Event Notification Report for April 16, 2014

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO MINOR HYDRAULIC OIL SPILL IN THE DELAWARE RIVER

"At 0908 EDT on April 16th, 2014, approximately one pint of hydraulic fluid was spilled into the Delaware River in front of the Unit One Circulating Water System (CWS) Intake trash racks at the Salem Generating Station. The spill of hydraulic fluid was caused by a leak from the crane used to rake debris from the Unit One trash racks. The crane was stopped and the leak terminated at the time of discovery. The oil was cleaned up by onsite personnel at 0930 EDT.

"Nuclear Environmental Affairs Department determined a 4 hr report to the NRC under RAL 11.8.2.a. was warranted due to the 15 minute notification to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection at 0922 EDT. Additionally, a report of the spill was made to the National Response Center at 1034 EDT."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA FAILURE OF SOURCE TO RETRACT TO SAFE POSITION

The following was received from the State of Illinois via email:

"On Wednesday at midday, the Regional Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for the licensee's South Roxana, IL area was called by their two man crew working at the WRB Refinery in Roxana, IL. The crew reported that following a sixth 'shot' on an elevated tank from an overhead platform, the source to the radiography camera would not retract into the safe position. The source had previously been 'run out' to a distance of just over 7 feet into a collimator, and although the crank and assembly rotated freely without notable restriction through two ninety degree turns, the source would not enter the camera. The crew reported that the guide tube had not been affected during the previous shots and noted that the equipment had regularly passed the routine maintenance inspection prior to that day.

"The Regional RSO assembled his emergency response equipment kit and arrived at the site approximately 30 minutes later. The crew had maintained a perimeter and advised responsible site safety personnel of the matter with instructions to ensure the affected area was to remain off limits until the situation was resolved. The Regional RSO inspected the guide tube and set up and like the crew was unable to retract the source. Calls were then placed to the company's regional management and to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency to advise of the situation. The set up was disassembled and the collimated end point placed into a shielded configuration using bags of lead shot so that the full length of the guide tube could be more closely inspected. Minor dents and obstructions of the guide tube were noted and although when corrected by the Regional RSO, would still not allow the source to be safely returned. With the help of the radiography crew, the camera and guide tube assembly was subsequently moved to a more accessible lower platform by the Regional RSO to allow for additional inspection and to create a more direct path. The source however would still not retract into the camera. Dose rates with the source in the collimator were measured as 390 millirem at 8 feet and 695 millirem at 6 feet which was the closest distance the Regional RSO remained in. Additional support from the regional office was requested to thoroughly patrol the boundaries of the area as it appeared additional time was going to be required and the camera would need to be lowered further to gain better access for potential repairs.

"While additional equipment was being collected from the regional office, the manufacturer was advised of the situation and consulted. The manufacturer suggested the issue may lie with the drive cables from the reserve crank end and they would likely have to be disconnected from the source cable. When the additional equipment arrived, the crank housing was disconnected from the camera following the manufacturer's suggestion and from a distance, the cable was manually retracted. The source subsequently was returned to the shielded and locked position with no further difficulties. The total time for recovery was approximately two and a half hours.

"Later, close inspection of the drive crank assembly showed that the reserve section of the crank had been subjected to heat or burned such that the exterior plastic covering had melted along approximately 3 inches of its length. Upon testing, this damaged section prohibited movement of the cable past this point. It's surmised that the crank assembly may have come to rest against an uninsulated section of the piping while taking shots that morning at the refinery that led to the burning/melting of the protective covering over the braided cable which led to the inability to retract the source.

"A check of the Regional RSO direct reading dosimeter showed less than 80 millirem as a result of the recovery operation. Members of the radiography crew received a total dose for the day of less than 100 millirem. The camera was last inspected by the manufacturer on March 14, 2014 and the manufacturer's associated equipment on February 4, 2014 by the Regional RSO. The associated equipment is being returned to the manufacturer for evaluation and repair/replacement."

Illinois event # IL14007

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR INADVERTENT FAST START OF DIESEL GENERATOR DURING TESTING

"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), this 60-day telephone notification addresses an unplanned, invalid actuation of the 2B-B Diesel Generator (DG). The event occurred on 04/16/2014 at approximately 0148 EDT while Watts Bar (WBN) Unit 1 was in Mode 6 for a refueling outage. At this time, an 18 month performance of 0-SI-82-6, '18 Month Loss of Offsite Power DG 2B-B,' was in process which required that 2-HS-82-113 (Maint-Auto Hand Switch Generator 2B-B) be placed in the Auto position. When this action was taken, the 2B-B DG experienced a fast start. At 0314 EDT on 04/16/2014, while in the process of stopping the DG, the DG experienced a second fast start. For both starts of the 2B-B DG, the DG successfully functioned and achieved its rated speed of 900 RPM. Following the second start of the 2B-B DG, an emergency stop was performed on the DG in accordance with SOI 82.04, 'Diesel Generator (DG) 2B-B.' The cause of the invalid starts was determined to be an intermittent open between a relay pin on the R3 relay (DG start relay) and the relay base due to oxidation. This event was documented in TVA's corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 872575.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."