Event Notification Report for June 18, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/17/2014 - 06/18/2014
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50209
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ANGELO LEONE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ANGELO LEONE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 06/18/2014
Notification Time: 12:35 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2014
Event Time: 08:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/18/2014
Notification Time: 12:35 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2014
Event Time: 08:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MAINTENANCE BEING PERFORMED ON MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITORS
"At 0832 EDT on 6/18/2014, Millstone Station Unit 2 removed the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors RM-4299B and RM-4299C from service for pre-planned maintenance. Portable handheld radiation detectors will be used to assess radiation releases. Both radiation monitors will be restored no later than 2200 EDT on 6/19/14."
The licensee informed both State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0832 EDT on 6/18/2014, Millstone Station Unit 2 removed the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors RM-4299B and RM-4299C from service for pre-planned maintenance. Portable handheld radiation detectors will be used to assess radiation releases. Both radiation monitors will be restored no later than 2200 EDT on 6/19/14."
The licensee informed both State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50210
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: HENK VERWEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: HENK VERWEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 06/18/2014
Notification Time: 21:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2014
Event Time: 15:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2014
Notification Time: 21:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2014
Event Time: 15:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 86 | Power Operation | 86 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF HPCI ROOM COOLING
"At 1545 [EDT], while testing of the Emergency Service Water system (ST-8Q) was being performed at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF), two of five unit coolers (66UC-22H and 66UC-22K) in the East Crescent were found with indicated flow of 0 gpm. The other three unit coolers in the East Crescent Area were found with sufficient flow. At least four unit coolers are required to support the functionality of the East Crescent Area Ventilation Subsystem (TRO 3.7.C). The East and West Crescent Area Ventilation Subsystems support the Operability of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system by removing heat from the areas, in the event that ECCS and RCIC were used to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The West Crescent Area Ventilation Subsystem remained functional. The accident mitigating function of the division of ECCS and RCIC located in the West Crescent Area were unaffected by this condition. However, this condition could have prevented the function of one division of the ECCS, including the single train of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), located in the East Crescent. Therefore, this condition could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of HPCI and it is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"As part of the testing, the throttle valves to the unit coolers (66UC-22H and 66UC-22K) were cycled and normal flow was restored. This condition no longer exists."
The licensee is investigating the loss of flow to the "H" and "K" unit coolers and the restoration of flow by cycling the unit cooler supply throttle valves.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID CALLEN TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1506 EDT ON 8/13/2014 * * *
"FitzPatrick is retracting EN # 50210 made on June 18, 2014 at 2120 EDT. The plant was at 86% power at the time. The ENS notification was an 8-Hr non-emergency notification to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) when it was discovered that two of five unit coolers in the East Crescent (66UC-22H and 66UC-22K) were found with indicated flow of 0 gpm while testing. The other three unit coolers in the East Crescent (66UC-22B, 66UC-22D, 66UC-22F) were found with sufficient flow. At least four unit coolers are required to support the functionality of the East Crescent Area Ventilation subsystem (TRO 3.7.C). The East and West Crescent Area Ventilation subsystems support the Operability of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system by removing heat from these areas in the event that ECCS and RCIC are used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. As part of testing, throttle valves to unit coolers 66UC-22H and 66UC-22K were cycled and normal flow was restored.
"The West Crescent Area Ventilation subsystem remained functional. The accident mitigating function of the division of the ECCS and RCIC located in the West Crescent Area were unaffected by this condition. Initial review of this condition determined that it could have prevented the function of one division of the ECCS, including the single train of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), located in the East Crescent. Therefore, this condition was initially reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the Safety function of HPCI.
"This EN# 50210 is being retracted based upon a subsequent engineering analysis that determined that there is reasonable assurance that the three unit coolers with sufficient flow (66UC-22B, 66UC-22D, and 66UC-22F) would have been capable of removing accident heat loads as a function of time to maintain East Crescent area temperatures at a value which ensures operability of supported equipment. The analysis considered unit cooler heat transfer capability at the modified design condition flow of 22 gpm for historically observed lake temperatures and for flow at tested conditions. Additional margin in flow at the tested condition provided increased heat removal capability and provided added assurance that accident heat load would have been removed. The East Crescent Area Ventilation subsystem was, therefore, functional with three unit coolers (functionality never was lost) and the supported ECCS remained Operable. The Operability determination for the condition has subsequently been revised based upon the engineering analysis, to state the condition was not immediately reportable per 10 CFR 50.72."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector
Notified R1DO (Kennedy)
"At 1545 [EDT], while testing of the Emergency Service Water system (ST-8Q) was being performed at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF), two of five unit coolers (66UC-22H and 66UC-22K) in the East Crescent were found with indicated flow of 0 gpm. The other three unit coolers in the East Crescent Area were found with sufficient flow. At least four unit coolers are required to support the functionality of the East Crescent Area Ventilation Subsystem (TRO 3.7.C). The East and West Crescent Area Ventilation Subsystems support the Operability of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system by removing heat from the areas, in the event that ECCS and RCIC were used to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The West Crescent Area Ventilation Subsystem remained functional. The accident mitigating function of the division of ECCS and RCIC located in the West Crescent Area were unaffected by this condition. However, this condition could have prevented the function of one division of the ECCS, including the single train of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), located in the East Crescent. Therefore, this condition could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of HPCI and it is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"As part of the testing, the throttle valves to the unit coolers (66UC-22H and 66UC-22K) were cycled and normal flow was restored. This condition no longer exists."
