Event Notification Report for September 23, 2014

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF A PROCESS GAUGE SHUTTER

The following was received from the State of Nebraska via email:

"The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, Radioactive Materials Program, was notified at 0803 CDT on 9/25/2014 by a representative of the Omaha Public Power District that a Kay Ray fixed gauge Model Number 7080 source shutter failed to close. The device contains approximately 6 millicuries of Cesium-137 originally installed in 1984 with approximately 50 millicuries. The gauge is mounted between two fly ash hoppers approximately 20 feet above the floor. The source closure mechanism on the gauge is connected to a handle located at floor level by a flexible cable. The closure cable is secured so that when the floor handle is operated, the control cable slides inside of the sheath opening/closing the shutter. The outer sheath for the cable became separated from the capture mechanism at the source. The handle on the floor would move but the linkages at the source would only move approximately « inch and then the sheath would move away from the compression fitting. The reason for operating the source shutter was to perform the semiannual function check.

"This type of failure has been seen in the past and is easily fixed by tightening the screw which secures the end of the cable to the structure. This requires a scaffold to be built up to the source level."

NE Incident ID #: NE140005

RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"[Millstone] U2 High Range Stack Radiation Monitor, RM-8168 was removed from service for pre-planned maintenance. This action is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). RM-8168 was restored to operable status on 9/23/14 at 1212 [EDT]."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local authorities.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - THERMAL EVENT SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER SPRINKLER SYSTEM

The following report was received from the State of Tennessee via email:

"Event description: Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (DRH) was notified on September 23, 2014, by a representative from [Manufacturing Science Corporation] MSC that there had been a thermal incident in the chip/turnings oxidizer that triggered the sprinkler system. The Oak Ridge [OR] Fire Dept. responded. The sprinkler system released ~200 gallons of water which was contained within the bermed area. The incident was contained sufficiently that the OR fire department left the facility prior to 1000 [EDT]. MSC changed pre-filters upstream of the HEPA filters, the HEPAs did not appear to need changing. MSC felt that this incident is required to be reported per TN State Regulations for Protection Against Radiation (SRPAR) 0400-20-05-.141(2)(c)4, in that the event potentially involved 'an unplanned fire or explosion damaging any licensable material or any device, container or equipment containing licensable material when:
(i) The quantity of material involved exceed five times the lowest annual limit of intake specified for the material in Schedule RHS 8-30 in Rule 0400-20-05-.161, and
(ii) The damage affects the integrity of the licensable material or any device, container or equipment containing licensable material.'

"There was no release to the environment, no personnel contamination, and no injuries.

"Notifications: [State] Oak Ridge Fire Department. Press release has not been issued at this time. TN DRH has not received any media inquiries at this time."

No fire or smoke was observed.

State Event Report ID #: TN-14-181

UPDATE FROM BILLY FREEMAN TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0921 EDT ON 9/24/14:

The following was received via email:

"Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (DRH) was notified on September 23, 2014 by a representative from MSC that there had been a thermal incident in the depleted uranium (DU) chip/turnings oxidizer that triggered the sprinkler system. The Oak Ridge Fire Dept. responded. The sprinkler system released ~200 gallons of water which was contained within the bermed area. The incident was contained sufficiently that the OR fire department left the facility prior to 1000 EDT. MSC changed pre-filters upstream of the HEPA filters the HEPAs did not appear to need changing. MSC felt that this incident is required to be reported per TN State Regulations for Protection Against Radiation (SRPAR) 0400-20-05-.141(2)(c)4. in that the event potentially involved 'an unplanned fire or explosion damaging any licensable material or any device, container or equipment containing licensable material when:
(i) The quantity of material involved exceed five times the lowest annual limit of intake specified for the material in Schedule RHS 8-30 in Rule 0400-20-05-.161, and
(ii) The damage affects the integrity of the licensable material or any device, container or equipment containing licensable material.'

