Event Notification Report for October 28, 2014

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE CAN NOT BE RETRACTED

The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email:

"The Department's [PA Department of Radiation Protection] Southwest Office informed the Central Office of this event on October 28, 2014. This event is reportable to the Department within 24-hours per 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2), and within 30 days as per 10 CFR 34.101(a)2.

"While radiographing a pipe in the field, a crew had an incident where the camera fell and crimped the guide tube, and the source could not be retracted. The area was immediately secured after the event, and recovery operation initiated. The recovery was completed within two hours. Using long handled pliers under lead sheets, the licensee was able to un-crimp the guide tube and retract the source back into the camera. The readings with the lead sheets in place were in the range of 10 to 15 milli-roentgen per hour (mR/h). Electronic dosimetry readings of those involved with the recovery were provided to the Department [Radiation Protection], with no whole body results above 40 mR.

"Camera Information:
Model: AEA / QSA 880 Delta
Serial#: D12920

"Source Information:
Model: AEA / QSA A424-9
Serial #: 11088G
Isotope: lr-192
Activity: 99 Ci

"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: The camera was not tied down to the pipe, it slid off the supporting structure, fell, and crimped the guide tube.

"ACTIONS: The licensee was able to un-crimp the guide tube and retract the source back into the camera. The Department plans a reactive inspection."

PA Event Report ID No.: PA140022

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE IN RADIOCHEMISTRY LAB CAUSES CONTAMINATION OF FUME HOOD

"On October 28, 2014 at 1615 PDT, a fire started in a fume hood in radiochemistry lab MSM 173 hood 2 [located at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas]. The researcher was working with uranium, which is pyrophoric. The fire damaged a container of used pipettes containing Tc-99 (maximum of 150 microCi), which resulted in contamination of the fume hood. The damage to the container and loss of integrity of the licensed material resulted in this report.

"The lab was immediately closed and surveys performed. There were no personnel or airborne contamination detected. The two HEPA filters for the fume hood exhaust prevented a release to the environment. The [licensee] issued a Stop Work order for all radiochemistry labs and initiated an investigation and will follow-up with additional reports to the Nevada Radiation Control Program."

REACTOR BUILDING VACUUM BELOW TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT

"On the evening of October 28, 2014 at 1708 EDT, with James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100 percent power, the Reactor Building differential pressure decreased below the JAF Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) value of at least 0.25 inches water vacuum for a period of thirty-four (34) seconds. This occurred during restoration of the Reactor Building Ventilation System (RBVS) following planned maintenance. The Reactor Building differential pressure was 0.50 inches water vacuum with the 'A' RBVS fans in-service in conjunction with the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS). The Reactor Building differential pressure decreased to 0.19 inches water vacuum when the SGTS was secured. The Reactor Building Vent was subsequently isolated, and the alternate 'B' RBVS fans were placed in-service; the differential pressure increased to within the required 0.25 inches water vacuum value.

"The JAF TS bases associated with Secondary Containment state that, 'for Secondary Containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.' Troubleshooting activities indicated that the transient was due to a non-safety related, non-TS damper downstream of one of the 'A' RBVS fans that did not fully stroke open. The subject damper is not part of Secondary Containment, and has no safety related function. This condition did not impact the leak tightness of Secondary Containment or the ability of the associated equipment to establish and maintain the required differential pressure. Secondary Containment would have fulfilled its safety function.

"However, because the JAF TS SR value of 0.25 inches water vacuum was not met, Secondary Containment was considered Technical Specification INOPERABLE for a period of thirty-four (34) seconds. The Secondary Containment is considered a single-train system; therefore, this condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURES FOR NON-OCCUPATIONAL WORKERS

The following information was provided by the State of Ohio via email:

"At 1530 EDT on 10/28/14, an INEOS Supervisor noticed that the indicator for the High-High Level gauge for the tank in the DIN1 reactor showed that the gauge was in the open position. The gauge shutter was closed immediately upon this discovery. The level gauge contains a 1 Ci Cs-137 source (assay date 1993).

"The open shutter could have caused exposures to non-occupational workers who were working in the area performing cleaning and maintenance. The tank had been emptied for cleaning and contractors have been entering the tank for maintenance. Workers would have passed through the beam while using the access ladder to gain entry to the tank to perform their work. At the time of the original notification by the licensee, it was unknown how many individuals might have been exposed and for how long. The licensee was advised to take prompt action to determine the exposure to the individuals and it was recommended that he contact a CHP Health Physics Consultant as soon as possible.

"ODH [Ohio Department of Health] responded on 10/29/14. Investigation determined that work actually began on 10/26/14 and that five (5) individuals were involved, all non-occupational workers. Any exposure would have been primarily from passing through beam on access ladder enroute to work in tank, which was taking place approximately 25 feet below the beam inside the tank. There was one (1) individual who was performing a maintenance task in or near the beam for approximately 15 minutes at a distance of approximately 12 inches from the gauge.

"Licensee has contacted a local gauge manufacturer which has experienced staff available to assist with dose reconstruction.

"Information on gauge and source model/type/serial number not available at time of this entry. More information to follow as available.

"Initial investigation would indicate that exposures may exceed allowances for non-occupational workers, but not at a level that would result in serious health issues."

Ohio Item Number: OH140012