Event Notification Report for September 12, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/11/2014 - 09/12/2014
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 50453
Rep Org: NOVELIS
Licensee: NOVELIS
Region: 1
City: FAIRMONT State: WV
County:
License #: 47-13348-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL ROSSANA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: NOVELIS
Region: 1
City: FAIRMONT State: WV
County:
License #: 47-13348-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL ROSSANA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 09/12/2014
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2014
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2014
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2014
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOUCE (EMAI)
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOUCE (EMAI)
FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION
The licensee RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) reported that the shutter on a fixed gauge was stuck in the closed position. An authorized technician was able to repair the shutter and the gauge has been returned to service. There were no exposures involved with this event. The gauge is an ABB/IRMS, source model S18 containing a Y-90 300 mCi source. This report is being made per 10CFR30.50(b)(2)(i).
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL ROSSANA TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1250 EDT ON 9/13/14 * * *
The licensee RSO reported that around 0000 EDT on 9/13/14, an electrician performing routine checks found the gauge shutter stuck in the open position. The technician who performed maintenance on the previous day had caused the shutter to stick in the open position because of a mis-positioned screw. Repairs were completed and the gauge shutter is now functioning normally. This gauge is scheduled to be replaced during the upcoming Christmas shutdown. There were no exposures involved with this event.
Notified R1DO (Jackson) and FSME Events Resource via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL ROSSANA TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1224 EDT ON 9/15/14 * * *
The following report was received from the Novelis Corporation RSO via email;
"This email serves as [the licensee's] formal notification to follow up the two telephone notifications made by [the licensee's RSO] on September 12, 2014. Both occurrences were related to shutter failures on the same thickness gauge. These notifications were made to satisfy the NRC Regulation 10 CFR 30.50 reporting requirement.
"On Friday, September 12, 2014, at approximately 1300 [EDT], the shutter on the Novelis Fairmont #1 Mill thickness gauge failed in the closed position. An employee who has received non-routine maintenance training per NUREG-1556, Volume 4, Appendix G & N, took it upon himself to remove the side of the gauge and perform an investigation and repair the stuck shutter. It was determined that the pneumatic cylinder for the shutter was not functioning properly and replaced. A radiation survey was performed and the surrounding area was taped off with caution tape. There was no over exposure to radiation. The gauge was put back into service at approximately 1400 [EDT] that same afternoon.
"On the same night, Friday, September 12, 2014, at approximately 2330 [EDT], the shutter on the same thickness gauge failed again. This time the shutter failed in the open position. Once the shutter was determined to be in the open position, the foreman on shift notified [the RSO]. [The RSO] spoke with the shift electrician and had him perform a radiation survey and tape off the area with caution tape. The shift electrician has received non-routine maintenance training per NUREG-1556, Volume 4, Appendix G & N. [The RSO] was on site at approximately 0030 [EDT] Saturday morning, September 13, 2014. [The RSO] verified that the shutter was in the open position by performing a radiation survey. Additionally, the light identifying the shutter position was RED indicating the shutter was open. The same individual that replaced the pneumatic cylinder was on site and he investigated the failure. It was determined that the shutter appeared to be on a bind and the screws that hold the pneumatic cylinder in place were adjusted and the shutter was free to move as intended.
"With the side off of the gauge, next to the shutter assembly, at 6 inches, the measured mR/H was approximately 1 mR/h. Directly beside the shutter mechanism approximately 2 mR/h was measured. The employee worked for about 30 minutes to adjust the shutter mechanism. During this repair, there was no over exposure to radiation."
Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl) and FSME Events Resource via email.
The licensee RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) reported that the shutter on a fixed gauge was stuck in the closed position. An authorized technician was able to repair the shutter and the gauge has been returned to service. There were no exposures involved with this event. The gauge is an ABB/IRMS, source model S18 containing a Y-90 300 mCi source. This report is being made per 10CFR30.50(b)(2)(i).
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL ROSSANA TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1250 EDT ON 9/13/14 * * *
The licensee RSO reported that around 0000 EDT on 9/13/14, an electrician performing routine checks found the gauge shutter stuck in the open position. The technician who performed maintenance on the previous day had caused the shutter to stick in the open position because of a mis-positioned screw. Repairs were completed and the gauge shutter is now functioning normally. This gauge is scheduled to be replaced during the upcoming Christmas shutdown. There were no exposures involved with this event.
Notified R1DO (Jackson) and FSME Events Resource via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL ROSSANA TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1224 EDT ON 9/15/14 * * *
The following report was received from the Novelis Corporation RSO via email;
"This email serves as [the licensee's] formal notification to follow up the two telephone notifications made by [the licensee's RSO] on September 12, 2014. Both occurrences were related to shutter failures on the same thickness gauge. These notifications were made to satisfy the NRC Regulation 10 CFR 30.50 reporting requirement.
"On Friday, September 12, 2014, at approximately 1300 [EDT], the shutter on the Novelis Fairmont #1 Mill thickness gauge failed in the closed position. An employee who has received non-routine maintenance training per NUREG-1556, Volume 4, Appendix G & N, took it upon himself to remove the side of the gauge and perform an investigation and repair the stuck shutter. It was determined that the pneumatic cylinder for the shutter was not functioning properly and replaced. A radiation survey was performed and the surrounding area was taped off with caution tape. There was no over exposure to radiation. The gauge was put back into service at approximately 1400 [EDT] that same afternoon.
"On the same night, Friday, September 12, 2014, at approximately 2330 [EDT], the shutter on the same thickness gauge failed again. This time the shutter failed in the open position. Once the shutter was determined to be in the open position, the foreman on shift notified [the RSO]. [The RSO] spoke with the shift electrician and had him perform a radiation survey and tape off the area with caution tape. The shift electrician has received non-routine maintenance training per NUREG-1556, Volume 4, Appendix G & N. [The RSO] was on site at approximately 0030 [EDT] Saturday morning, September 13, 2014. [The RSO] verified that the shutter was in the open position by performing a radiation survey. Additionally, the light identifying the shutter position was RED indicating the shutter was open. The same individual that replaced the pneumatic cylinder was on site and he investigated the failure. It was determined that the shutter appeared to be on a bind and the screws that hold the pneumatic cylinder in place were adjusted and the shutter was free to move as intended.
"With the side off of the gauge, next to the shutter assembly, at 6 inches, the measured mR/H was approximately 1 mR/h. Directly beside the shutter mechanism approximately 2 mR/h was measured. The employee worked for about 30 minutes to adjust the shutter mechanism. During this repair, there was no over exposure to radiation."
Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl) and FSME Events Resource via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50454
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: MARK REID
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: MARK REID
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 09/12/2014
Notification Time: 20:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2014
Event Time: 15:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2014
Notification Time: 20:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2014
Event Time: 15:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
STORED FUEL MAY NOT MEET FUEL SPECIFICATIONS OR LOADING CONDITIONS FOR HI-STORM 100 CASK SYSTEM
"Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) identified the potential for stored fuel that does not meet the fuel specifications or loading conditions of the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System. Investigation into the cause of a Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) actuation on the morning of 9/12/2014 led to sampling of helium circulating through the Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC-24-060) as part of the Forced Helium Dehydration process in the final stages of cask loading. Sample results indicated the presence of Kr-85. Kr-85 is a fission product that indicates the potential for the fuel that does meet the selection criteria for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System.
"All fuel assemblies loaded into MPC-24-060 were checked to confirm their intact status (a cask Certificate of Conformance requirement) as part of the selection process. Each assembly's status as intact is based on in-mast sipping and/or ultrasonic testing performed subsequent to their final operating cycle. Results of these sipping and ultrasonic test campaigns are maintained in a comprehensive engineering report used to verify assembly status during cask fuel selection.
"Per the CoC for the Hi-STORM 100 Cask System, Appendix B, Section 1.0, the definition of 'INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLY' is a fuel assembly without known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks, and which can be handled by normal means. Given the presence of Kr-85 along with the fuels history, it cannot be confirmed that all fuel assemblies meet the definition of 'Intact' and would not meet the CoC
Requirements for Fuel to be stored in the HI-STORM 100 SFSC System (Section 2.1.1)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) identified the potential for stored fuel that does not meet the fuel specifications or loading conditions of the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System. Investigation into the cause of a Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) actuation on the morning of 9/12/2014 led to sampling of helium circulating through the Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC-24-060) as part of the Forced Helium Dehydration process in the final stages of cask loading. Sample results indicated the presence of Kr-85. Kr-85 is a fission product that indicates the potential for the fuel that does meet the selection criteria for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System.
"All fuel assemblies loaded into MPC-24-060 were checked to confirm their intact status (a cask Certificate of Conformance requirement) as part of the selection process. Each assembly's status as intact is based on in-mast sipping and/or ultrasonic testing performed subsequent to their final operating cycle. Results of these sipping and ultrasonic test campaigns are maintained in a comprehensive engineering report used to verify assembly status during cask fuel selection.
"Per the CoC for the Hi-STORM 100 Cask System, Appendix B, Section 1.0, the definition of 'INTACT FUEL ASSEMBLY' is a fuel assembly without known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks, and which can be handled by normal means. Given the presence of Kr-85 along with the fuels history, it cannot be confirmed that all fuel assemblies meet the definition of 'Intact' and would not meet the CoC
Requirements for Fuel to be stored in the HI-STORM 100 SFSC System (Section 2.1.1)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50562
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN RASMUSSEN
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN RASMUSSEN
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 10/23/2014
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2014
Event Time: 13:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2014
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2014
Event Time: 13:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of the Unit 1, Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator on September 12, 2014, at 1342 CDT. Per NUREG-1022, R.3, page 33, the following information should be provided for an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1): (a) the specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated, (b) whether each train actuation was complete or partial, (c) whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that actuated were: Unit 1, Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: The actuation of the Unit 1, Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator was a complete actuation.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: The Unit 1, Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator started and functioned successfully.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of the Unit 1, Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator on September 12, 2014, at 1342 CDT. Per NUREG-1022, R.3, page 33, the following information should be provided for an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1): (a) the specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated, (b) whether each train actuation was complete or partial, (c) whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that actuated were: Unit 1, Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: The actuation of the Unit 1, Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator was a complete actuation.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: The Unit 1, Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator started and functioned successfully.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."