Event Notification Report for July 26, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/25/2014 - 07/26/2014
EVENT NUMBERS
5031250313503175045250450
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 50312
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: ROSS LINDBERG
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: ROSS LINDBERG
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 07/26/2014
Notification Time: 10:44 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2014
Event Time: 04:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2014
Notification Time: 10:44 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2014
Event Time: 04:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
MERAJ RAHIMI (NMSS)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
MERAJ RAHIMI (NMSS)
UNPLANNED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF A CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL
"[A Honeywell] employee with dust in his right eye reported to the on-site dispensary this morning. The plant nurse administered first aid. A whole body survey of the employee in his plant clothing was performed; the maximum amount of contamination present was on the employee's work boots, 331,597 dpm/100 sq.cm. The plant nurse allowed the employee to return to work following treatment. The employee remained inside the Restricted Area over the entire course of the event."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and Region 2 (David Hartland via email).
"[A Honeywell] employee with dust in his right eye reported to the on-site dispensary this morning. The plant nurse administered first aid. A whole body survey of the employee in his plant clothing was performed; the maximum amount of contamination present was on the employee's work boots, 331,597 dpm/100 sq.cm. The plant nurse allowed the employee to return to work following treatment. The employee remained inside the Restricted Area over the entire course of the event."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and Region 2 (David Hartland via email).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50313
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL FRECHETTE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL FRECHETTE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/26/2014
Notification Time: 15:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2014
Event Time: 14:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2014
Notification Time: 15:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2014
Event Time: 14:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 80 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO TURBINE DRIVEN AFW PUMP FAILURE
"At 1458 [EDT] on 7/26/14, the [Technical Specification] 72 hour action statement for TDAFWP [Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump] inoperable expires (LCO 3.7.1.1 Action C). Per Technical Specification Action Statement, plant is required to be in HOT STANDBY by 2058 on 7/26/14 (6 hours) and in HOT SHUTDOWN by 0858 on 7/27/14 (additional 12 hours). MPS [Millstone Power Station] Unit 2 shutdown (using normal procedures) has commenced at 1411 when troubleshooting and repairs were unable to determine and correct cause of low pump recirculation flow. Additional activities will continue to correct issue."
Unit 3 is not affected by this event. All safety-related systems and equipment required for safe plant shutdown are available.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Waterford Dispatch, and State of Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection.
"At 1458 [EDT] on 7/26/14, the [Technical Specification] 72 hour action statement for TDAFWP [Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump] inoperable expires (LCO 3.7.1.1 Action C). Per Technical Specification Action Statement, plant is required to be in HOT STANDBY by 2058 on 7/26/14 (6 hours) and in HOT SHUTDOWN by 0858 on 7/27/14 (additional 12 hours). MPS [Millstone Power Station] Unit 2 shutdown (using normal procedures) has commenced at 1411 when troubleshooting and repairs were unable to determine and correct cause of low pump recirculation flow. Additional activities will continue to correct issue."
Unit 3 is not affected by this event. All safety-related systems and equipment required for safe plant shutdown are available.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Waterford Dispatch, and State of Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection.
Agreement State
Event Number: 50317
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: FUGRO CONSULTANTS LP
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: 04322
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: FUGRO CONSULTANTS LP
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: 04322
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/29/2014
Notification Time: 08:16 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2014
Notification Time: 08:16 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT
The following information was obtained from the state of Texas via email:
"On July 28, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice that a radiography source retraction failure had occurred at a temporary field site [Houston] on July 26, 2014. The guide tube had separated at the crimp between the flexible portion and the fitting to the camera. The flexible portion had pushed out when the source was cranked out. The source was retrieved by manually pulling the drive cable back through the camera. The guide tube was removed from service and replaced. The camera was a Sentinel 880 Delta with about 40 curies of selenium-75. No overexposures resulted from this event. An investigation into this event is ongoing. Additional information will be supplied as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9215
The following information was obtained from the state of Texas via email:
"On July 28, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice that a radiography source retraction failure had occurred at a temporary field site [Houston] on July 26, 2014. The guide tube had separated at the crimp between the flexible portion and the fitting to the camera. The flexible portion had pushed out when the source was cranked out. The source was retrieved by manually pulling the drive cable back through the camera. The guide tube was removed from service and replaced. The camera was a Sentinel 880 Delta with about 40 curies of selenium-75. No overexposures resulted from this event. An investigation into this event is ongoing. Additional information will be supplied as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9215
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50452
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: BOB RUSH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: BOB RUSH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/12/2014
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2014
Event Time: 16:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2014
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2014
Event Time: 16:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"The following information is provided as 60 day telephone notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of Division 1 Shutdown Service Water (SX) and an invalid actuation signal for Division 1 Containment Isolation Group 12. This event occurred on July 26, 2014, at 1648 CDT. As allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) this notification is made via telephone.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that actuated were:
On July 26th, during lightning strikes on the switchyard grid system, the Division 1 SX (Shutdown Service Water) auto-started as a result of momentary loss of power to the Low Pressure Auto Start Relay. A lightning strike causing voltage transients also caused a Division 1 Group 12 Containment Isolation signal affecting DIV 1 Hydrogen monitor.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
Upon receiving the invalid signal from momentary loss of power, for Division 1 SX and Group 12 Containment Isolation signal, the systems responded as expected for existing plant conditions. For group 12 isolation, [Containment Monitoring] 1CM011/12/47 and 48 valves closed from their normally open position. For DIV 1 Shutdown Service Water (SX), the start of the Shutdown Service Water (SX) pump and alignment of valves operated as expected. The actuation was considered a complete Division 1 SX and Division 1 Group 12 Containment Isolation actuation.
