Event Notification Report for August 13, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/12/2014 - 08/13/2014
EVENT NUMBERS
5036350360503615036550366
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50363
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ALAN TUBMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ALAN TUBMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/14/2014
Notification Time: 01:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: 23:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2014
Notification Time: 01:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: 23:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MOMENTARY LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time.
"At 2318 [EDT] on 8/13/2014, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were open simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored.
"Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.'
"The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified."
"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time.
"At 2318 [EDT] on 8/13/2014, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were open simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored.
"Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.'
"The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50360
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED SEACOR
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED SEACOR
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/13/2014
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2014
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM BOUNDARY DOOR FAILED TO LATCH
"A Control Room Boundary Door failed to latch and maintain the Control Room boundary. This condition was reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The door was repaired and the Control Room boundary was restored on 8/13/14 at 0552 [EDT]."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State of Connecticut, and local agencies.
"A Control Room Boundary Door failed to latch and maintain the Control Room boundary. This condition was reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The door was repaired and the Control Room boundary was restored on 8/13/14 at 0552 [EDT]."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State of Connecticut, and local agencies.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50361
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK GUALDONI
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK GUALDONI
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 08/13/2014
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: 11:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2014
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: 11:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP
"On August 13, 2014 at 1157 EDT, the Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Protection System automatically actuated at 100% power due to Over Temperature Delta Temperature logic. At the time of the trip, pressurizer pressure Channel 1 was in test for maintenance, though testing was suspended at this time for lunch. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. All plant equipment responded normally to the unit trip. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The plant is stable in Mode 3 at this time.
"The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated following the automatic trip as expected. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start as offsite power remained available and stable. The unit remains on offsite power and all electrical loads are stable. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted. The plant is in Hot Standby at normal operating temperature and pressure with decay heat removal using auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators, and normal heat removal through the condenser via condenser steam dumps. There was no radiation released. Indian Point Unit 2 was not affected by this event and remains at 100% power.
"A post trip investigation is in progress.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On August 13, 2014 at 1157 EDT, the Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Protection System automatically actuated at 100% power due to Over Temperature Delta Temperature logic. At the time of the trip, pressurizer pressure Channel 1 was in test for maintenance, though testing was suspended at this time for lunch. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. All plant equipment responded normally to the unit trip. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The plant is stable in Mode 3 at this time.
"The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated following the automatic trip as expected. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start as offsite power remained available and stable. The unit remains on offsite power and all electrical loads are stable. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted. The plant is in Hot Standby at normal operating temperature and pressure with decay heat removal using auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators, and normal heat removal through the condenser via condenser steam dumps. There was no radiation released. Indian Point Unit 2 was not affected by this event and remains at 100% power.
"A post trip investigation is in progress.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 50365
Rep Org: UNION ELECTRIC DBA AMEREN MISSOURI
Licensee: UNION ELECTRIC DBA AMEREN MISSOURI
Region: 3
City: ST. LOUIS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-02020-08
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HOLDERNESS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: UNION ELECTRIC DBA AMEREN MISSOURI
Region: 3
City: ST. LOUIS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-02020-08
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HOLDERNESS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/14/2014
Notification Time: 09:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: 10:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2014
Notification Time: 09:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: 10:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(4) - FIRE/EXPLOSION
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(4) - FIRE/EXPLOSION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
PROCESS DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED BY FIRE AND/OR HEAT
"On the morning of August 13, 2014 while cleaning up from a fire event on coal handling conveyer belt #2 at the Ameren Missouri (Ameren) Rush Island Energy Center it was observed that the nucleonic gauge located outside of the area of the original fire had some indications of potential damage. The gauge is located approximately 12 feet above the walkway near the ceiling of the room in an area that was not easily accessible. The gauge is a Ronan Engineering Model SA1-C10 containing 100 mCi of CS-137 in sealed solid form. Ameren contacted R. M. Wester (NRC Licensed maintenance vendor) to evaluate the nucleonic gauge on August 13, 2014 to determine if the gauge had been damaged due to the fire.
"R. M. Wester examination of the source housing showed the exterior to be in good condition with some minor scorching. The shutter check performed showed smooth operation and good beam strength with the shutter open (greater than 200 mR/hr) and good shielding with the shutter closed (1.5 mR/hr). Wipes of the source and the area below the source indicated no contamination or leakage from the source.
"An area radiation survey did indicate that some of the lead inside of the source housing had potentially melted and shifted. The on contact readings of the back (0.2 mR/hr), sides/bottom (0.3 mR/hr), and shutter (1.5 mR/hr) were all consistent with expected readings. The 30 cm readings from the source back, sides, and bottom were also as expected (approximately 0.03 mR/hr). The readings on top of the source were higher than expected with a reading of 6 mR/hr on contact and 0.4 mR/hr at 30 cm. These readings on the top of the source do not present an immediate radiological hazard due to their low intensity and the fact that the source is mounted very close to the ceiling in the room. The ceiling support beam and water deflection shield make it difficult to even get a reading 30 cm from the top of the source.
"R. M. Wester's recommendation was that the gauge is functional and it could continue to be use until a replacement device could be procured and installed."
