Event Notification Report for September 04, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/03/2014 - 09/04/2014
EVENT NUMBERS
504245042550427504285042950433
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50424
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE INGALLS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE INGALLS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 09/04/2014
Notification Time: 09:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 08:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2014
Notification Time: 09:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 08:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
1R-50 SHIELD BUILDING HIGH RANGE VENT GAS RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"At 0843 CDT on September 4th, 2014, 1R-50 High Range Shield Building Vent Gas Monitor was removed from service for planned maintenance. This monitor provides indication of release of gaseous radioactivity to the environment. There is not a compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels when out of service: General Emergency Event RG1.1 and Site Area Emergency Event RS1.1. This results in a loss of emergency assessment Capability while 1R-50 is out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Unit 1 Shield Building ventilation stack is also monitored by radiation monitor 1R-22 that is used for the same purpose in Alert or Unusual Event Emergency classifications. 1R-22 is being monitored and is indicating normal values. There are no radioactive leaks that will impact the Shield Building as evidenced by normal readings on 1R-50 prior to its removal from service. The maintenance is scheduled for ten hours or will continue until the monitor is returned to service. Maintenance will not result in the unplanned release of radioactivity to the environment and will not affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"At 0843 CDT on September 4th, 2014, 1R-50 High Range Shield Building Vent Gas Monitor was removed from service for planned maintenance. This monitor provides indication of release of gaseous radioactivity to the environment. There is not a compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels when out of service: General Emergency Event RG1.1 and Site Area Emergency Event RS1.1. This results in a loss of emergency assessment Capability while 1R-50 is out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Unit 1 Shield Building ventilation stack is also monitored by radiation monitor 1R-22 that is used for the same purpose in Alert or Unusual Event Emergency classifications. 1R-22 is being monitored and is indicating normal values. There are no radioactive leaks that will impact the Shield Building as evidenced by normal readings on 1R-50 prior to its removal from service. The maintenance is scheduled for ten hours or will continue until the monitor is returned to service. Maintenance will not result in the unplanned release of radioactivity to the environment and will not affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 50425
Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: TONY ENGLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: TONY ENGLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 09/04/2014
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2014
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
FUELS OUO GROUP (EMAI)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
FUELS OUO GROUP (EMAI)
UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO POTENTIAL MATERIAL TRANSFER CART TIPPING
"I. EVENT DESCRIPTION: On September 4, 2014 at approximately 1100 [EDT], a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer identified a safety concern. While working to consolidate information in the safety basis for the safe geometry storage and transport carts, it was determined that an unanalyzed condition existed that did not meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. Tipping or impact of a cart during transport had not been considered as a credible upset condition.
"II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: At B&W's NOG-L [Nuclear Operations Group] facilities, safe geometry storage and transport carts are used to transfer uranium bearing materials between radiologically controlled areas. The carts are typically used to transfer scrap and waste materials in favorable volumes less than or equal to 2.5 liter containers to the Drum Count Area for 235U assay. Because the 235U content of such containers is not known until they have been assayed, they are referred to as 'unknowns' and are subject to a net weight limit. These containers are limited to a maximum of 7,000 grams net weight (approximately 15 pounds) of uranium bearing material in any form.
"There are forty storage locations on a cart, twenty per side. The locations on each side are arranged in an array of 4 columns, each column contains 5 storage locations. During transport each column of storage locations is protected by closure of a door. The four column doors on each side of the cart are secured by a common locked bar.
"The NCS evaluation of the safe geometry storage and transport carts did not address possible tipping during transit. Although unlikely, it is believed at this point the event is credible. If a cart were to tip, no controls were identified to retain the containers on the cart. Although the doors on the cart are secured by a robust locking bar, this action is taken for security purposes and is not credited as an IROFS [Item Relied On For Safety]. Assuming the containers on the cart were fully loaded (7 kg net weight) with a U-metal water mixture at optimum H/X and the cart tipped over, and more than three containers fell out of the cart, a configuration could result that would exceed the keff safety limit of 0.95 in NRC License SNM-42 for a single contingency.
