Event Notification Report for September 18, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/17/2014 - 09/18/2014
EVENT NUMBERS
50467504685047050494
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50467
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/18/2014
Notification Time: 13:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2014
Event Time: 11:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2014
Notification Time: 13:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2014
Event Time: 11:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JOHNATHAN LILLIENDAH (R1DO)
JOHNATHAN LILLIENDAH (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 68 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO MISALIGNED CONTROL ROD
"During the performance of PT-Q89, Control Rod Exercise Test, Rod G-3 in Shutdown Bank 'B' misaligned (stepped in) to approximately 195-200 steps indicated with group demand at 217 steps. The movable gripper fuse was suspect, found not blown [so further] troubleshooting required. At 1150 [EDT], the decision was made to reduce power to approximately 70% within two hours per I.T.S. [Improved Technical Specification] 3.1.4.b.2.2. The plant is currently stable at 68% power. I.T.S. 3.1.5.b.1 was also entered for Shutdown Bank 'B' less than allowable insertion limits at time 1228 [EDT] to be in Mode 3 in 6 hrs. (1828 [EDT])."
The licensee notified the New York Independent System Operator, the New York Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During the performance of PT-Q89, Control Rod Exercise Test, Rod G-3 in Shutdown Bank 'B' misaligned (stepped in) to approximately 195-200 steps indicated with group demand at 217 steps. The movable gripper fuse was suspect, found not blown [so further] troubleshooting required. At 1150 [EDT], the decision was made to reduce power to approximately 70% within two hours per I.T.S. [Improved Technical Specification] 3.1.4.b.2.2. The plant is currently stable at 68% power. I.T.S. 3.1.5.b.1 was also entered for Shutdown Bank 'B' less than allowable insertion limits at time 1228 [EDT] to be in Mode 3 in 6 hrs. (1828 [EDT])."
The licensee notified the New York Independent System Operator, the New York Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50468
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY HAUTH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY HAUTH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/18/2014
Notification Time: 14:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2014
Event Time: 11:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2014
Notification Time: 14:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2014
Event Time: 11:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
TOM ANDREWS (R4DO)
TOM ANDREWS (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"During a review of INPO Event Report 14-33, Direct Current Circuits Challenge Appendix R Fire Analysis, it was determined that portions of the control circuits for the Turbine Generator DC Emergency Lube Oil Pump and the Emergency DC Seal Oil Pump are not properly fused to prevent overload and possible secondary fires. The review found that a fire at the motor starter cabinet in the turbine building could cause specific smart hot shorts that could cause overheating of the control cable and result in secondary fires outside the turbine building. Based on this information, it was determined that this condition is unanalyzed and is potentially reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Hourly fire watch compensatory measures are in place in the affected areas of the Turbine Building. The presence of compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection and suppression in these fire areas ensures protection of the equipment."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During a review of INPO Event Report 14-33, Direct Current Circuits Challenge Appendix R Fire Analysis, it was determined that portions of the control circuits for the Turbine Generator DC Emergency Lube Oil Pump and the Emergency DC Seal Oil Pump are not properly fused to prevent overload and possible secondary fires. The review found that a fire at the motor starter cabinet in the turbine building could cause specific smart hot shorts that could cause overheating of the control cable and result in secondary fires outside the turbine building. Based on this information, it was determined that this condition is unanalyzed and is potentially reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Hourly fire watch compensatory measures are in place in the affected areas of the Turbine Building. The presence of compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection and suppression in these fire areas ensures protection of the equipment."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50470
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CHUCK JACOBS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CHUCK JACOBS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/18/2014
Notification Time: 18:43 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2014
Event Time: 12:35 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2014
Notification Time: 18:43 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2014
Event Time: 12:35 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - FAILURE TO SUBMIT REQUIRED SEMI-ANNUAL AND ANNUAL SAMPLES AND REPORTS PER NPDES
"Today, at 1235 [PDT], San Onofre made the decision to notify offsite agencies (San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board and Environmental Protection Agency if directed by SDRWQCB). Initial contact made with the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board was at 1333 [PDT] on 9/18/14. The subject of the report is listed below:
"On September 15, 2014, during a review of the NPDES [National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] self-monitoring reports, SCE SONGS [Southern California Edison San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station] environmental staff discovered annual and semi-annual samples and required reports due in 2014 were not submitted on time and are now past due:
"- The missed samples and associated reports are non-radiological in nature
"- All parameters (physical and analytical data) in past Semi-annual and Annual reports have been in compliance with the NPDES permit."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Today, at 1235 [PDT], San Onofre made the decision to notify offsite agencies (San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board and Environmental Protection Agency if directed by SDRWQCB). Initial contact made with the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board was at 1333 [PDT] on 9/18/14. The subject of the report is listed below:
"On September 15, 2014, during a review of the NPDES [National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] self-monitoring reports, SCE SONGS [Southern California Edison San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station] environmental staff discovered annual and semi-annual samples and required reports due in 2014 were not submitted on time and are now past due:
"- The missed samples and associated reports are non-radiological in nature
"- All parameters (physical and analytical data) in past Semi-annual and Annual reports have been in compliance with the NPDES permit."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 50494
Rep Org: MALLINCKRODT
Licensee: MALLINCKRODT
Region: 3
City: MARYLAND HEIGHTS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-04206-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SUROVI
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Licensee: MALLINCKRODT
Region: 3
City: MARYLAND HEIGHTS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-04206-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SUROVI
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 09/25/2014
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2014
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
MEXICO (EMAI)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
MEXICO (EMAI)
LOST DEPLETED URANIUM SHIELDS
Mallinckrodt reported the loss of six (6) depleted Uranium shields used as shielding for Tc-99m generators. The licensee believes that the shields were lost in transit between 5/2013 and 9/2013. Five of the shields were in transit between Mallinckrodt and Triad Isotopes (locations in Texas and Hicksville, NY) shipped by "Associated Couriers." One of the shields was in transit between Mallinckrodt and Cardinal Health (Plainville, NY) shipped by "Medical Delivery Services." Each shield is roughly 12 inches in height, 8 inches in diameter, 65 pounds in weight, and contains 8.1 mCi of Uranium. The dose rate on contact would be roughly 3.1 mrem/hr, and the dose at 1 foot would be roughly 1.2 mrem/hr.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Mallinckrodt reported the loss of six (6) depleted Uranium shields used as shielding for Tc-99m generators. The licensee believes that the shields were lost in transit between 5/2013 and 9/2013. Five of the shields were in transit between Mallinckrodt and Triad Isotopes (locations in Texas and Hicksville, NY) shipped by "Associated Couriers." One of the shields was in transit between Mallinckrodt and Cardinal Health (Plainville, NY) shipped by "Medical Delivery Services." Each shield is roughly 12 inches in height, 8 inches in diameter, 65 pounds in weight, and contains 8.1 mCi of Uranium. The dose rate on contact would be roughly 3.1 mrem/hr, and the dose at 1 foot would be roughly 1.2 mrem/hr.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf