Event Notification Report for October 01, 2014

TWO INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATIONS OF SAFETY INJECTION

"This 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report [two separate] invalid actuations of the Unit 4 Safety Injection (SI) System in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"On October 1, 2014 at approximately 1656 [EDT], Sl was actuated on low pressurizer pressure when the Sl signal block was inadvertently removed during pressure transmitter calibrations. The actuation was invalid because it was not in response to an actual plant condition requiring the need for Sl. Containment and containment ventilation isolation were initiated, and the following equipment automatically started: 4B residual heat removal pump; 3A, 3B and 4B high head safety injection (HHSI) pumps; 3A, 3B and 4B diesel generators (DG). This was a partial Sl actuation because of equipment removed from service or already in service due to unit outage conditions. Actuated equipment started and functioned successfully. Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) injection did not occur. The DGs started but did not load.

"On October 7, 2014 at approximately 1607 [EDT while unit was in a defueled status], Sl was actuated on low pressurizer pressure during restoration of power to the Train A instrumentation rack. The Sl actuation occurred when a fuse was inserted reenergizing the logic circuit because an incorrect test switch was manipulated during a prior procedure step. Properly positioning the correct test switch would have blocked the low pressurizer pressure signal. The actuation was invalid because it was not in response to an actual plant condition requiring the need for Sl. Containment isolation, containment ventilation isolation, control room isolation, feedwater isolation, and turbine trip were initiated, and the following equipment automatically started: 3A, 3B and 4A HHSI pumps; 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B DGs: 4A intake cooling water pump with isolation of turbine plant cooling water heat exchangers. This was a partial Sl actuation because of equipment removed from service or already in service due to unit outage conditions. Actuated equipment started and functioned successfully. ECCS injection did not occur. The DGs started but did not load.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
..

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER STUCK OPEN ON A FIXED GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of California via email:

"At 1510 [PDT] on May 7, 2015, the licensee notified us [California Radiation Control Program] that the shutter on their belt weight scale on the Coarse Gangue Belt in Plant 1 is stuck in the open position. This is a generally licensed device (Berthold Technologies, Model: LB300L, s/n: 17729-1061-10003 containing 18 mCi Cs-137). The shutter malfunction was initially found during their six month shutter check in October 2014, however, the licensee only became aware of the reporting requirement last week when they contacted the manufacturer to repair the device. The device is in a restricted area 100 feet above the ground on a conveyance structure. The source is below the belt and the beam path is upward with no real exposure potential to any personnel in the area. The only way to access the belt and the source is via a catwalk which is not in the beam path. The dose rate on the catwalk is approximately 0.4 mRem/hr."

CA 5010 Number: (Date Notified): 050715

PARTIAL LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS IN EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY AND JOINT INFORMATION CENTER

"At 0750 EDT on October 1, 2014, the Shift Manager was notified that site Information Technology (IT) personnel were being mobilized to investigate a potential voice and network loss at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Joint Information Center (JIC). Site IT personnel were notified by offsite IT resources at 0727 EDT on October 1, 2014 of the issue that was first identified by IT monitoring software at 0124 on October 1, 2014.

"The site IT personnel that responded to the EOF and JIC reported to site Control Room and Emergency Preparedness (EP) personnel at 0845 that connectivity to the Exelon network and the internet was unavailable at both the EOF and the JIC. This loss of connectivity would prevent the ability of the EOF Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel to directly monitor key plant parameters via the site's Plant Process Computer (including the Site Parameter Display System) and other network-based plant parameter display systems.

"Site IT and EP personnel determined that the following communications equipment was not impacted by the connectivity issue:

- Dedicated Offsite Agency Phones (primary method for contacting state and local agencies)
- Commercial Phones and dedicated bridge line (primary method for contacting other site Emergency Response Facilities)
- FTS-2001 Phones (e.g., ENS and HPN lines)
- ERDS

"Additionally, EP personnel verified with Dose Assessment Office personnel that dose assessment and dose monitoring functions from the EOF could still be performed without delay.

"Site IT personnel reported to the Control Room at 1135 that connectivity to the Exelon network and the internet had been restored to a fully functional status.

"While site and fleet IT personnel continue to address and verify all appropriate corrective actions have been taken to prevent recurrence of the connectivity issue, the site has employed appropriate compensatory measures to ensure that the verbal transmission of key plant parameters from the site (Technical Support Center or Control Room) to the EOF is recognized and maintained.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM TIM HUBER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1208 EDT ON 10/27/2014 * * *

"This update retracts Event Report #50502, which reported that a loss of connectivity to the Exelon network and internet at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Joint Information Center (JIC) had impacted the ability of staff in these facilities to directly monitor key plant parameters via the site's Plant Process Computer and other network-based plant parameter display systems.

"Subsequent to the identification of this event, further investigation by site and fleet staff determined that adequate direction was included in applicable Emergency Response Organization (ERO) procedures to respond to data display system failures of this type. Specifically, the checklist (procedure) for the Operations Communicator in the EOF provided adequate direction for this ERO member to obtain required plant data from the Operations Communicator located in the Control Room via alternate methods (e.g., over the phone - phone lines remained functional throughout the time that the loss of computer connectivity condition existed).

"Therefore, this event did not result in a major loss of emergency assessment capability and was not reportable to the NRC under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R1DO (Bickett) and Cyber Assessment Team via email.