Event Notification Report for August 01, 2014

PART 21 REPORT - SAFETY-RELATED VALVES ASSEMBLED WITH NON-SAFETY RELATED LEVERS

Crane did not provide safety related levers, for manual type safety valves, on a recent shipment. Crane was advised by their customer that valves provided for AP1000 PV10 Scopes (VDS 101 and VDS 150) should have had safety-related levers.

Crane believes the only affected valves are those that have been provided on the AP 1000 project.

If you have questions please contact;
Rosalie Nava, Director Safety and Quality
Phone 630-226-4940
Fax 630-226-4646
Email RNAVA@cranevs.com

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO TEST RETURN VALVE LEAKAGE

"River Bend Station personnel declared the High Pressure Core Spray system inoperable at 2142 [CDT] on 8/1/2014.

"The High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system at River Bend Station includes a test return line to the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). The test return line is isolated by two motor operated valves (MOVs) with both having a safety function to close on an ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] initiation signal to ensure that injection flow is directed to the reactor vessel. While the HPCS pump is normally aligned to the CST, the credited source of water for the pump is the suppression pool. Accordingly, the pump suction is realigned to the suppression pool on low level in the CST or when suppression pool level rises to a certain point. Station personnel identified leakage past the test return valves to the CST. In evaluating this condition, engineering personnel noted that the observed leakage past the two MOVs might be sufficient to deplete suppression pool inventory such that it would not be capable of performing its specified function for the duration of the 30 day mission time. The issue of concern is that once HPCS is aligned to the suppression pool post-LOCA, pool inventory would be lost to the CST through the leaking test return valves.

"Based on that concern, the HPCS pump suction valve from the suppression pool was disabled in the closed position to preserve pool inventory. This action caused the HPCS system to be declared inoperable at 2142 [CDT]. This action results in a 14 day shutdown LCO and is reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"The HPCS pump remains available with its suction aligned to the CST. Assuming normal makeup water supplies are available, the HPCS system can be realigned to the suppression pool if necessary.

"This condition continues to be evaluated and rework options are being developed.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

POTENTIAL ISSUE REGARDING INCORRECT INDUSTRIAL IRRADIATION DOSE

The following information was received via facsimile:

Nutherm International, Inc. was notified by Steris Isomedix Services that the applied radiation dose reported on their Component Irradiation Certificates did not account for all uncertainties involved (i.e. density of unrelated products in carriers, off-carrier location within the irradiator and Cobalt-60 source decay). This issue was originally identified as part of NRC Inspection Report No. 99901445/2014-201.

"Nutherm International, Inc. is conducting an evaluation to determine whether a defect as defined by 10 CFR Part 21 exists. The impact of this failure to account for all uncertainties will be evaluated for all projects that required data from any sample irradiated by this supplier.

"At the conclusion of the evaluation, any customer impacted by this issue will be notified and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be notified in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.21.

"If you have any questions regarding this issue please do not hesitate to contact Adrienne Smith, Quality Assurance Manager at 618-244-6000, adrienne.smith@nutherm.com."

The supplier will update this report when the evaluation is complete. This event report was originally received by the NRC Operations Center on 08/01/2014

* * * UPDATE AT 1727 ON 8/31/2015 FROM THOMAS STERBIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following information was received via fax:

"Nutherm has identified one customer where there is a potential impact to the conclusions of the equipment qualification that Nutherm does not have the capability to perform further evaluations to determine if a defect exists.

"Nutherm International, Inc. performed equipment qualification testing for SOR, Inc., Lenexa, KS under SOR, Inc. Purchase Order number 166984 which included irradiation performed by Steris Isomedix. Based on the location of the sample during the irradiation and the total variability for this location provided by Steris Isomedix, Nutherm has verified that the test specimens received a minimum irradiation dose that meets the customer's TID requirement but does not meet the customer's TID requirement with the 10 percent IEEE 323 margin.

"In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.21, SOR Inc. has been notified regarding this issue to allow them to evaluate this deviation or failure to comply."

Notified the R4DO (Werner), NMSS Events Resource (via e-mail), and the Part-21 Group (via e-mail)

* * * UPDATE FROM NUTHERM INTERNATIONAL, INC. AT 1658 EST ON 2/3/16 * * *

The following information is summarized from the information received from Nutherm International, Inc. via fax:

Nutherm has completed their evaluation of past equipment qualifications and identified that the following U.S. facilities may be impacted: Cooper Nuclear Plant, Oconee Station, J.A. Fitzpatrick Station, Point Beach Nuclear, Brunswick Nuclear, Susquehanna Nuclear and Electric Power Research Institute.

Nutherm has notified the affected facilities.

Notified R1DO (Rogge), R2DO (Musser), R3DO (Kozak), R4DO (Pick) and the Part 21 group via email.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOCKING MECHANISM FAILURE

The following information was received via facsimile:

"On October 2, 2014, during a complaint investigation, the Agency [Texas Department of Health Services] confirmed allegations that on August 1, 2014, one of the licensee's industrial radiography crews had experienced a mechanical failure on an INC Model IR-100 exposure device that contained a 34 curie Iridium-192 source. Following the last exposure of the day, the source failed to retract into the locked and secure position within the device. The locking mechanism had tripped while the ball stop was outside the lock. The source was inside the s-tube but not in the locked position. The source could not be cranked out of the guide tube either. The key was removed and the radiographer was unable to unlock the camera when the key was re-inserted to retract the source. The radiographer was able to manipulate the locking mechanism so that the lock reset and the source was fully retracted. The licensee reported that its investigation [had determined] no one had exceeded any dose limits as a result of this event. The licensee did not believe it was a reportable event and did not notify the Agency. The exposure device was cleaned and returned to service by the licensee. Further information will be reported in accordance with SA-300 as it is obtained."

Texas Incident #: I-9241