Event Notification Report for August 27, 2014

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL RELEASE EXCEEDING EMISSION LIMIT

The following report was received from the State of Washington via email:

"Event Narrative: Notification [was given] to [Washington] State by the licensee for exceeding the allowable total abated emission limit for this unit [Cardinal Health 414, LLC]. The limit is 7.4 mRem to the MEI [Maximally Exposed Individual] while the licensee acknowledges a release so far in 2014 of a total of 23.7 mRem (21.5 from Fluorine 18 and 2.2 from Carbon 11). The licensee believes the problem is a combination of errors including both human and engineering. Proposed corrective actions include changes in procedures as well as changes in the air discharge system components."

NMED Report Number: WA-14-039.

26 OF 40 EP SIRENS COULD NOT BE VERIFIED FUNCTIONAL

"At 0645 CDT on August 27, 2014, Exelon was notified that during the daily test at 0530 CDT of the offsite sirens, the vendor received an alarm on Clinton Power Station siren communications. This Emergency Preparedness (EP) siren communications issue results in 26 of the 40 EP sirens not being verified as functional, which affects 84.4% of the EPZ population. The loss of communications represents more than 25% of the EPZ population for greater than 1 hour and is therefore reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The cause of issue has been isolated to a microwave link at Clinton Power Station that communicates via radio frequency to each siren. The siren vendor is currently investigating to repair the issue.

"The DeWitt County Emergency Manager has been notified. DeWitt County has implemented the Emergency Message System through 'Code Red' notification in lieu of siren communications.

"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM RICH CHAMPLEY TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1755 EDT ON 8/27/14 * * *

"The DeWitt County Emergency Manager has been notified. DeWitt County has implemented the backup means of notification called 'Route Alerting' in lieu of siren communications. Route Alerting consists of vehicles and public address systems.

"At 1400 CDT only 2 sirens remain not fully functional. These 2 sirens represent 0.7% of EPZ population. Work continues to restore these 2 sirens.

"The NRC Senior Resident has been informed."

Notified R3DO (Stone).

SAFETY INJECTION PUMP FAILED TO START

"At 0243 [EDT on 8/27/14] the '11' Safety Injection pump breaker was tagged for scheduled maintenance on the 11SJ34, and the control room entered TSAS 3.5.2.b, action 'A' - a 72 hr LCO. The control room recognized the time line for the repair would require filling the '14' SI Accumulator prior to work completion. The CRS [Control Room Supervisor] decided to perform the '14' SI Accumulator makeup prior to commencing work on the 11SJ34, and directed the NCOs [Nuclear Control Operators] to start the '12' SI pump and make up to the '14' SI Accumulator in accordance with procedure SI.OP-SO.SJ-0002. At 0248, TSAS 3.0.3 was entered when the '12' Safety Injection pump failed to start on demand. At 0301, the '11' Safety Injection pump was restored to service and declared operable and TSAS 3.0.3 was exited. TSAS 3.5.2.b, action 'A' remains in effect due to the '12' Safety Injection pump being inoperable.

"This event is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to perform mitigation of the consequences of an accident.'''

"Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No one was injured as a result of the failure of the '12' Safety Injection pump breaker."

The licensee will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"Loss of assessment capability due to preplanned maintenance affecting radiation monitors. Normal ventilation and 'HI' range process radiation monitors (3HVR & RE10A/10B) will be out of service. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The equipment is expected to be restored within 9 hours."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the state and local governments.

LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS DUE TO POWER SUPPLY FAILURE

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of communications capability. On August 27, 2014 at 0805 hours CDT the internal phone system, Emergency Notification System (ENS), and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) became nonfunctional because of a power supply failure.

"The ERDS has been restored to service and work is currently in progress to restore the internal phone system and ENS. It has not been determined at the time of this notification as to when the internal phones system and ENS will be restored to a fully functional status."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED AT CONSTRUCTION SITE

"Our [Froehling & Robertson] technician was using the gauge to test compaction of soils placed for wall backfill. [The technician] placed the nuclear gauge on the sloped hill next to the backfill area and stepped away from the gauge to check on the concrete pour that was happening at the top of the hill. As she was walking away, the backfill crew started using the two drum walk-behind roller. The roller was in vibratory mode and, as it approached the area near the nuclear gauge, the gauge slid down the slope into the path of the roller. The gauge was hit with the roller on the end opposite the rod, damaging the casing and the instrument panel. [The technician] and the roller operator moved the gauge to assess the damage and, when they realized it was damaged, [the technician] cordoned off the area.

"Exposure Readings and Visual Damage Assessment:

"[The RSO] arrived on-site with the survey meter (CD V-700 calibrated 5/9/2014) and checked the area for radiation exposure. No significant readings were recorded (less than 0.1 mrem/hr 5 feet from the gauge). The source rod was fully retracted into the casing and did not appear to be damaged other than the handle was twisted. The gauge appeared to be intact in the vicinity of the Americium source. The gauge was packed and secured in its storage case and transported to Northeast Technical Services for a leak test and damage evaluation.

"Assessment of Cause:

"[The RSO] interviewed the client and [technician] to try to assess a cause for the incident. The client had asked [the technician] to go check on the concrete pour before performing another density test and, instead of properly securing the gauge in the truck or keeping it within arm's reach, [the technician] left the gauge unattended while she walked up the slope. In talking with [the technician], she was aware of the proper procedures for securing the gauge and maintaining control of the gauge but failed to do so in this case.

"Corrective Measures:

"As this is a first offense for [the technician], she will be issued a written warning stating that if involved in another incident like this, she will be terminated. Additionally, she will be asked to take another refresher course on using and transporting nuclear density gauges. [The RSO] will also be holding a safety meeting with all technicians to review this incident and review the F&R Nuclear Gauge Safety material regarding maintaining control of gauges."

Sources: 0.37 GBq Cs-137 and 1.48 GBq Am-241:Be
Make/Model: Troxler 3400
Serial #: 23898

INVALID ACTUATION OF GENERAL CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNALS

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.

"On August 27, 2014, at 1109 hours Central Daylight Savings Time (CDT), while in a forced unit outage with the reactor noncritical (Mode 3) and with all control rods fully inserted, instrument mechanics were attempting to backfill reactor water level transmitter (LT) 3-53 sensing lines following performance of LT replacement. During this effort, water levels in both the variable and reference legs of the LT were disturbed resulting in a Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 full scram and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals due to receipt of an invalid low reactor water level signal. The PCIS Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of Trains B and C of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) Subsystem 'A'. The Reactor and Refuel Zone ventilation fans tripped and the secondary containment dampers isolated. Train A of the SBGT System was tagged out of service during the event.

"Operations personnel responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured all equipment operated as designed, and placed affected systems back in service.

"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.

"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report 928777.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."