Event Notification Report for June 25, 2014

VARIOUS TELECOMMUNICATION LINES AND ERDS OUTAGE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"Planned preventive maintenance will render parts of telephone system and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) nonfunctional. As a result, this represents a loss of emergency communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The maintenance is scheduled to begin on 6/25/2014 at 00:00 [CDT], and is expected to last approximately 5 hours. During this maintenance window, various communication connections will be intermittently interrupted for short periods of time. Affected communication connections include some local telephone company lines, Federal Telephone System, ERDS, the Monticello's NRC office, and automatic ring down lines to the state of Minnesota's Emergency Operations Center.

"During the planned maintenance window, communications to offsite will be available via radios, cell phones, and satellite communications. This ensures that the plant can adequately communicate with the NRC, state, and local agencies to ensure protection of the health and safety of the general public.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the planned telecommunications maintenance."

Licensee also notified the Minnesota State Duty Officer and the Wright and Sherburne County Sheriff dispatchers.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY DAMON HESSIG TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1823 EDT ON 06/25/2014 * * *

"At 0500 [CDT] on 6/25/2014, planned maintenance on the Monticello telecommunications system was completed. At 1630 [CDT] on 6/25/2014, testing of all telecommunications was completed. All systems are functioning properly.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified that the telecommunications system is functional. The Minnesota State Duty Officer and the Wright and Sherburne County Sheriff dispatchers have been notified that the telecommunications system is functional."

Notified R3DO (Lara).

POTENTIAL LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK CAPACITY DUE TO LOW LEVEL

"At approximately 1555 CDT on Wednesday, June 25, 2014, during a review of several station abnormal operating procedures for actions related to low ultimate heat sink (UHS) level, it was discovered that the procedures do not incorporate design assumptions for shutting down the non-essential service water (WS) pumps following a loss of cooling lake dike. The pumps that take suction from the UHS include the WS, circulating water (CW) and fire protection (FP) pumps. Based on current procedural guidance, the only pumps that are secured due to a low ultimate heat sink level are the circulating water (CW) pumps based on low net positive suction (NPSH)

"Failing to secure the non-essential pumps on a loss of cooling lake dike failure significantly reduces the 30 day design basis UHS volume to approximately 4 days.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'

"Immediate actions taken included issuance of an operations standing order providing direction to secure non-essential pumps on the failure of the cooling lake dike. Proposed corrective actions include procedure revisions.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of Washington via email:

"On June 25, 2014 at 1600 PDT, a CPN portable gauge (model MC1-DR, SN: MD00405577) containing 50 mCi of Am-241/Be and 10 mCi of Cs-137 was damaged by a front end loader. An AllWest employee was [performing] an in-place moisture/density test in a parking lot at the URM warehouse project in Spokane, Washington. A front end loader was brought into the same parking lot to work on another part of the project. The AllWest employee walked 20 feet away from the gauge to direct the loader operator. The loader made a hard right turn while backing up to do a line up for a proof roll. The AllWest employee realized the loader was traveling in the direction of the portable gauge. The AllWest employee tried to get the loader operators attention by yelling and waving his hands. The operator noticed and stopped the loader just as the tire bumped the portable gauge. The employee looked at the gauge and did not notice any obvious damage until the loader was moved away. The AllWest employee noticed the gauge guide tube was slightly bent. The employee was able to retract the source rod (which was at 2 inch depth at the time of the accident) and verified the slide plate was in the safe position. The loader was checked for contamination and none was found. The AllWest employee notified the office manager at the time of the accident and was told to return to the office since there was no major damage to the gauge. The office manager contacted the company RSO to report the incident and to report that a leak test would be performed before the gauge would be sent to CPN/Instrotek for repairs. The leak test showed no sign of leaking sources. The gauge was sent to CPN/Instrotek on July 1, 2014 and on July 14, 2014, AllWest was notified that the source rod was also slightly bent and could not be repaired and needed to be disposed of."

Incident Number: WA-14-030

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GENERAL LICENSED MATERIAL

The following information was provided by the State of Colorado via email:

On July 21, 2014, the State of Colorado was made aware of a stolen generally licensed device. The general license holder was contacted on July 24, 2014 to gather additional information. The general license owner, Rocky Mountain Recycling was planning to perform a demonstration for a company in Dallas, Oregon. During the night of June 25, 2014, the analyzer was stolen from a vehicle parked overnight in Dallas, Oregon. A police report for the stolen material was filed in the city of Dallas, Oregon. The device manufacturer is Thermo Niton, model XLp, serial number 6199, containing 30 milliCuries of Am-241. The investigation is ongoing. No report was made to the Oregon Radiation Protection Services.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION EVENT

"Event Text: At approximately 2348 hours (ET) on June 25, 2014, an employee dropped a container of radioactive material solution after removal from a glove box enclosure. The 2-liter poly container split, releasing contents to the floor and surrounding equipment. Operations in the area were placed in a safe condition at the time of the event, radiological controls implemented for personnel protection, and decontamination initiated. Extensive surface contamination surveys were performed to facilitate decontamination and the area was released to normal access by 1615 hours (ET) on June 26, 2014. At this time, the additional radiological controls implemented at the time of the event were removed. At 0245 hours (ET) on June 27, 2014, contamination was discovered to be weeping out of some facility and equipment surfaces in the area of the earlier spill. Radiological controls were reestablished, decontamination efforts resumed, and enhanced monitoring implemented. Since the cumulative time for access restrictions exceeded 24 hours, this is being reported to the [NRC] Operations Center under 10 CFR 70.50 (b)(1).

"There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the public or the environment. There were no actual safety consequences to the workers. The potential safety consequences to the workers include exposure to uranyl nitrate solution.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The radioactive material solution was Uranyl Nitrate containing 540 grams of Uranium-235.