Event Notification Report for April 02, 2014

CONSOLE KEY LEFT UNATTENDED

After performing routine maintenance and surveillance procedures, the reactor operator left the reactor control room for a rest break. During this break the reactor operator left the console key inserted and unattended in the console. Another operator came by and noticed that the key was in the console without the other reactor operator in the control room. The second reactor operator notified the reactor manager. The reactor manager immediately removed the key from the console. The reactor manager then suspended the first reactor operator's operating rights until corrective actions have been determined and implemented.

During the time the key was unattended, all control elements were fully inserted. Based upon video review, the length of time the key was unattended was 14 minutes.

The relevant Technical Specification to this situation is 6.1.3 (Staffing): the minimum staffing when the reactor is operating shall be one licensed reactor operator in the control room.

The licensee notified NRC NPR (Adams and Bassett).


* * * RETRACTION FROM MICHAEL KRAUSE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1934 EDT ON 4/29/2014 * * *

"SUMMARY: After further review the facility has determined that the 'Unattended Key Left in Console' event originally reported as a reportable occurrence was indeed not a reportable occurrence and retracts the official notice, changing the notification to a for your information only as was discussed with the facility NRC Project Manager Alexander Adams in a call following the notification.

"DETAILS: On April 2, 2014, after the reactor had been shutdown for an extended period due to maintenance repairs, an operator was performing surveillance / maintenance activities which required the console key to be inserted into the reactor control system. The maintenance was done with the reactor in the shutdown mode with the reactor subcritical by more than $1.00. After a portion of the maintenance was completed, the operator left the control room for a short break and did not remove the reactor key from the console before leaving the room. All control rods were fully down at the time the operator left the room and remained in that condition for 14 minutes until the key was removed from the console by the reactor manager. A review of video surveillance confirmed the reactor remained shutdown while the key was unattended. The facility does not normally leave the key unattended in the control console so the initial response was to report this event as a reportable occurrence based on the Standard English Dictionary definition of shutdown. A follow-up review of the requirements in the Technical Specification Section 6.1.3 required a licensed operator in the control room when the reactor was not 'Shutdown', with 'Shutdown' defined in Technical Specification Section 1.19 as the reactor subcritical by at least $1.00. Since the reactor was clearly shutdown based on the Technical Specification definition, the report of a reportable occurrence is hereby retracted and the notification can be interpreted as a for your information notice only. Nonetheless, the operator who left the key in the console was given retraining and review by the reactor manager prior to being allowed to resume licensed activities since his actions had come very close to a Technical Specification violation."

Notified R4DO (Haire), and NRC NPR (Adams and Schoenebeck).

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO TWO AIR LOCK DOORS OPEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

"At 0123 EDT on April 2, 2014, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Refueling, and in the other specified condition of Operations with Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessel. During this condition both redundant personnel airlock doors were open at the same time in an airlock penetration of the reactor building. This condition represents a loss of Secondary Containment safety function. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Action A.1 was entered for the loss of Secondary Containment and was promptly exited when the doors were closed.

"Secondary containment being inoperable is an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO TOXIC GAS RELEASE

"Release of toxic or flammable gas affecting the Protected Area boundary deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant."

Emergency Action Level entered: MU-1. The leak is Trichloroethylene (TCE) gas used in the Off-Gas building. The Off-Gas building ground and basement levels were evacuated due to the leak. There is no safe-shutdown equipment located in the Off-Gas building. The licensee is working to isolate the leak.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

The licensee notified the State of Ohio and the local counties.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, DOE Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, and Nuclear SSA via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1630 EDT ON 4/2/14 FROM DON ROGERS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee notified the following outside agencies: U.S. EPA National Response Center, Ohio EPA, Perry Township Fire Department, Lake County Emergency Planning Committee, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

Notified R3DO (Passehl).

* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL ADLER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0115 EDT ON 04/05/2014 * * *

"Unusual Event has been terminated on 4/5/2014 at 0059 EDT. The trichloroethylene leak has been stopped. Access has been restored to all normally accessible areas."