"On the morning of August 13, 2014 while cleaning up from a fire event on coal handling conveyer belt #2 at the Ameren Missouri (Ameren) Rush Island Energy Center it was observed that the nucleonic gauge located outside of the area of the original fire had some indications of potential damage. The gauge is located approximately 12 feet above the walkway near the ceiling of the room in an area that was not easily accessible. The gauge is a Ronan Engineering Model SA1-C10 containing 100 mCi of CS-137 in sealed solid form. Ameren contacted R. M. Wester (NRC Licensed maintenance vendor) to evaluate the nucleonic gauge on August 13, 2014 to determine if the gauge had been damaged due to the fire.
"R. M. Wester examination of the source housing showed the exterior to be in good condition with some minor scorching. The shutter check performed showed smooth operation and good beam strength with the shutter open (greater than 200 mR/hr) and good shielding with the shutter closed (1.5 mR/hr). Wipes of the source and the area below the source indicated no contamination or leakage from the source.
"An area radiation survey did indicate that some of the lead inside of the source housing had potentially melted and shifted. The on contact readings of the back (0.2 mR/hr), sides/bottom (0.3 mR/hr), and shutter (1.5 mR/hr) were all consistent with expected readings. The 30 cm readings from the source back, sides, and bottom were also as expected (approximately 0.03 mR/hr). The readings on top of the source were higher than expected with a reading of 6 mR/hr on contact and 0.4 mR/hr at 30 cm. These readings on the top of the source do not present an immediate radiological hazard due to their low intensity and the fact that the source is mounted very close to the ceiling in the room. The ceiling support beam and water deflection shield make it difficult to even get a reading 30 cm from the top of the source.
"R. M. Wester's recommendation was that the gauge is functional and it could continue to be use until a replacement device could be procured and installed."
Agreement State
Event Number: 50366
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP INC
Region: 4
City: DEER PARK State: TX
County:
License #: 06369
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP INC
Region: 4
City: DEER PARK State: TX
County:
License #: 06369
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/14/2014
Notification Time: 11:07 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2014
Notification Time: 11:07 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE WOULD NOT RETRACT
The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:
"On August 14, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that on August 13, 2014, a radiography crew using a 50 foot crank out device could not retract a 54 curie iridium-192 source to the fully retracted and locked position in a QSA 880D exposure device (camera). The RSO stated the radiographer had completed an exposure at a temporary field site and was retracting the source when he felt the resistance to movement in the crank out handle disappear and he could no longer move the source. The radiographer noted the dose rates were still higher than those for a fully shielded source. The radiographer contacted the RSO and increased the control area. The radiographer placed two bags of lead on the guide tube where he believed the source was located. The RSO stated the radiographer was in the area of the source for just a few seconds. The radiographer checked his self reading dosimeter after placing the lead at the source and found it off scale.
"The RSO and a recovery team went to the location to retrieve the source. The RSO had additional lead placed on the guide tube and the dose rates at the crank out device dropped to less than 2 millirem per hour. The RSO disconnected the drive cable housing from the broken in two at crank out device. The RSO grabbed the drive cable inside the drive cable housing with a set of pliers and was able to pull the drive cable and return the source to the fully shielded position.
"The personnel dosimeter for the radiographer who had approached the guide tube was sent to the licensee's dosimetry processor for processing and the radiographer has been removed from all work involving exposure to radiation until the results for their badge has been received. The RSO stated that based on the exposure rates and the time the radiographer was in the area of the source he did not believe the radiographer received
a significant exposure from the event. The RSO received 8 millirem by pocket dosimeter from the event. No other individuals received any significant exposure in this event.
"The crank out and drive cable will been sent to the manufacturer for inspection. The RSO stated he examined the drive cable, but did not see anything that would indicate why the cable failed. The RSO stated they performed a flex test of the drive cable and it passed. The RSO stated the camera and guide tube were inspected and returned to service. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9219
The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:
"On August 14, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that on August 13, 2014, a radiography crew using a 50 foot crank out device could not retract a 54 curie iridium-192 source to the fully retracted and locked position in a QSA 880D exposure device (camera). The RSO stated the radiographer had completed an exposure at a temporary field site and was retracting the source when he felt the resistance to movement in the crank out handle disappear and he could no longer move the source. The radiographer noted the dose rates were still higher than those for a fully shielded source. The radiographer contacted the RSO and increased the control area. The radiographer placed two bags of lead on the guide tube where he believed the source was located. The RSO stated the radiographer was in the area of the source for just a few seconds. The radiographer checked his self reading dosimeter after placing the lead at the source and found it off scale.
"The RSO and a recovery team went to the location to retrieve the source. The RSO had additional lead placed on the guide tube and the dose rates at the crank out device dropped to less than 2 millirem per hour. The RSO disconnected the drive cable housing from the broken in two at crank out device. The RSO grabbed the drive cable inside the drive cable housing with a set of pliers and was able to pull the drive cable and return the source to the fully shielded position.
"The personnel dosimeter for the radiographer who had approached the guide tube was sent to the licensee's dosimetry processor for processing and the radiographer has been removed from all work involving exposure to radiation until the results for their badge has been received. The RSO stated that based on the exposure rates and the time the radiographer was in the area of the source he did not believe the radiographer received
a significant exposure from the event. The RSO received 8 millirem by pocket dosimeter from the event. No other individuals received any significant exposure in this event.
"The crank out and drive cable will been sent to the manufacturer for inspection. The RSO stated he examined the drive cable, but did not see anything that would indicate why the cable failed. The RSO stated they performed a flex test of the drive cable and it passed. The RSO stated the camera and guide tube were inspected and returned to service. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9219