"The requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 (d) states in part: '... the risk of nuclear criticality accidents must be limited by assuring that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for safety.'
"Therefore the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 (d) would not be maintained during this credible abnormal condition.
"The as-found condition had no actual safety significance. There was no immediate risk or threat to the safety of the workers, the public, or the environment as a result of this condition. The safe geometry storage and transport carts did not contain any uranium bearing materials. There was no actual tipping event. The carts were immediately removed from service.
"Ill. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: B&W is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1)--Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61.
"IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The carts have been removed from service. An investigation of the root causes of this condition is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the facility NMSS Project Manager (Baker).
* * * RETRACTION FROM KENNY KIRBY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1634 EDT ON 9/18/14 * * *
"The initially identified abnormal condition was not analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis. A conservative approach was taken in evaluating the condition in order to ensure compliance with the specified time period established in the regulations for reporting. Further analysis has determined the condition is not credible. Although unlikely, should more than three containers fall from the cart, it is not credible that a configuration could occur that would exceed the keff limit of 0.95 in NRC License SNM-42 for a single contingency. The performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 would be maintained. Following the guidance of FCSS ISG-12, Rev 0, '10 CFR Part 70, Appendix A- Reportable Safety Events', B&W is correcting Event Notification #50425 in accordance with 10 CFR 70.74(a)(4) and withdrawing the 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1) notification."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Sykes), NMSS EO (Gonzalez) and Fuels OUO Group via email.
"I. EVENT DESCRIPTION: On September 4, 2014 at approximately 1100 [EDT], a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer identified a safety concern. While working to consolidate information in the safety basis for the safe geometry storage and transport carts, it was determined that an unanalyzed condition existed that did not meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. Tipping or impact of a cart during transport had not been considered as a credible upset condition.
"II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: At B&W's NOG-L [Nuclear Operations Group] facilities, safe geometry storage and transport carts are used to transfer uranium bearing materials between radiologically controlled areas. The carts are typically used to transfer scrap and waste materials in favorable volumes less than or equal to 2.5 liter containers to the Drum Count Area for 235U assay. Because the 235U content of such containers is not known until they have been assayed, they are referred to as 'unknowns' and are subject to a net weight limit. These containers are limited to a maximum of 7,000 grams net weight (approximately 15 pounds) of uranium bearing material in any form.
"There are forty storage locations on a cart, twenty per side. The locations on each side are arranged in an array of 4 columns, each column contains 5 storage locations. During transport each column of storage locations is protected by closure of a door. The four column doors on each side of the cart are secured by a common locked bar.
"The NCS evaluation of the safe geometry storage and transport carts did not address possible tipping during transit. Although unlikely, it is believed at this point the event is credible. If a cart were to tip, no controls were identified to retain the containers on the cart. Although the doors on the cart are secured by a robust locking bar, this action is taken for security purposes and is not credited as an IROFS [Item Relied On For Safety]. Assuming the containers on the cart were fully loaded (7 kg net weight) with a U-metal water mixture at optimum H/X and the cart tipped over, and more than three containers fell out of the cart, a configuration could result that would exceed the keff safety limit of 0.95 in NRC License SNM-42 for a single contingency.
"The requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 (d) states in part: '... the risk of nuclear criticality accidents must be limited by assuring that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for safety.'
"Therefore the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 (d) would not be maintained during this credible abnormal condition.
"The as-found condition had no actual safety significance. There was no immediate risk or threat to the safety of the workers, the public, or the environment as a result of this condition. The safe geometry storage and transport carts did not contain any uranium bearing materials. There was no actual tipping event. The carts were immediately removed from service.
"Ill. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: B&W is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1)--Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61.
"IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The carts have been removed from service. An investigation of the root causes of this condition is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the facility NMSS Project Manager (Baker).