Unit 1 remains in Mode 1 at 100% power.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Local and State emergency agencies.

Notified the IRD MOC (Gott), R3DO (Passehl), and NRR EO (McGinty).

Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email.

ALERT DECLARED DUE TO FIRE IN UNIT 2 TURBINE BUILDING

"Quad Cities Unit 2 Alert Classification (HA3) Due to Fire.

"On April 2, 2014, at 1340 CDT, an ALERT was declared due to a fire in the Unit 2 turbine building. Prior to declaring the ALERT, Unit 2 was manually scrammed at 1302 CDT. All control rods inserted and all automatic isolations actuated as designed. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed. The fire has been extinguished. Unit 2 is currently in Hot Shutdown.

"The cause of the event is under investigation.

"Unit 1 remains at 100% power.

"The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the event."

Unit 2 is still being supplied from off-site power and is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup with the exception of Bus 29-1 (480 VAC safety bus) that was deenergized. One Unit 2 emergency diesel generator is inoperable due to the loss of power to its cooling water pump.

The licensee has notified the State and local agencies.

Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HAYES TO DONG PARK AT 2252 EDT ON 04/02/2014 * * *

At 2132 CDT on April 2, 2014, the licensee terminated the Unit 2 Alert declaration. Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown). Unit 2 is proceeding to Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) on shutdown cooling.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State emergency agencies.

Notified the IRD (Gott), R3DO (Passehl), and NRR EO (McGinty).

Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON TWO NUCLEAR GAUGES

The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On April 2, 2014, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of Health] that earlier that morning, while it was doing lockouts on fixed nuclear gauges in preparation for the annual shutdown of its facility, the handles on two shutters broke. The handles sheared their roll pins. The two gauges are mounted on digesters and are used for level control. The licensee was able to close one of the shutters, but the other shutter remains stuck in the open position. There is no exposure risk to any person. The licensee contacted a service company and arrangements have been made for the company to come on-site and make repairs next week.

"Device #1 Information: Kay Ray, Model 7063, 1.5 curies cesium-137 (original activity in 1972)
"Device #2 Information: Kay Ray, Model 7063P, 1.0 curie cesium-137 (original activity in 1972)

"Further information will be provided per SA-300 as it is obtained."

Texas Incident #: I-9175

FIRE RELATED UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT COULD IMPACT CREDITED SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS

"This is a non-emergency notification. As part of converting to NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 805, Catawba determined that there are conditions that may not ensure required equipment remains available under certain postulated fire scenarios. The determination concluded that the effects of a postulated fire in specific fire areas could prevent critical systems or components from performing their intended functions, potentially resulting in the inability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

"Affected fire areas are as follows (elevation numbers are in parentheses):
1. Residual Heat Removal/Containment Spray Pump Room (522)
2. Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (543)
3. Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (543)
4. Auxiliary Building Common Area (543)
5. Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Room (560)
6. Unit 1 Electrical Penetration Room (560)
7. 2ETB Switchgear Room (560)
8. 1ETB Switchgear Room (560)
9. Unit 2 Battery Room (554)
10. Unit 1 Battery Room (554)
11. Auxiliary Building Common Area (560)
14. Unit 2 ETA Switchgear Room (577)
15. Unit 1 ETA Switchgear Room (577)
17. Unit 1 Cable Room (574)
18. Auxiliary Building Common Area (577)
20. Unit 1 Electrical Penetration Room (594)
45. Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor (574)
46. Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor (574)
48. Unit 2 Inside Doghouse
49. Unit 1 Inside Doghouse
RB1. Unit 1 Reactor Building
RB2. Unit 2 Reactor Building

"This is reportable as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Fire watches have been implemented as appropriate in response to this determination. This condition has been entered into the Catawba Corrective Action Program.

"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified."

The licensee will notify the State of North Carolina and South Carolina and well as the local counties.