at the site. The error was discovered this morning when an inspector from Hi-Tech's client found the camera at the site. The client contacted Hi-Tech, who recovered the camera and have it in their possession. They report no evidence that the camera was tampered with or that there was an overexposure involved. DEQ will do an investigation of the incident.

"The above is very preliminary, based on phone reports from the licensee. It is basically all the information known to DEQ at this time. It will be updated as more information becomes available."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf