Event Notification Report for September 24, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/23/2014 - 09/24/2014
Agreement State
Event Number: 50500
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP. INC.
Region: 4
City: EL DORADO State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-1034-0331
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MACK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP. INC.
Region: 4
City: EL DORADO State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-1034-0331
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MACK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/01/2014
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2014
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2014
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2014
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE
The following information was obtained from the State of Arkansas via email:
"Mistras Group, Inc., ARK-1034-03310, reported the inability to retract a 2.738 TBq (74 Ci) Ir-192 source (Source QSA Global Model A424-9, Serial 10270G) into the radiography exposure device (QSA Global, Model 880 Delta, Serial D9086) on 9/24/2014.
"During the morning of September 24, 2014, the radiographer's written statements indicated that a piece of pipe shifted and rolled onto the guide tube during an exposure. This action caused a crimp in the guide tube and the source was not retractable.
"The radiography crew reset the boundaries to 2.0 mR/hr and contacted the home office. The RSO of the Baton Rouge, Louisiana office responded to the site.
"The RSO reported that upon arrival, the radiography crew had reset the boundaries to 2.0 mR/hr. The source was located in the collimator and the crimp location was 6 inches from the collimator. The RSO placed 50 pounds of lead shot over the collimator and placed a metal plate under the crimp. The RSO then used a hammer to 'round out' the guide tube allowing the source to be retracted into the camera. The guide tube was removed from service and the crank-out was inspected for any damage.
"The RSO stated that he wore an SRD [self-reading dosimeter] with a 0-200 mR range and this was found to be off-scale. The RSO was instructed by the State to submit the dosimetry badge for immediate processing.
"The pocket dosimeters for the radiography crew were reported to read 1 mR and 0 mR respectively.
"No other survey readings, other than the 2 mR/hr boundary, have been reported.
"The State is tracking this event under Arkansas Event Number AR-2014-007 and is continuing to investigate this incident."
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE MACK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1245 EST ON 12/04/14 * * *
The following report was received from the State of Arkansas via email:
"The State of Arkansas is providing the following update to event 50500.
"Dosimetry results for the individual performing the source retrieval were received and indicated that a dose of 1.0 millirem had been received. A dose reconstruction performed by the licensee indicated that the highest possible dose received during the source retrieval was 4.538 millirem.
"The State of Arkansas agrees that there was no overexposure as a result of this source retrieval. The licensee provided corrective actions that included review of the licensee's source retrieval procedures and reporting procedures.
"The [State of Arkansas] Department considers this event to be closed."
Notified R4DO (Kellar) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
The following information was obtained from the State of Arkansas via email:
"Mistras Group, Inc., ARK-1034-03310, reported the inability to retract a 2.738 TBq (74 Ci) Ir-192 source (Source QSA Global Model A424-9, Serial 10270G) into the radiography exposure device (QSA Global, Model 880 Delta, Serial D9086) on 9/24/2014.
"During the morning of September 24, 2014, the radiographer's written statements indicated that a piece of pipe shifted and rolled onto the guide tube during an exposure. This action caused a crimp in the guide tube and the source was not retractable.
"The radiography crew reset the boundaries to 2.0 mR/hr and contacted the home office. The RSO of the Baton Rouge, Louisiana office responded to the site.
"The RSO reported that upon arrival, the radiography crew had reset the boundaries to 2.0 mR/hr. The source was located in the collimator and the crimp location was 6 inches from the collimator. The RSO placed 50 pounds of lead shot over the collimator and placed a metal plate under the crimp. The RSO then used a hammer to 'round out' the guide tube allowing the source to be retracted into the camera. The guide tube was removed from service and the crank-out was inspected for any damage.
"The RSO stated that he wore an SRD [self-reading dosimeter] with a 0-200 mR range and this was found to be off-scale. The RSO was instructed by the State to submit the dosimetry badge for immediate processing.
"The pocket dosimeters for the radiography crew were reported to read 1 mR and 0 mR respectively.
"No other survey readings, other than the 2 mR/hr boundary, have been reported.
"The State is tracking this event under Arkansas Event Number AR-2014-007 and is continuing to investigate this incident."
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE MACK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1245 EST ON 12/04/14 * * *
The following report was received from the State of Arkansas via email:
"The State of Arkansas is providing the following update to event 50500.
"Dosimetry results for the individual performing the source retrieval were received and indicated that a dose of 1.0 millirem had been received. A dose reconstruction performed by the licensee indicated that the highest possible dose received during the source retrieval was 4.538 millirem.
"The State of Arkansas agrees that there was no overexposure as a result of this source retrieval. The licensee provided corrective actions that included review of the licensee's source retrieval procedures and reporting procedures.
"The [State of Arkansas] Department considers this event to be closed."
Notified R4DO (Kellar) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50487
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 09/24/2014
Notification Time: 08:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2014
Event Time: 07:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2014
Notification Time: 08:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2014
Event Time: 07:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SHIELD BUILDING VENT GAS RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"At 0728 CDT on 9/24/2014, 2R-22 Shield Building Vent Gas Radiation Monitor was removed from service for planned maintenance. This monitor has no compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels (EALs) - NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert classifications - when out of service. It is also used for offsite dose projection calculations. This results in a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability while 2R-22 is out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Unit 2 Shield Building Ventilation Stack is also monitored by high range monitor, 2R-50, which is used for the same purpose in Site Area or General Emergency classifications. 2R-50 is being monitored and is indicating normal values. There are no radioactive leaks that will impact the Shield Building as evidenced by normal readings on 2R-22 prior to its removal from service. The duration of this maintenance is scheduled for 1 hour and will continue until the monitor is returned to service. Maintenance will not result in the unplanned release of radioactivity to the environment and will not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"At 0728 CDT on 9/24/2014, 2R-22 Shield Building Vent Gas Radiation Monitor was removed from service for planned maintenance. This monitor has no compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels (EALs) - NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert classifications - when out of service. It is also used for offsite dose projection calculations. This results in a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability while 2R-22 is out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Unit 2 Shield Building Ventilation Stack is also monitored by high range monitor, 2R-50, which is used for the same purpose in Site Area or General Emergency classifications. 2R-50 is being monitored and is indicating normal values. There are no radioactive leaks that will impact the Shield Building as evidenced by normal readings on 2R-22 prior to its removal from service. The duration of this maintenance is scheduled for 1 hour and will continue until the monitor is returned to service. Maintenance will not result in the unplanned release of radioactivity to the environment and will not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50492
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE INGALLS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE INGALLS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 09/25/2014
Notification Time: 00:04 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2014
Event Time: 15:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2014
Notification Time: 00:04 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2014
Event Time: 15:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNIT 1 TRAIN B RVLIS AND ICCM INOPERABLE DUE TO DATA ERRORS
"At 1533 CDT on September 24, during a Past Operability review for the Unit 1 Train B Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM), it was discovered that due to data errors, the as left VDC [voltage DC] value for the Remote Display Power Supply was outside of acceptance criteria during the last performance of SP 1213B 'Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor Calibration,' completed on 8/25/2014. The Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) and the Core Exit Thermocouples (CETs) are subsystems of the ICCM System and were determined to be inoperable during this timeframe. Therefore Tech Spec 3.3.3 Condition A for Train B RVLIS and Tech Spec 3.3.3 Condition B for CETs were not met. Also during this time, Unit 1 Train A ICCM was out of service from 1110 [CDT] on 9/8/2014 to 1530 [CDT] on 9/12/2014 for calibration. Thus, both trains of Core Exit Thermocouples and RVLIS were inoperable during this 4 day, 4 hour and 20 minute time period.
"ICCM System indication is used for Safety Injection Termination and Reinitiation criteria in the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). During the time when both trains of ICCM were inoperable, B Train remained in service and was thought to be operable. This provided the potential for operators to perform an untimely SI Termination or Reinitiation during an accident based on inaccurate information. The Emergency Response Computer System was available to provide accurate backup information to the operators and for timely Emergency Action Limit classification
"This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident.
"Based on new information currently being received from Westinghouse, the ICCM Remote Display Power Supply only functions to communicate data to the display and has no effect on the data values. Thus the ICCM System may have been functioning properly. An update to this information will be provided once it is available
"The protection of the health and safety of the public was not affected by this issue.
"The Unit 1 Train B ICCM System was returned to operable status at 2300 [CDT] on 9/24/2014.
"The license has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1408 EDT ON 10/6/2014 FROM NATHAN BIBUS TO DONG PARK * * *
"Based on further analysis and input from Westinghouse, the remote display 12V power supply is operable as long as data is still updating on the display. It was determined that the tolerance acceptance criteria within our procedure was conservative. For this application, the power supply can function at much less than 12V. The acceptance criteria within surveillance procedures were incorrect and procedure changes have been submitted to correct the tolerance. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Orlikowski).
"At 1533 CDT on September 24, during a Past Operability review for the Unit 1 Train B Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM), it was discovered that due to data errors, the as left VDC [voltage DC] value for the Remote Display Power Supply was outside of acceptance criteria during the last performance of SP 1213B 'Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor Calibration,' completed on 8/25/2014. The Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) and the Core Exit Thermocouples (CETs) are subsystems of the ICCM System and were determined to be inoperable during this timeframe. Therefore Tech Spec 3.3.3 Condition A for Train B RVLIS and Tech Spec 3.3.3 Condition B for CETs were not met. Also during this time, Unit 1 Train A ICCM was out of service from 1110 [CDT] on 9/8/2014 to 1530 [CDT] on 9/12/2014 for calibration. Thus, both trains of Core Exit Thermocouples and RVLIS were inoperable during this 4 day, 4 hour and 20 minute time period.
"ICCM System indication is used for Safety Injection Termination and Reinitiation criteria in the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). During the time when both trains of ICCM were inoperable, B Train remained in service and was thought to be operable. This provided the potential for operators to perform an untimely SI Termination or Reinitiation during an accident based on inaccurate information. The Emergency Response Computer System was available to provide accurate backup information to the operators and for timely Emergency Action Limit classification
"This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident.
"Based on new information currently being received from Westinghouse, the ICCM Remote Display Power Supply only functions to communicate data to the display and has no effect on the data values. Thus the ICCM System may have been functioning properly. An update to this information will be provided once it is available
"The protection of the health and safety of the public was not affected by this issue.
"The Unit 1 Train B ICCM System was returned to operable status at 2300 [CDT] on 9/24/2014.
"The license has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1408 EDT ON 10/6/2014 FROM NATHAN BIBUS TO DONG PARK * * *
"Based on further analysis and input from Westinghouse, the remote display 12V power supply is operable as long as data is still updating on the display. It was determined that the tolerance acceptance criteria within our procedure was conservative. For this application, the power supply can function at much less than 12V. The acceptance criteria within surveillance procedures were incorrect and procedure changes have been submitted to correct the tolerance. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Orlikowski).