The licensee is investigating the loss of flow to the "H" and "K" unit coolers and the restoration of flow by cycling the unit cooler supply throttle valves.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID CALLEN TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1506 EDT ON 8/13/2014 * * *
"FitzPatrick is retracting EN # 50210 made on June 18, 2014 at 2120 EDT. The plant was at 86% power at the time. The ENS notification was an 8-Hr non-emergency notification to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) when it was discovered that two of five unit coolers in the East Crescent (66UC-22H and 66UC-22K) were found with indicated flow of 0 gpm while testing. The other three unit coolers in the East Crescent (66UC-22B, 66UC-22D, 66UC-22F) were found with sufficient flow. At least four unit coolers are required to support the functionality of the East Crescent Area Ventilation subsystem (TRO 3.7.C). The East and West Crescent Area Ventilation subsystems support the Operability of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system by removing heat from these areas in the event that ECCS and RCIC are used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. As part of testing, throttle valves to unit coolers 66UC-22H and 66UC-22K were cycled and normal flow was restored.
"The West Crescent Area Ventilation subsystem remained functional. The accident mitigating function of the division of the ECCS and RCIC located in the West Crescent Area were unaffected by this condition. Initial review of this condition determined that it could have prevented the function of one division of the ECCS, including the single train of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), located in the East Crescent. Therefore, this condition was initially reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the Safety function of HPCI.
"This EN# 50210 is being retracted based upon a subsequent engineering analysis that determined that there is reasonable assurance that the three unit coolers with sufficient flow (66UC-22B, 66UC-22D, and 66UC-22F) would have been capable of removing accident heat loads as a function of time to maintain East Crescent area temperatures at a value which ensures operability of supported equipment. The analysis considered unit cooler heat transfer capability at the modified design condition flow of 22 gpm for historically observed lake temperatures and for flow at tested conditions. Additional margin in flow at the tested condition provided increased heat removal capability and provided added assurance that accident heat load would have been removed. The East Crescent Area Ventilation subsystem was, therefore, functional with three unit coolers (functionality never was lost) and the supported ECCS remained Operable. The Operability determination for the condition has subsequently been revised based upon the engineering analysis, to state the condition was not immediately reportable per 10 CFR 50.72."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector
Notified R1DO (Kennedy)
Part 21
Event Number: 50434
Rep Org: UNDERWATER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
Licensee: UNDERWATER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: ESSEX State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LES AYER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: UNDERWATER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: ESSEX State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LES AYER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/08/2014
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2014
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
PART 21 - FAILURE TO MEET SPECIFIED IRRADIATION DURING TESTING OF COATED TEST PANELS
The following information is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:
Underwater Construction Corporation (UCC) was notified by Steris Isomedix Services (SIS) that test panels coated with Bio-Dur 560Blue epoxy coating, which SIS had been contracted to irradiate to a minimum accumulated dose of 1000 Mrad, could possibly have received a dose of only 949 Mrad due to a variance of 5.1 percent not previously reported on the Steris Component Irradiation Certificate. Bio-Dur 560Blue is a Service Level I coating. Failure to meet irradiation requirements for qualifying Service Level I coatings could result in the coating disbonding from the substrate, thus clogging Emergency Core Cooling Strainers during a postulated Loss of Cooling Accident (LOCA).
Bio-Dur 560Blue was used to reline the toruses at Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3. Also, 588 square feet of Bio-Dur 560Blue was applied to the liner of the suppression pool at Limerick Unit 1. UCC notified Exelon concerning the irradiation failure and provided the following recommendations:
- Perform evaluation of their Safety Analysis Report to determine if 949 Mrad meets licensing commitments.
- Perform a review and determine if Supplemental Test Report per Exelon Contract 00045628, Release 00735, whereby irradiation testing of Bio-Dur 560Blue was performed to 1000 Mrad by University of Massachusetts will provide reasonable assurance that coating will not fail during a LOCA.
Notification to NRC provided by Les Ayer, UCC QA Manager, 860-767-8256, x-169.
The following information is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:
Underwater Construction Corporation (UCC) was notified by Steris Isomedix Services (SIS) that test panels coated with Bio-Dur 560Blue epoxy coating, which SIS had been contracted to irradiate to a minimum accumulated dose of 1000 Mrad, could possibly have received a dose of only 949 Mrad due to a variance of 5.1 percent not previously reported on the Steris Component Irradiation Certificate. Bio-Dur 560Blue is a Service Level I coating. Failure to meet irradiation requirements for qualifying Service Level I coatings could result in the coating disbonding from the substrate, thus clogging Emergency Core Cooling Strainers during a postulated Loss of Cooling Accident (LOCA).
Bio-Dur 560Blue was used to reline the toruses at Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3. Also, 588 square feet of Bio-Dur 560Blue was applied to the liner of the suppression pool at Limerick Unit 1. UCC notified Exelon concerning the irradiation failure and provided the following recommendations:
- Perform evaluation of their Safety Analysis Report to determine if 949 Mrad meets licensing commitments.
- Perform a review and determine if Supplemental Test Report per Exelon Contract 00045628, Release 00735, whereby irradiation testing of Bio-Dur 560Blue was performed to 1000 Mrad by University of Massachusetts will provide reasonable assurance that coating will not fail during a LOCA.
Notification to NRC provided by Les Ayer, UCC QA Manager, 860-767-8256, x-169.