* * * RETRACTION FROM KENNY KIRBY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1634 EDT ON 9/18/14 * * *
"The initially identified abnormal condition was not analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis. A conservative approach was taken in evaluating the condition in order to ensure compliance with the specified time period established in the regulations for reporting. Further analysis has determined the condition is not credible. Although unlikely, should more than three containers fall from the cart, it is not credible that a configuration could occur that would exceed the keff limit of 0.95 in NRC License SNM-42 for a single contingency. The performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 would be maintained. Following the guidance of FCSS ISG-12, Rev 0, '10 CFR Part 70, Appendix A- Reportable Safety Events', B&W is correcting Event Notification #50425 in accordance with 10 CFR 70.74(a)(4) and withdrawing the 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1) notification."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Sykes), NMSS EO (Gonzalez) and Fuels OUO Group via email.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50427
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK BRIDGES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK BRIDGES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/05/2014
Notification Time: 00:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 19:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2014
Notification Time: 00:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 19:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION (CREV) SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"On September 04, 2014, at 1905 hours [CDT], the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to the Air Handling Unit (AHU) tripping upon restoration of Control Room Ventilation following testing of Reactor Building Ventilation instrumentation. Troubleshooting is in progress at this time.
"Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven (7) days. Additionally, Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition A, was entered which requires CREV AC to be restored to an operable status in 30 days.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), '[any] event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function,' because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY MARK BRIDGES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1721 EDT ON 10/23/2014 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on September 4, 2014 (ENS 50427). Upon further investigation it was verified that the function of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System was not affected as discussed in Chapters 6 and 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function was not met (NUREG 1022 Revision 3 - Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable State authorities.
Notified R3DO (Pelke)
"On September 04, 2014, at 1905 hours [CDT], the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to the Air Handling Unit (AHU) tripping upon restoration of Control Room Ventilation following testing of Reactor Building Ventilation instrumentation. Troubleshooting is in progress at this time.
"Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven (7) days. Additionally, Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition A, was entered which requires CREV AC to be restored to an operable status in 30 days.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), '[any] event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function,' because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY MARK BRIDGES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1721 EDT ON 10/23/2014 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on September 4, 2014 (ENS 50427). Upon further investigation it was verified that the function of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System was not affected as discussed in Chapters 6 and 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function was not met (NUREG 1022 Revision 3 - Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable State authorities.
Notified R3DO (Pelke)
Part 21
Event Number: 50428
Rep Org: SCHULZ ELECTRIC
Licensee: SCHULZ ELECTRIC
Region: 1
City: NEW HAVEN State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL ELDREDGE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: SCHULZ ELECTRIC
Region: 1
City: NEW HAVEN State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL ELDREDGE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/05/2014
Notification Time: 11:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2014
Notification Time: 11:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS GRO (EMAI)
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS GRO (EMAI)
POTENTIAL PART 21 ISSUE ON MOTOR DEDICATIONS PERFORMED PRIOR TO JUNE 2002
The following information was obtained via fax:
"Pursuant to the 10 CFR Part 21 requirements, this letter is to notify the NRC of a potential Part 21 condition.
"While performing research on questions regarding acceleration presented by First Energy/Davis Besse, Schulz Electric identified that the acceleration calculation used to determine acceleration times for new motors which it dedicated before June 7, 2002 (at which time Schulz developed a shop instruction for calculating acceleration using the proper calculation) was incorrect. The use of this incorrect calculation could potentially cause misleading acceleration times, and therefore motors which may not perform as required by First Energy/Davis Besse and/or other customers.
"Schulz Electric will perform an evaluation to identify:
1. All projects that had acceleration calculations performed as part of a motor dedication prior to June 7, 2002.
2. The methodology used to perform the calculations.
3. Whether the actual acceleration times meet the acceleration/performance requirements of the applicable customers.
"Schulz Electric has the capability and chooses to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists. It is the responsibility of Schulz Electric to inform the purchaser(s), and any affected licensees.
"Schulz Electric will complete the specified evaluation of the circumstances within sixty (60) days of discovery of the potential defect. The NRC will be provided a copy of Schulz Electric's evaluation report.
"If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me [Charles 'Bill' Eldredge] by phone 203.562.5811, by fax 203.562.1082, or email me at Eldredge@schulzelectric.com."
