Event Notification Report for October 12, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/11/2014 - 10/12/2014
EVENT NUMBERS
50524505255052650527
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50524
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: JIM RITCHIE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: JIM RITCHIE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 10/12/2014
Notification Time: 05:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2014
Event Time: 02:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2014
Notification Time: 05:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2014
Event Time: 02:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 1 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO DECREASING REACTOR WATER LEVEL
"Today at approximately 0250 (EDT) [on 10/12/14], during a planned reactor power ascension with reactor power at approximately 1% of rated thermal power, reactor water level began lowering. Operators inserted a manual SCRAM at 0251 (EDT) in accordance with station procedures. The cause of the lowering reactor level is currently under investigation.
"All rods inserted into the core and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. No electromatic (EMRVs) or safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The plant is currently shutdown and plant parameters are stable.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'"
Decay heat is being released to the main condenser and normal offsite power is being maintained.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JOSH MCGUIRE TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1520 EDT ON 10/17/2014 * * *
"An automatic SCRAM occurred at 0251 EDT, moments before operators inserted a manual SCRAM in accordance with station procedures."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Cook).
"Today at approximately 0250 (EDT) [on 10/12/14], during a planned reactor power ascension with reactor power at approximately 1% of rated thermal power, reactor water level began lowering. Operators inserted a manual SCRAM at 0251 (EDT) in accordance with station procedures. The cause of the lowering reactor level is currently under investigation.
"All rods inserted into the core and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. No electromatic (EMRVs) or safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The plant is currently shutdown and plant parameters are stable.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'"
Decay heat is being released to the main condenser and normal offsite power is being maintained.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JOSH MCGUIRE TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1520 EDT ON 10/17/2014 * * *
"An automatic SCRAM occurred at 0251 EDT, moments before operators inserted a manual SCRAM in accordance with station procedures."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Cook).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50525
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KYLE SAYLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KYLE SAYLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 10/12/2014
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2014
Event Time: 04:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2014
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2014
Event Time: 04:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL TRANSPORTED OFFSITE FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT
"At 0426 CST [on 10/12/14], a potentially contaminated individual [contract employee] was transported off-site for medical attention at Nemaha County Hospital. The individual had been working in a contaminated area in the main condenser. When the Incident Commander (IC) and Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) arrived on station the individual was no longer in the contaminated area but was still in the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA). Radiological Protection personnel were dispatched with the individual in the ambulance and surveyed him in route. At 0445 CST, prior to arrival at the hospital, it was confirmed that the individual was not contaminated."
The individual was suffering from a heat related medical condition.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0426 CST [on 10/12/14], a potentially contaminated individual [contract employee] was transported off-site for medical attention at Nemaha County Hospital. The individual had been working in a contaminated area in the main condenser. When the Incident Commander (IC) and Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) arrived on station the individual was no longer in the contaminated area but was still in the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA). Radiological Protection personnel were dispatched with the individual in the ambulance and surveyed him in route. At 0445 CST, prior to arrival at the hospital, it was confirmed that the individual was not contaminated."
The individual was suffering from a heat related medical condition.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50526
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/12/2014
Notification Time: 12:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2014
Event Time: 09:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2014
Notification Time: 12:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2014
Event Time: 09:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING REACTOR STARTUP
"VEGP [Vogtle Electric Generating Plant] Unit 2 was performing startup and had taken reactor critical at 0929 EDT. When attempting to stabilize power to collect critical data, control rods were inserted with Control Bank D the expected group to insert. Control Bank A inserted instead of Control Bank D. Power had reached 6 E-2 percent as indicated by IR [intermediate range] indication when control room crew performed a manual reactor trip. AFW [auxiliary feed water] was in service to support plant conditions prior to the trip and did not receive any actuation signal. All equipment operated as expected. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"VEGP [Vogtle Electric Generating Plant] Unit 2 was performing startup and had taken reactor critical at 0929 EDT. When attempting to stabilize power to collect critical data, control rods were inserted with Control Bank D the expected group to insert. Control Bank A inserted instead of Control Bank D. Power had reached 6 E-2 percent as indicated by IR [intermediate range] indication when control room crew performed a manual reactor trip. AFW [auxiliary feed water] was in service to support plant conditions prior to the trip and did not receive any actuation signal. All equipment operated as expected. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50527
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN MCHUGH
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN MCHUGH
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/12/2014
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2014
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2014
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2014
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SERVICE WATER PUMPS INOPERABLE
"At 0226 [EDT on 10/12/14], the 25 Service Water Pump Traveling Screen differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV was discovered closed while performing the monthly bubbler blow down activity. The associated 25 Service Water Pump was operable at this time. The differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV, in the closed/discovered position would have prevented the operation of the 25 Service Water Traveling Screen due to high differential pressure. The 25 Service Water Traveling Screen needs to be operable to support 25 Service Water Pump operability. 25 Service Water Pump Traveling Water Screen was restored to operable after differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV was reopened. The station subsequently verified all Unit 1 and 2 high side and low side differential pressure transmitter valves positions were correct.
