Event Notification Report for April 25, 2014

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RECOVERED SOURCE

"A DOT special permit was issued by our Agency to allow the transport of unidentified radioactive material [RAM] from one waste transfer station to the originating transfer station. Subsequently, a contractor (Atlantic Nuclear) was hired by the waste services operator to isolate the RAM, identify it, label it accordingly, and store it in a secure onsite location. The contractor was not able to definitively identify the RAM. The contractor employed portable multi-channel analyzer's in the effort (both an ICS-4000, and LMJ-702), but no positive identification of the isotope(s) could be made. The material in question is encapsulated in what appears to be a metal enclosure, and the contractor postulated that the material might be Ra-226 due to the number of gamma energy lines measured. It was also postulated that metal encapsulation may be providing interferences, and further testing is required to establish the identity of the isotope. The dose rate measurements conducted by the contractor revealed: At contact 35-40 mR/hr; at 12 inches approx. 3 mR/hr.

"The contractor, Atlantic Nuclear (MA Lic. No. 56-0477), is planning to pick up the materials for storage pending disposal in accordance with their specific license. The Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] investigation remains open."

POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of industry Operating Experience identified that there were unprotected DC control circuits for non safety-related DC motors which are routed from the turbine building to other separate fire areas. Fuses used to protect the motor power conductors appear to be inadequate to protect the control conductors. The concern is that under fire safe shutdown conditions, it is postulated that a fire in one area can cause short circuits potentially resulting in secondary fires or cable failures in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis.

"This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

STACK RADIATION MONITOR REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"System Affected: Millstone Station Stack Radiation Monitor, RM-8169
"Actuations and Their Signals: None
"Causes: Preplanned Maintenance
"Effect of Event on Plant: None
"Actions Taken or Planned: Completed testing and restored operability" (on 4/26/14 at 0037 EDT)
"Additional Information: None"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN AND FOUND RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The following information was received from the State of Texas by email:

"On May 19, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received a complaint alleging multiple rule violations had been committed by an industrial radiographer working for the licensee. On May 27, 2014, during the complaint investigation, the licensee's site radiation safety officer (SRSO) stated that on April 25, 2014, the radiographer had taken one of the licensee's radiography trucks which contained a SPEC 150 exposure device with a 23 curie iridium-192 source following completion of a job in San Antonio, Texas. The radiographer had possession of the truck and exposure device with its source until April 30, 2014. The licensee's SRSO stated they attempted during that time to contact the radiographer and to locate the truck using its GPS locator system, but they were unsuccessful. The licensee located the truck at a recreational vehicle park in Portland, Texas. The licensee's SRSO stated the exposure device was found laying in the floor of the dark room, the dark room door was not locked, and the dark room's alarm was not activated. The SRSO stated to the Agency investigator during the May 27th telephone interview that it did appear to him that an exposure could have resulted to persons in an unrestricted area during the event. An investigation into this event is ongoing and more information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident: I-9196

* * * RETRACTION FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO CHARLES TEAL ON 6/4/14 AT 1332 EDT * * *

The following was received from the State of Texas via email.:

"Investigation has determined that no theft occurred and this was not a reportable event. Investigation will continue in order to identify and address other potential regulatory violations."

Notified R4DO (Taylor), Grant (IRD), Wray (ILTAB), and FSME Event Resource via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf