Event Notification Report for May 15, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/14/2014 - 05/15/2014
Agreement State
Event Number: 50122
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: HEVLY TECHNICAL SERVICES COMPANY
Region: 4
City: PHOENIX State: AZ
County:
License #: 15-096
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN D. GORETZKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: HEVLY TECHNICAL SERVICES COMPANY
Region: 4
City: PHOENIX State: AZ
County:
License #: 15-096
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN D. GORETZKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/19/2014
Notification Time: 17:55 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2014
Notification Time: 17:55 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
MEXICO (FAX)
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
MEXICO (FAX)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RECOVERY OF TWO MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGES BY AN ARIZONA LICENSEE
The following information was provided by the State of Arizona via email:
"Date: May 19, 2014
"Time: 2:30 PM (MST)
"First Notice: 14-012
"Arizona Licensee: N/A
"License No.: N/A
"On May 15, 2014, the [Arizona Radiation Regulatory] Agency was contacted by a licensee who stated that he was called about the disposal of a nuclear density gauge. The caller stated that they were not licensed and did not want to go to the regulatory agency but needed to get rid of the gauge. The caller also stated that if [the licensee] did not take the gauge, he would take it to a dumpster or leave it out in the desert. [The licensee] contacted the Agency on the afternoon of the 15th to discuss the situation. [The licensee] was contacted on the 16th and subsequently met the unknown caller and picked up the gauge. The gauge was brought to the Agency, where it was leak tested and secured.
"The depth moisture gauge came in two different wood boxes. The first box contained a Troxler depth moisture probe, model number 1255, with a 100 millicurie Americium-241:Be source and an origin date of 05/03/1975. The second box contained a Troxler depth density gauge, model number 1351, with a 7.7 millicurie Cesium-137 source and an origin date of 07/13/1982
"The Agency continues to investigate the event."
The State of Arizona will notify the Governor's Office and the FBI.
* * * UPDATE AT 1553 EDT ON 05/20/14 FROM BRIAN GORETZKI TO S. SANDIN VIA EMAIL * * *
The State of Arizona identified the Arizona licensee who picked up and dropped off the sources at the Agency.
"The Am-241:Be probe/gauge has 3 labels on it with all different model and serial numbers. They are as follows:
Model: 104a Serial #: J-3475
Model: 1255 Serial #: 810
Serial #: Am-239 Date: 5/30/75
"The Cs-137 gauge has the same thing. They are as follows:
Model: 504 Serial #: 212
Model: 1351 Serial #: 212
Model: 40-6475 Date: 7/13/82
"[The Agency] crossed referenced the model/serial numbers in the NMED database and did not get any hits."
Notified R4DO (Gepford) and FSME (via email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was provided by the State of Arizona via email:
"Date: May 19, 2014
"Time: 2:30 PM (MST)
"First Notice: 14-012
"Arizona Licensee: N/A
"License No.: N/A
"On May 15, 2014, the [Arizona Radiation Regulatory] Agency was contacted by a licensee who stated that he was called about the disposal of a nuclear density gauge. The caller stated that they were not licensed and did not want to go to the regulatory agency but needed to get rid of the gauge. The caller also stated that if [the licensee] did not take the gauge, he would take it to a dumpster or leave it out in the desert. [The licensee] contacted the Agency on the afternoon of the 15th to discuss the situation. [The licensee] was contacted on the 16th and subsequently met the unknown caller and picked up the gauge. The gauge was brought to the Agency, where it was leak tested and secured.
"The depth moisture gauge came in two different wood boxes. The first box contained a Troxler depth moisture probe, model number 1255, with a 100 millicurie Americium-241:Be source and an origin date of 05/03/1975. The second box contained a Troxler depth density gauge, model number 1351, with a 7.7 millicurie Cesium-137 source and an origin date of 07/13/1982
"The Agency continues to investigate the event."
The State of Arizona will notify the Governor's Office and the FBI.
* * * UPDATE AT 1553 EDT ON 05/20/14 FROM BRIAN GORETZKI TO S. SANDIN VIA EMAIL * * *
The State of Arizona identified the Arizona licensee who picked up and dropped off the sources at the Agency.
"The Am-241:Be probe/gauge has 3 labels on it with all different model and serial numbers. They are as follows:
Model: 104a Serial #: J-3475
Model: 1255 Serial #: 810
Serial #: Am-239 Date: 5/30/75
"The Cs-137 gauge has the same thing. They are as follows:
Model: 504 Serial #: 212
Model: 1351 Serial #: 212
Model: 40-6475 Date: 7/13/82
"[The Agency] crossed referenced the model/serial numbers in the NMED database and did not get any hits."
Notified R4DO (Gepford) and FSME (via email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50116
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PAGE KEMP
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PAGE KEMP
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/15/2014
Notification Time: 23:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2014
Event Time: 19:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2014
Notification Time: 23:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2014
Event Time: 19:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS START AND LOAD DUE TO LOSS OF ONE 34.5KV LINE
"On 5-15-2014 at 1920 hours [EDT], with Unit 1 & 2 operating at 100% power, the North Anna 34.5 kV Bus 5, offsite power feed to the 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer, was lost which resulted in the loss of power to the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus and the Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus. As a result of the power loss, the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator and the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started as designed and restored power to the associated emergency bus. During this event, the Unit 2 'A' Charging Pump, 2-CH-P-1A, automatically started as designed due to the loss of power event.
"The valid actuation of these ESF [Engineered Safety Feature] components due to the loss of electrical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus off-site power source was restored to service and the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator was secured and returned to automatic. The Unit 1 Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.8.1 was cleared at 2115 hours on 5-15-2014. The Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus power feed continues to be from the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator and this line-up will remain until the off-site power source can be restored to operable status. The Unit 2 'A' Charging Pump has been secured and returned to automatic.
"Both Units are in a stable condition. An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the 34.5 kV Bus 5 loss of power."
Power was returned to the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus via the Unit 1 'B' Reserve Station Service Transformer.
The licensee will be notifying local Louisa County officials and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 5-15-2014 at 1920 hours [EDT], with Unit 1 & 2 operating at 100% power, the North Anna 34.5 kV Bus 5, offsite power feed to the 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer, was lost which resulted in the loss of power to the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus and the Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus. As a result of the power loss, the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator and the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started as designed and restored power to the associated emergency bus. During this event, the Unit 2 'A' Charging Pump, 2-CH-P-1A, automatically started as designed due to the loss of power event.
"The valid actuation of these ESF [Engineered Safety Feature] components due to the loss of electrical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus off-site power source was restored to service and the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator was secured and returned to automatic. The Unit 1 Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.8.1 was cleared at 2115 hours on 5-15-2014. The Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus power feed continues to be from the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator and this line-up will remain until the off-site power source can be restored to operable status. The Unit 2 'A' Charging Pump has been secured and returned to automatic.
"Both Units are in a stable condition. An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the 34.5 kV Bus 5 loss of power."
Power was returned to the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus via the Unit 1 'B' Reserve Station Service Transformer.
The licensee will be notifying local Louisa County officials and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50117
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ADAM SCHEEL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ADAM SCHEEL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/15/2014
Notification Time: 23:49 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2014
Event Time: 16:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2014
Notification Time: 23:49 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2014
Event Time: 16:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 89 | Power Operation | 89 | Power Operation |
DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER
"A degraded fire barrier was identified during a walkdown on May 15th, 2014 at 1620 [CDT]. The barrier separates Appendix R safe shutdown divisional equipment.
"A fire watch has been established as a compensatory measure. The health and safety of the public was not jeopardized as a result of this condition as there have been no fires or initiating events.
"The discovery of this degraded fire barrier is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
"A degraded fire barrier was identified during a walkdown on May 15th, 2014 at 1620 [CDT]. The barrier separates Appendix R safe shutdown divisional equipment.
"A fire watch has been established as a compensatory measure. The health and safety of the public was not jeopardized as a result of this condition as there have been no fires or initiating events.
"The discovery of this degraded fire barrier is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."