Event Notification Report for June 19, 2014

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received via e-mail:

"On June 20, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee of the loss of a Humboldt model 5001EZ moisture density gauge, serial #4772, containing a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) Am-Be source and a 0.3 GBq (8 mCi) Cs-137 source. The licensee stated a technician was working at a job site on June 19, 2014, when he rushed home for a family emergency. He failed to secure the gauge in the back of the truck and he left the tailgate down. The gauge fell off the truck between the job site and his home. The licensee stated they searched the job site and the route taken by the technician."

Texas event: I-9205

* * * UPDATE AT 1040 EDT ON 7/1/2014 FROM IRENE CASARES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following report was received via e-mail:

"On Saturday June 28, 2014, the gauge was reported, via email from the licensee, as found and the gauge was sent off for any damage identification and leak check. It was reported that the gauge was not damaged and passed the leak check. Two violations were cited."

Notified the R4DO (Hagar), FSME Events Resource (via e-mail) and Mexico (via e-mail)..

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN

"At 1435 [CDT] on June 19, 2014 while performing Unit 1 A Train Safeguards Logic Test at power, it was discovered, while testing the Safety Injection Automatic Actuation Relay Logic, that the 1SI-15x, SI RELAY TRAIN A, was not making up the contact to energize 1SI-16x, SI AUX RELAY TRAIN A. As a result, the 8 hour exception for testing allowed under LCO 3.3.2 Condition C no longer applied, and the 6, 12, and 42 hour clocks associated with condition C were entered.

"At 2035 [CDT] on June 19, when the 6 hour time limit to complete Condition C.1 action could not be completed operators began preparation to shutdown Unit 1 to Mode 3 by 0235 on 6/20/14.

"At 2245 [CDT] on June 19, 2014 operators commenced reducing reactor power of Prairie Island Unit 1. As of 0003, June 20, Unit 1 was at 55 percent power and continuing to reduce load.

"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) - 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specification'.

"The protection of the health and safety of the public is not affected by this issue.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR MAINTENANCE

"System affected: Normal and High Range SLCRS [Supplementary Leakage Collection and Release System] ventilation process radiation monitors.

"Actuations and their initiation signals: None.

"Causes: Removed from service for scheduled maintenance.

"Effect of event on plant: None.

"Actions taken or planned: Complete required calibration.

"Additional information: Will be returned to service following maintenance."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable State and local agencies.

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO A POSTULATED HOT SHORT THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of industry operating experience regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) circuits has determined the described condition to be applicable to the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to fire safe shutdown requirements.

"In the postulated event, a fire induced hot short could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment. The potential exists for a secondary fire to occur due to unfused DC control circuits associated with the Turbine Emergency Bearing Oil Pump, Reactor Feed Pump Turbine 'A' Emergency Lube Oil Pump, Turbine Emergency Seal Oil Pump, and Reactor Feed Pump Turbine 'B' Emergency Lube Oil Pump. These circuits are routed from the respective equipment to other plant areas including the Unit 1 Control Room, Division 1 Cable Spreading, and Division 1 Cable Chase.

"Without overcurrent protection for these circuits, the potential exists that an initial fire event affecting these circuits could cause short circuits without protection that would cause excessive current through the circuit beyond the capacity rating of the conductors. This could lead to a secondary fire in another plant area where these circuits are routed challenging the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

ONE INCORE DETECTOR CONTAINING U-235 UNACCOUNTED FOR DURING INVENTORY

"This is a non-emergency notification regarding a very small amount of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) which is unaccounted for. On May 30, 2014, a discrepancy was found in the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station SNM inventory. After extensive review, it was determined on June 19, 2014 that one nuclear instrumentation incore detector could not be located at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. Detectors of this type are used to measure incore neutron flux (intensity of neutron radiation) inside the reactor vessel. This is being reported under 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(1)(ii) Reports of Theft or Loss of Licensed Material.

"According to V.C. Summer documentation, there should be 42 such detectors in storage. Only 41 detectors could be physically located. There is no evidence of theft or diversion of the detector. Detectors of this type contain very small amounts of Uranium-235 (.0041 grams/detector), which qualifies them as SNM. The detector is believed to be located in a storage location in the Reactor Building (RB). The RB storage location will be inspected during the next refueling outage.

"This event had no effect on plant operations. No impact on public health and safety has been identified. A written report will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(1)(i-vi).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf