Event Notification Report for April 18, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/17/2014 - 04/18/2014
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50043
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN RASMUSSEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN RASMUSSEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 04/18/2014
Notification Time: 14:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2014
Event Time: 12:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2014
Notification Time: 14:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2014
Event Time: 12:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
CABLE ROUTING UNANALYZED FOR FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN BARRIER
"While implementing a multiple spurious operations (MSO's) modification during a refueling outage, it was identified that a fire safe shutdown cable routing location may have been in question. On 04/18/2014 at 1252 CDT, it was determined that this cable was routed through a cable tray that was not designed to have a fire safe shutdown barrier. This created an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, consistent with NUREG 1022, Rev. 3 guidance.
"This cable is associated with a Motor Operated Valve (MOV) used to isolate the containment sump from the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump suction during normal system operations.
"Compensatory measures in this area were already in effect for the resolution of MSO's scenarios. The compensatory measures assure the Systems, Structures, and Components (SSC's) associated with this cable remain operable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"While implementing a multiple spurious operations (MSO's) modification during a refueling outage, it was identified that a fire safe shutdown cable routing location may have been in question. On 04/18/2014 at 1252 CDT, it was determined that this cable was routed through a cable tray that was not designed to have a fire safe shutdown barrier. This created an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, consistent with NUREG 1022, Rev. 3 guidance.
"This cable is associated with a Motor Operated Valve (MOV) used to isolate the containment sump from the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump suction during normal system operations.
"Compensatory measures in this area were already in effect for the resolution of MSO's scenarios. The compensatory measures assure the Systems, Structures, and Components (SSC's) associated with this cable remain operable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50044
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: MIKE MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: MIKE MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 04/18/2014
Notification Time: 22:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2014
Event Time: 20:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2014
Notification Time: 22:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2014
Event Time: 20:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO REACTOR HEAD VESSEL PENETRATION INDICATIONS
"On April 18, 2014, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Unit 1 identified 3 reactor vessel head penetrations (9, 43 and 51) that did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1. The station is in a refueling outage (RF21) and the plant is currently shutdown and defueled. The reactor vessel head contains a total of 66 penetrations and the volumetric inspection efforts are complete.
"The indications are not through wall as indicated by volumetric and bare metal visual inspections. The penetrations will be repaired to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a prior to returning the vessel head to service. The inspection results are reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of South Carolina and local counties."
* * * UPDATE FROM BETH DALICK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1302 EDT ON 4/26/14 * * *
"On April 26, 2014, V. C. Summer Station (VCSNS) Unit 1 finalized the inspections of the reactor vessel head penetrations. Confirmatory dye penetrant inspections determined that penetrations 15 and 22 also did not meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1. The station is in a refueling outage (RF21) and the plant is currently shutdown and defueled.
"The indications are not through wall as indicated by volumetric and bare metal visual inspections. The penetrations will be repaired to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a prior to returning the vessel head to service.
"The inspection results are reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"The licensee will notify the State of South Carolina and local counties."
Notified R2DO (McCoy).
"On April 18, 2014, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Unit 1 identified 3 reactor vessel head penetrations (9, 43 and 51) that did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1. The station is in a refueling outage (RF21) and the plant is currently shutdown and defueled. The reactor vessel head contains a total of 66 penetrations and the volumetric inspection efforts are complete.
"The indications are not through wall as indicated by volumetric and bare metal visual inspections. The penetrations will be repaired to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a prior to returning the vessel head to service. The inspection results are reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of South Carolina and local counties."
* * * UPDATE FROM BETH DALICK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1302 EDT ON 4/26/14 * * *
"On April 26, 2014, V. C. Summer Station (VCSNS) Unit 1 finalized the inspections of the reactor vessel head penetrations. Confirmatory dye penetrant inspections determined that penetrations 15 and 22 also did not meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1. The station is in a refueling outage (RF21) and the plant is currently shutdown and defueled.
"The indications are not through wall as indicated by volumetric and bare metal visual inspections. The penetrations will be repaired to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a prior to returning the vessel head to service.
"The inspection results are reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"The licensee will notify the State of South Carolina and local counties."
Notified R2DO (McCoy).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50191
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN JARRELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN JARRELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 06/12/2014
Notification Time: 09:31 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2014
Event Time: 04:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2014
Notification Time: 09:31 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2014
Event Time: 04:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
MASONEILAN ACTUATORS DISCOVERED TO FAIL-CLOSED INSTEAD OF THE REQUIRED FAIL-OPEN CONFIGURATION
"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning the deviation of a basic component from manufacturing purchase specifications.
"On 04/18/2014, during pneumatic actuator replacement for Emergency Feedwater [EFW] valve EFW-224A (EFW to Steam Generator #1 Primary Flow Control Valve), it was identified that the fail action of the actuator was incorrect in that it was in a fail-closed instead of fail-open configuration. The actuator model, as identified in Waterford 3 site receipt/acceptance document and the actuator's name plate data, was a Masoneilan model 47 Sigma-F, which is specified as a fail-open actuator. However, the actuator was discovered to have a fail closed action, which is indicative of a Masoneilan model 48 actuator.
"The fail-action of these Masoneilan Sigma-F actuators can be changed in accordance with its technical manual TDM120.0565 with no additional parts; therefore, Waterford 3 corrected the fail action of EFW-224A's replacement actuator (to fail-open) and ensured the handwheel indicator was corrected prior to entering mode 4.
"Two of these actuators were received and accepted as Masoneilan model 47 Sigma-F (fail-open) actuators in September of 2010, both of which were labeled as such, yet configured in the fail-closed action. One of these two actuators remains in the warehouse and has been placed on hold. The vendor, Dresser Masoneilan, has been notified in writing on May 12, 2014.
"On 6/9/2014 at approximately 1600 CDT, Entergy concluded that for those potential applications of this valve operator model in the EFW system, had they been installed without correcting the deviation, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard in that it could have prevented fulfillment of EFW safety function, and therefore reportable under 10CFR PART 21. The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed on 06/11/2014."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning the deviation of a basic component from manufacturing purchase specifications.
"On 04/18/2014, during pneumatic actuator replacement for Emergency Feedwater [EFW] valve EFW-224A (EFW to Steam Generator #1 Primary Flow Control Valve), it was identified that the fail action of the actuator was incorrect in that it was in a fail-closed instead of fail-open configuration. The actuator model, as identified in Waterford 3 site receipt/acceptance document and the actuator's name plate data, was a Masoneilan model 47 Sigma-F, which is specified as a fail-open actuator. However, the actuator was discovered to have a fail closed action, which is indicative of a Masoneilan model 48 actuator.
"The fail-action of these Masoneilan Sigma-F actuators can be changed in accordance with its technical manual TDM120.0565 with no additional parts; therefore, Waterford 3 corrected the fail action of EFW-224A's replacement actuator (to fail-open) and ensured the handwheel indicator was corrected prior to entering mode 4.
"Two of these actuators were received and accepted as Masoneilan model 47 Sigma-F (fail-open) actuators in September of 2010, both of which were labeled as such, yet configured in the fail-closed action. One of these two actuators remains in the warehouse and has been placed on hold. The vendor, Dresser Masoneilan, has been notified in writing on May 12, 2014.
"On 6/9/2014 at approximately 1600 CDT, Entergy concluded that for those potential applications of this valve operator model in the EFW system, had they been installed without correcting the deviation, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard in that it could have prevented fulfillment of EFW safety function, and therefore reportable under 10CFR PART 21. The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed on 06/11/2014."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.