* * * UPDATE FROM CHARLES ELDREDGE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0922 ON 9/30/2014 * * *
The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:
FINAL EVALUATION RE: EVENT # 50428
Customer: First Energy / Davis Besse.
Parts: 3 AC Motors - 1) 400 HP, 1) 450 HP, 1) 600 HP. All located at First Energy / Davis Besse.
Description of Defect/Nonconformance: Schulz Electric identified that the methodology for determining acceleration for the subject motors was incorrect. When the acceleration times were calculated using the correct methodology, it was determined that the three motors will not meet the acceleration requirements for 70% voltage as required by the purchase order.
Corrective Action: The customer has been informed of the nonconformance and Schulz has worked with the customer to generate performance curves at various voltage levels and pump head requirements.
Other Plants Affected: None.
Notified R1DO (Krohn), R2DO (Widmann), R3DO (McCraw), R4DO (Whitten) and Part 21 Reactors Group.
The following information was obtained via fax:
"Pursuant to the 10 CFR Part 21 requirements, this letter is to notify the NRC of a potential Part 21 condition.
"While performing research on questions regarding acceleration presented by First Energy/Davis Besse, Schulz Electric identified that the acceleration calculation used to determine acceleration times for new motors which it dedicated before June 7, 2002 (at which time Schulz developed a shop instruction for calculating acceleration using the proper calculation) was incorrect. The use of this incorrect calculation could potentially cause misleading acceleration times, and therefore motors which may not perform as required by First Energy/Davis Besse and/or other customers.
"Schulz Electric will perform an evaluation to identify:
1. All projects that had acceleration calculations performed as part of a motor dedication prior to June 7, 2002.
2. The methodology used to perform the calculations.
3. Whether the actual acceleration times meet the acceleration/performance requirements of the applicable customers.
"Schulz Electric has the capability and chooses to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists. It is the responsibility of Schulz Electric to inform the purchaser(s), and any affected licensees.
"Schulz Electric will complete the specified evaluation of the circumstances within sixty (60) days of discovery of the potential defect. The NRC will be provided a copy of Schulz Electric's evaluation report.
"If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me [Charles 'Bill' Eldredge] by phone 203.562.5811, by fax 203.562.1082, or email me at Eldredge@schulzelectric.com."
* * * UPDATE FROM CHARLES ELDREDGE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0922 ON 9/30/2014 * * *
The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:
FINAL EVALUATION RE: EVENT # 50428
Customer: First Energy / Davis Besse.
Parts: 3 AC Motors - 1) 400 HP, 1) 450 HP, 1) 600 HP. All located at First Energy / Davis Besse.
Description of Defect/Nonconformance: Schulz Electric identified that the methodology for determining acceleration for the subject motors was incorrect. When the acceleration times were calculated using the correct methodology, it was determined that the three motors will not meet the acceleration requirements for 70% voltage as required by the purchase order.
Corrective Action: The customer has been informed of the nonconformance and Schulz has worked with the customer to generate performance curves at various voltage levels and pump head requirements.
Other Plants Affected: None.
Notified R1DO (Krohn), R2DO (Widmann), R3DO (McCraw), R4DO (Whitten) and Part 21 Reactors Group.
Agreement State
Event Number: 50429
Rep Org: WA OFFICE OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: GEORESOURCES, LLC.
Region: 4
City: AUBURN State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0549-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MATTHEWS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Licensee: GEORESOURCES, LLC.