"They are not certain of the quantity of DU involved. There was no release to the environment, no personnel contamination and no injuries.

"Notifications: [State] Oak Ridge Fire Department. Press release has not been issued at this time. TN DRH has not received any media inquiries at this time."

Updated information: The material involved was Depleted Uranium.

Notified R1DO (Gray), FSME MOC (Dudes), FSME Events Resource (email)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE LOST THEN FOUND

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On September 23, 2014, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee of the loss of a Troxler Model 3411 moisture density gauge, serial #6329, containing a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) Am-Be source, serial #47-2502, and a 0.3 GBq (8 mCi) Cs-137 source (serial #40-3459). The licensee stated a technician was traveling when his tailgate fell open and the container holding the locked gauge fell off the truck. The gauge was improperly secured in the back of the truck. He turned around to go back to the intersection but the gauge was missing.

"On September 24, 2014, a company called the licensee informing them that they found the gauge in the road. The gauge was returned to the licensee. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9238

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE

The following report was received from the State of Colorado via email:

"Event description: The department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] was notified via phone on 9/23/2014, at approximately 1845 [MDT] by the Radiation Safety Officer [RSO] of Premier NDT Services, Inc. (license # CO 1162-01) that a radiography crew was unable to retract the source assembly to its fully shielded position and secure it in this position at a temporary job site.

"At approximately, 1900 [MDT] on 9/23, the RSO reported to the department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] that the source had been retracted to it fully shielded position by working the crank back and forth a few times. It was about a quarter turn to get the source into position and have the exposure device lock engage. The source was not fully extended outside of the camera but was in the camera enough to close the outlet port cover.

"The radiography camera was surveyed and it was determined that the source was in fact in its fully shielded position prior to transporting the camera back to the licensee facility.

"The department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] visited the licensee facility on 9/24/14, at approximately 0930 [MDT] and interviewed licensee staff including the radiography crew.

"It was determined that the radiography assistant had not properly surveyed during the approach to the camera to verify that the source was in fact in its fully shielded position and that he disconnected the guide tube prior to realizing that the source was not fully shielded. When he attempted to disconnect the drive cable he realized that the exposure device lock was not engaged properly and the crew retreated to a safe distance.

"There were two assistant radiographers and a radiographer present and their pocket dosimeters read 10, 9 , and 20 mrem after the event. It appears unlikely that this is an overexposure event. The time in which the crew was in close proximity to the camera with the source out of its secured position was less than 5 minutes total and the time in which the crew member was in contact with the camera was less than a second to disconnect the guide tube and close the outlet port cover and another second when he attempted to disconnect the drive cable.

"It is suspected that this was a malfunction of the device. The camera (QSA 880 Delta), drive cables, and guide tube are being sent back to the manufacturer for diagnosis.

"The department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] is preparing a Notice Of Violation for multiple items and is expecting a full report from the licensee within 30 days including dose estimates."

Event Report ID No.: CO14-I14-26

PART 21 REPORT - CARBOLINE SG BASE NOT CURING PROPERLY

The following report was received via facsimile:

"This letter serves to notify of a potential safety related noncompliance deviation in a basic component as defined in 10CFR Part 21. The noncompliance involves a batch of Carbozinc 11 SG Base that is not curing properly.

"A customer notified Carboline of concerns regarding the cure of a particular batch of Carbozinc 11 SG. Our salesman was contacted by the customer and the salesman initiated a report to our Technical Service group. The internal report was opened and investigation began on Friday 9/19/2014. Analysis of the retain sample by our plant Quality Control was requested, the results show a slower than normal cure. Material was then sent into Saint Louis R&D for additional analysis. On Tuesday, September 23, 2014, the analytical evaluation was reviewed by the product chemist and the batch cure issues were confirmed.

"The batch has been placed on hold and reports have been run to determine where the batch has shipped.

"We are notifying customers to review their use and stock of Carbozinc 11 SG, to discontinue use of this batch, 14FN6228L and return any material with the batch number of 14FN6228L.

"Please contact our Customer Service Department at 1-800-848-4645 to obtain a Returned Goods Authorization. We will credit your account for this material, if you need replacement material, Customer Service can make the necessary arrangements at that time.

"Further work is being done to determine the cause of cure issues with this batch of Carbozinc 11 SG. At this time, we have confirmed that this material is not curing properly.

"If you have any questions or need additional information please contact me.

"Respectfully submitted,

"Marikay Speckert - Corporate Quality Manager - Carboline Company
2150 Schuetz Road - Saint Louis, MO 63146 - 314-644-1000 Ext. 2456"

PART 21 REPORT - ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE EXCESSIVE WEAR

The following report was received via e-mail:

"This is a non-emergency notification from Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) required under 10 CFR Part 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators.

"On June 20, 2014, during as-found bench (stroke) testing of the EMRV actuators removed from the plant during refueling outage 1R24 (October 2012), two of five EMRV actuators failed to operate. Subsequent inspection of these actuators found unexpected wear of the posts (grooves approximately 1/2 inch from the top), springs (thinned and broken at the top), and guides (grooves inside), with one spring having a piece axially wedged between the post and the guide.

"The root cause of this failure was determined to be the inadequate design of the EMRV actuators in that when placed in an environment where the actuator is subject to the vibration associated with plant operation, the allowed installation tolerances between posts and guides can create a condition where the springs can jam the actuator plunger assembly by wedging between the guides and the posts. If the EMRV actuators are set up in a condition where the posts are not optimally aligned, preferential wear of the post is observed due to interaction of the post, spring, and guide. Additionally, the vendor guidance for refurbishment of the EMRV actuator does not provide the necessary acceptance criteria for alignment of the posts to guides to ensure that the springs, posts, and guides do not interact in a way that causes preferential wear of the post allowing the jamming mechanism to exist.

"By OCNGS process, the EMRV actuators are refurbished with new springs, posts, guides, and microswitches every 24 months during refueling outages due to the known wear of these parts. The actuator inspection/refurbishment frequency of 24 months exceeds the manufacturer's (i.e., Dresser Industries) recommended frequency of 36 months (per Vendor Manual VM-OC-0030, Installation and Maintenance Manual for Electromatic Relief Valves, Revision 1, Section VII, Ref. 4.5). In addition, in 2008, the station implemented the manufacturer's recommended material changes intended to minimize part wear, and prevent potential actuator failures.

"Identification of Facility and Component: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station / Electromatic Relief Valve Actuator, Dresser Valve Type 6 inches Model 1525-VX

"Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier: Dresser Industries.

"Nature of Defect: Inadequate design of the EMRV actuators in that when placed in an environment where the actuator is subject to the vibration associated with plant operation, the allowed installation tolerances between posts and guides can create a condition where the springs can jam the actuator plunger assembly by wedging between the guides and the posts.

"Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created): Identified condition is a Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause EMRV to be inoperable, which could result in a loss of safety function.

"Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/20/14

"Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation): 09/22/14

"Recommended Actions: Change the design to mitigate the cause of the actuator parts (i.e., springs, guides and posts) interacting which results in unexpected wear due to vibration induced fretting.

"Number and Locations of All Defective Components: Two EMRVs located in the Drywell on the Main Steam piping.

"Any Advice Related to the Defect: Consider actuator design change if vibration conditions at the valve location results in unexpected wear of the EMRV actuators. Perform actuator as-found stroke testing before removal for refurbishment to determine in situ operability of the component. With current design, ensure posts are aligned such that preferential wear does not occur. Spring should be optimally centered on the guide and the post and guide should be equidistant around the full circumference of the bushing.

"Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc.): Sylvain L. Schwartz, Senior Staff Engineer, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Phone: (609) 971-4558, Email: sylvain.schwartz@exeloncorp.com"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Plants with similar Dresser EMRVs: Nine Mile Point, Quad Cities, and Dresden.