"At 0600 [EDT on 10/12/14], it was identified that the last manipulation of differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV was on 9/7/14. Based on the last known manipulation it is assumed that differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV remained closed from that time until the condition was discovered. Review of other activities performed from 9/7/2014 to present determined that surveillance testing of 21 Service Water Pump resulted in 21, 22, and 23 Service Water Pumps being inoperable on 9/18/2014 for several hours. During that surveillance, combined with the mis-positioned instrument valve on 25 Service Water Pump, five of the six Service Water Pumps would have been inoperable which may have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"This event is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to remove residual heat.'
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No one was injured as a result of the failure of 25 Service Water Traveling Screen inoperability."
* * * RETRACTION FROM ROBERT CORDREY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1543 EST ON 12/2/2014 * * *
"The purpose of this call is to retract event number 50527. On October 12, 2014, at 1307 EDT, notification was made to the NRC Operations Center by Salem Unit 2 reporting a condition under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: ...(D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"Subsequent to this report, Salem Unit 2 determined that the condition in which the 25 Service Water (SW) pump may have been considered inoperable, in conjunction with the other SW loop being out of service, was not occurring at the time of discovery and was thus not reportable under the reporting requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v).
"Further analysis of the event determined that the valve mis-positioning of the 25 SW pump traveling screen differential pressure transmitter which defeated the auto-start function of the traveling screen, did not impair the safety function of the traveling screen to minimize carryover of debris to the suction of the 25 SW pump. Thus, during the time in question, the 25 SW pump remained operable which maintained one loop of SW operable during the period of time the other service water loop was removed from service for pump testing. One loop of SW with two pumps operable from different safety related buses is capable of performing the safety function of the SW system during a design basis accident.
"This event is not considered a safety system functional failure and is not reportable to the NRC under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) or 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Dentel)
"At 0226 [EDT on 10/12/14], the 25 Service Water Pump Traveling Screen differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV was discovered closed while performing the monthly bubbler blow down activity. The associated 25 Service Water Pump was operable at this time. The differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV, in the closed/discovered position would have prevented the operation of the 25 Service Water Traveling Screen due to high differential pressure. The 25 Service Water Traveling Screen needs to be operable to support 25 Service Water Pump operability. 25 Service Water Pump Traveling Water Screen was restored to operable after differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV was reopened. The station subsequently verified all Unit 1 and 2 high side and low side differential pressure transmitter valves positions were correct.
"At 0600 [EDT on 10/12/14], it was identified that the last manipulation of differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV was on 9/7/14. Based on the last known manipulation it is assumed that differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV remained closed from that time until the condition was discovered. Review of other activities performed from 9/7/2014 to present determined that surveillance testing of 21 Service Water Pump resulted in 21, 22, and 23 Service Water Pumps being inoperable on 9/18/2014 for several hours. During that surveillance, combined with the mis-positioned instrument valve on 25 Service Water Pump, five of the six Service Water Pumps would have been inoperable which may have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"This event is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to remove residual heat.'
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No one was injured as a result of the failure of 25 Service Water Traveling Screen inoperability."
* * * RETRACTION FROM ROBERT CORDREY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1543 EST ON 12/2/2014 * * *
"The purpose of this call is to retract event number 50527. On October 12, 2014, at 1307 EDT, notification was made to the NRC Operations Center by Salem Unit 2 reporting a condition under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: ...(D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"Subsequent to this report, Salem Unit 2 determined that the condition in which the 25 Service Water (SW) pump may have been considered inoperable, in conjunction with the other SW loop being out of service, was not occurring at the time of discovery and was thus not reportable under the reporting requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v).
"Further analysis of the event determined that the valve mis-positioning of the 25 SW pump traveling screen differential pressure transmitter which defeated the auto-start function of the traveling screen, did not impair the safety function of the traveling screen to minimize carryover of debris to the suction of the 25 SW pump. Thus, during the time in question, the 25 SW pump remained operable which maintained one loop of SW operable during the period of time the other service water loop was removed from service for pump testing. One loop of SW with two pumps operable from different safety related buses is capable of performing the safety function of the SW system during a design basis accident.
"This event is not considered a safety system functional failure and is not reportable to the NRC under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) or 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Dentel)