Region: 4
City: AUBURN State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0549-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MATTHEWS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 09/05/2014
Notification Time: 16:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2014
Notification Time: 16:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following was received from the State of Washington via email:
"On Thursday, September 4, 2014, [Washington State] Emergency Response Duty Officer received a call from the Radiation Safety Officer of GeoResources, LLC. She informed [Washington State] that a portable gauge was run over by heavy equipment in a construction area. The gauge operator was within a few feet of the gauge and tried to stop the driver of the front end loader but could not and had to jump out of the way for his own safety. Because of the circumstances, there will be no citations of the radiation safety program. [A Washington State inspector] drove to the location and assisted the RSO and gauge operator. The mangled gauge was put into a 55 gallon drum surrounded by soil. The highest external surface of the drum was 80 mR/hr. For health and safety purposes and the short distance to transport the drum from the construction site to the licensee's facility, a decision was made to transport the drum without DOT Yellow III package labeling and vehicle placarding, while escorted by the state inspector. The drum was put into a secured room while waiting for the consultant to come the next day (today). A consultant from Northwest Technical Services is communicating with Instrotek and R.L. Carriers for transport and disposal."
WA Incident # WA-14-037
The gauge contained 0.050Ci AM-241 and 0.010Ci Cs-137
The following was received from the State of Washington via email:
"On Thursday, September 4, 2014, [Washington State] Emergency Response Duty Officer received a call from the Radiation Safety Officer of GeoResources, LLC. She informed [Washington State] that a portable gauge was run over by heavy equipment in a construction area. The gauge operator was within a few feet of the gauge and tried to stop the driver of the front end loader but could not and had to jump out of the way for his own safety. Because of the circumstances, there will be no citations of the radiation safety program. [A Washington State inspector] drove to the location and assisted the RSO and gauge operator. The mangled gauge was put into a 55 gallon drum surrounded by soil. The highest external surface of the drum was 80 mR/hr. For health and safety purposes and the short distance to transport the drum from the construction site to the licensee's facility, a decision was made to transport the drum without DOT Yellow III package labeling and vehicle placarding, while escorted by the state inspector. The drum was put into a secured room while waiting for the consultant to come the next day (today). A consultant from Northwest Technical Services is communicating with Instrotek and R.L. Carriers for transport and disposal."
WA Incident # WA-14-037
The gauge contained 0.050Ci AM-241 and 0.010Ci Cs-137
Agreement State
Event Number: 50433
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTESVILLE State: VA
County: ALBERMARLE
License #: 540-248-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTESVILLE State: VA
County: ALBERMARLE
License #: 540-248-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/08/2014
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2014
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT DUE TO MISADMINISTRATION OF Y-90 THERASPHERES
The following information was received via email:
"A Y-90 TheraSphere liver therapy procedure resulted in delivered doses to the liver and lungs that differed from the prescribed dose. The revised Lung Shunt Fraction (LSF) value was used to recalculate the actual radiation dose to lungs and LT liver lobe. The results are that the lungs received 34.5 Gy (instead of 3.7 Gy) and the LT liver lobe received 67 Gy (instead of 117 Gy). Also, it is calculated that the LT liver lobe was implanted with a Y-90 activity dose of 0.82 GBq (22.2 mCi) while the lungs received a Y-90 activity dose of 0.69 GBq (18.64 mCi) since the patient was implanted with 1.50 GBq (40.53 mCi) of Y-90. The patient's family was notified. UVA staff are meeting to analyze the root cause of the event. RMP [Virginia Radioactive Materials Program] staff will review UVA's findings and determine what further actions are necessary."
Virginia Event Report ID No.: VA-2014-16
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The following information was received via email:
"A Y-90 TheraSphere liver therapy procedure resulted in delivered doses to the liver and lungs that differed from the prescribed dose. The revised Lung Shunt Fraction (LSF) value was used to recalculate the actual radiation dose to lungs and LT liver lobe. The results are that the lungs received 34.5 Gy (instead of 3.7 Gy) and the LT liver lobe received 67 Gy (instead of 117 Gy). Also, it is calculated that the LT liver lobe was implanted with a Y-90 activity dose of 0.82 GBq (22.2 mCi) while the lungs received a Y-90 activity dose of 0.69 GBq (18.64 mCi) since the patient was implanted with 1.50 GBq (40.53 mCi) of Y-90. The patient's family was notified. UVA staff are meeting to analyze the root cause of the event. RMP [Virginia Radioactive Materials Program] staff will review UVA's findings and determine what further actions are necessary."
Virginia Event Report ID No.: VA-2014-16
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.