"Containment Isolation Signals:
The following Group 12 valves closed and associated shunt trips occurred on a loss of power to [Radiation Monitors] 1RIX-PR001A/1C: 1CM011, 1CM012, 1CM047, and 1CM048.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
Upon receiving the invalid signal from momentary loss of power, Division 1 SX and Containment Isolation signals started and functioned successfully.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"The following information is provided as 60 day telephone notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of Division 1 Shutdown Service Water (SX) and an invalid actuation signal for Division 1 Containment Isolation Group 12. This event occurred on July 26, 2014, at 1648 CDT. As allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) this notification is made via telephone.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that actuated were:
On July 26th, during lightning strikes on the switchyard grid system, the Division 1 SX (Shutdown Service Water) auto-started as a result of momentary loss of power to the Low Pressure Auto Start Relay. A lightning strike causing voltage transients also caused a Division 1 Group 12 Containment Isolation signal affecting DIV 1 Hydrogen monitor.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
Upon receiving the invalid signal from momentary loss of power, for Division 1 SX and Group 12 Containment Isolation signal, the systems responded as expected for existing plant conditions. For group 12 isolation, [Containment Monitoring] 1CM011/12/47 and 48 valves closed from their normally open position. For DIV 1 Shutdown Service Water (SX), the start of the Shutdown Service Water (SX) pump and alignment of valves operated as expected. The actuation was considered a complete Division 1 SX and Division 1 Group 12 Containment Isolation actuation.
"Containment Isolation Signals:
The following Group 12 valves closed and associated shunt trips occurred on a loss of power to [Radiation Monitors] 1RIX-PR001A/1C: 1CM011, 1CM012, 1CM047, and 1CM048.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
Upon receiving the invalid signal from momentary loss of power, Division 1 SX and Containment Isolation signals started and functioned successfully.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50450
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID LOCKWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID LOCKWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/12/2014
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2014
Event Time: 13:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2014
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2014
Event Time: 13:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ELECTRICAL TRANSIENT CAUSES AN INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"At 1313 [EDT] on 7/26/14, the plant experienced an electrical transient on bus EK-1-B1 (safety-related 120 volt AC distribution panel) that resulted in partial Balance of Plant Division 2 isolation signals and alarms received in the Control Room.
"The following component actuations occurred: valve 1P50F140 closed, resulting in a trip of Containment Vessel Chilled Water C; valve 1G41F140 closed, isolating the Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-up return from the containment building upper pools; valve 1B33F019 closed, isolating Reactor Water sampling; valve 1D17F071B closed, isolating the Drywell Atmosphere Radiation Monitor; valve 1D17F081B closed, isolating the Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor; valves 1G61-F030, 1G61-F150, 1G61-F075, and 1G61-F165 closed, isolating the Containment and Drywell Floor and Equipment drain sumps; valve 1G50-F272 closed isolating the Reactor Water Cleanup Backwash Receiving Tank: 1M25F020B, Control Room HVAC Inboard supply damper, closed and Division 2 indicated an auto initiation (M25-S12, Auto Initiate Active amber light was on).
"This event is considered an invalid system actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"The isolation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters, and was not a manual initiation. Therefore, this notification is provided via a 60 day optional phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report.
"The event meets reporting criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) as a general containment isolation valve signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. All affected systems functioned as expected in response to the electrical transient on bus EK-1-B1 that resulted in the partial Balance of Plant Division 2 isolation signals. The valves were reopened in accordance with plant procedures. The failure mechanism that caused the electrical transient was a failed capacitor in regulating transformer EFB1B2. The capacitor was replaced and tested with satisfactory results.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 1313 [EDT] on 7/26/14, the plant experienced an electrical transient on bus EK-1-B1 (safety-related 120 volt AC distribution panel) that resulted in partial Balance of Plant Division 2 isolation signals and alarms received in the Control Room.
"The following component actuations occurred: valve 1P50F140 closed, resulting in a trip of Containment Vessel Chilled Water C; valve 1G41F140 closed, isolating the Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-up return from the containment building upper pools; valve 1B33F019 closed, isolating Reactor Water sampling; valve 1D17F071B closed, isolating the Drywell Atmosphere Radiation Monitor; valve 1D17F081B closed, isolating the Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor; valves 1G61-F030, 1G61-F150, 1G61-F075, and 1G61-F165 closed, isolating the Containment and Drywell Floor and Equipment drain sumps; valve 1G50-F272 closed isolating the Reactor Water Cleanup Backwash Receiving Tank: 1M25F020B, Control Room HVAC Inboard supply damper, closed and Division 2 indicated an auto initiation (M25-S12, Auto Initiate Active amber light was on).
"This event is considered an invalid system actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"The isolation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters, and was not a manual initiation. Therefore, this notification is provided via a 60 day optional phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report.
"The event meets reporting criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) as a general containment isolation valve signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. All affected systems functioned as expected in response to the electrical transient on bus EK-1-B1 that resulted in the partial Balance of Plant Division 2 isolation signals. The valves were reopened in accordance with plant procedures. The failure mechanism that caused the electrical transient was a failed capacitor in regulating transformer EFB1B2. The capacitor was replaced and tested with satisfactory results.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."