Event Notification Report for July 03, 2014

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On July 3, 2014, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of Health] that one of its technicians left the licensee's facility in Austin, Texas, to transport a Troxler Model 4640 moisture/density gauge containing an 8 milliCurie cesium-137 source to the licensee's facility in Buda, Texas. The technician failed to properly secure the gauge for transport. When the technician arrived in Buda, he found the tailgate on pickup was down and the gauge was missing. The licensee retraced the technician's route of travel and found a water jug that had also been in the back of the truck near the licensee's Austin facility, but the gauge was not located. The licensee reported that the device (source rod handle) was not locked. The licensee reported that there were no locks on the transport case lid. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

* * * UPDATE FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/7/2014 AT 1144 EDT * * *

The following update was received by the State of Texas by email:

"Reporting criteria changed, as the only source in device (8 milliCurie cesium-137) is less than 1,000 times greater than Appendix C values and therefore does not meet 20.2201(a)(1)(i) immediate reporting criteria. The incident does meet 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) and further information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."

Notified the R4DO (Kellar) and FSME Event Resource via email.

Texas Incident # I-9211

HURRICANE WITHIN 500 NAUTICAL MILES OF THE FACILITY

"A hurricane is within 500 nautical miles from Indian Point Energy Center with wind speed in excess of 87 knots. The National Weather Service has issued a hurricane warning for a hurricane with wind in excess of 87 knots (approximately 100 mph) within 500 nautical miles of the facility. Per Technical Requirement Manual 5.4.A, a prompt report shall be made to the NRC Incident Response Center within 1 hour of receipt of that hurricane warning.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

PART 21 REPORT - INCORRECT INDUSTRIAL IRRADIATOR DOSE

The following was received via fax:

"Preferred Metal Technologies (PMT) was notified by Steris Isomedix Services that the applied radiation dose reported on their Component Irradiation Certificates did not account for all the uncertainties involved (i.e. density of unrelated products in carriers, off-carrier location within the irradiator and Cobalt-60 source decay). This potential defect was originally identified as part of NRC Inspection Report No. 99901445/2014-201.

"After a thorough review of all purchase orders issued to Steris Isomedix Services and PMT Projects that the irradiation test results were utilized on, PMT has determined that there are two projects where the applied radiation dose may have failed to meet the minimum required radiation dose to ensure that the safety related equipment would continue to operate satisfactorily during and after an accident. The details of those two projects are as follows:

"N1839 - Tennessee Valley Authority, Browns Ferry - 6 (Six) Electric Spring Return Actuators - Purchase Order #473351.

"N1893 - Commission Federal de Electricidad, Laguna Verde - 32 (Thirty Two) Damper Assemblies - Purchase Order #700419016.

"Tim Stewart, Vice President Nuclear
Preferred Metal Technologies, Inc.
140 East Tower Drive
Burr Ridge, Illinois 60527"

Preferred Metal Technologies Report Number: 14-01.


* * * UPDATE FROM TIM STEWART TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1636 EDT ON 7/30/2014 * * *

The following information was received via facsimile:

"In summary, additional radiation exposure testing was performed, post-radiation operability was verified, and it was confirmed that all affected equipment would continue to operate satisfactorily during a design basis event. No equipment upgrades or replacement is required as the supplied equipment was verified to meet the applicable technical requirements."

Notified R2DO (O'Donohue), R3DO (Lipa), and the Part 21 Group.

MISSING NICKEL-63 SOURCE

"On July 3, 2014, Montana State University's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) went to remove the Ni-63 sealed source (14 mCi) from a Varian Model 3400, Serial #13762 (Source Serial #A1059), Gas Chromatograph/Electron Capture Detector (GC/ECD) that was in storage. The RSO is in the process of disposing of all unwanted/unused sources. Upon arriving, the RSO found that the GC/ECD was no longer in CB 28 [Chemistry/Biochemistry Room 28] as it was three months earlier during the semi-annual sealed source leak test inspection. None of the individuals occupying the space had any idea what happened to the device.

"An email, including a picture of the device was sent to all personnel in both the transferor (Land Resources/Environmental Science) and transferee (Chemistry/Biochemistry) departments. In addition a lab by lab search of all chemistry labs was conducted by the RSO. As of this date, the GC/ECD has not been found. The RSO is in the process of continuing the search on the rest of the campus.

"Ni-63 is a low energy (67 keV) beta emitter. The beta energy necessary to penetrate the skin is 70 keV. Therefore, it is very unlikely for anyone to receive a dose from it unless it was broken open and injected, ingested, or inhaled.

"Corrective actions:
1. Two other unused GC/ECDs were picked up by the RSO and taken to his secure lab for removal of the Ni-63 sources to prevent the incident from happening again.
2. The three remaining GC/ECDs are being required to be put on active protocols.
3. During the search for the missing GC/ECD, another GC/ECD was revealed to be in another lab which has not been registered with the RSO. Therefore, the RSO has requested that all Principal Investigators (PIs) report all radiation producing equipment to him immediately.
4. The RSO is also currently meeting with each PI using radioactive material to verify they do not have the missing GC/ECD nor are there any other unreported radiation producing devices on campus.
5. The RSO has also placed a notice on all GC/ECDs stating, the RSO must be contacted prior to relocating this device.
6. All personnel in labs containing radiation producing equipment will be trained to report to the RSO any relocation of these devices.
7. The RSO has been placed under disciplinary action by the Director of the Office of Research Compliance.
8. The RSO will be conducting a search of the remainder of the MSU campus to locate the missing GC."


* * * UPDATE FROM NICHOLAS CHILDS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1351 on 3/27/2018 EDT * * *

"In August of 2014, Montana State University's (MSU's) previous RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] reported that a Ni-63 sealed source with a serial number of A1059 (15 mCi on 4/1/2004) was missing. The current RSO, as of October 2014, conducted a thorough review of MSU's sealed source inventory and located the source A1059.

"The source was leak tested with results indicating less than 0.005 microCi of removable contamination and subsequently added to MSU's sealed source inventory. The source was removed from MSU through the Source Consolidation And Threat Reduction Program (SCATR) on July 1, 2015."

Notified R4DO (Gaddy). Notified via E-mail: ILTAB (Whitney) and NMSS Events Notifications. Notified via fax: Canada.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf