Event Notification Report for March 14, 2014

HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER SYSTEMS DECLARED INOPERABLE

"On 3/14/2014 at 1330 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified by Fire Services that adequate pressure could not be verified during post maintenance testing of an inoperable High Pressure Fire Water System for the C-335 building. During investigation into the issue, it was discovered that eleven operable High Pressure Fire Water Systems were also impacted. The facility is in TSR mode three as all cells have been sampled UF6 negative and the cell motors are not energized. In this mode, the High Pressure Fire Water Systems are still required to be operable per TSR 2.4.4.6; however, due to inadequate pressure, the eleven systems may not have been able to perform the intended safety function. The eleven operable High Pressure Fire Water Systems were declared inoperable and hourly fire patrols were initiated according to TSR LCO 2.4.4.5.9.1 at 1520 hours on 3/14/2014.

"On 2/26/2014 at 1212 hours, three High Pressure Fire Water System Sectional Valves were isolated and declared inoperable in order to isolate a section of header which contained a small leak. Isolating these valves resulted in a single supply to twelve High Pressure Fire Water Systems in C-335. Upon investigation of the lack of pressure, it was determined that the sectional supply valve in the remaining supply loop was not operating as designed and is suspected to be the cause of the restricted water flow.

"Sectional supply valves that had been used for isolation of the small leak have been opened to provide unrestricted flow to the affected sprinkler systems. Following the confirmation of adequate flow, the sprinkler systems were declared operable and the hourly fire patrols were discontinued at 1739 hours on 3/14/2014. The small leak will be monitored until repairs can be initiated or the leak becomes unmanageable. At that point TSR LCO actions will be entered as necessary.

"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Region II (Marvin Sykes) has been notified of this event via voice mail."

POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"While evaluating IER 13-54, regarding the impact of unfused direct current (DC) circuits, a determination was made that the described condition is applicable to Edwin I. Hatch Units 1 and 2 for reactor protection system (RPS) battery/battery charger ammeter circuits. This results in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10CFR50 Appendix R analysis requirements.

"In the postulated event, a fire induced hot short could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment. The Unit 1 and 2 RPS battery/battery charger ammeter indication circuits are routed from the affected components to the main control room. It is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage the affected cables and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cable and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10CFR50 Appendix R.

"Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for the affected areas of the plant. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

UNPLANNED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF A CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL

"An employee with a wooden splinter in his right hand reported to the on-site dispensary this afternoon. The plant nurse administered first aid. A whole body survey of the employee in his plant clothing was performed; the maximum amount of contamination present was on the employee's right boot, 2760 dpm/100cm2. The plant nurse allowed the employee to return to work. The employee remained inside the Restricted Area over the course of the event."

The licensee will inform R2 (Hartland).

LOUISIANA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO ABANDONED WELL LOGGING SOURCES

The following information was obtained from the State of Louisiana via facsimile:

"Event Location: The source became stuck down hole at Deer Island CL&F 005, Terrebonne Parish, LA

"Event type: Two sources were in a device used to log down hole wells. The two sources became lodged down hole and Baker Hughes, after 'fishing', decided to cap the location and go around the sources. Cement and a whip-stock were used as deflection devices.

"Notifications: LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] was notified of the lodged sources on March 17, 2014 @ 15:00 hrs. [CDT]. At that time, Baker Hughes requested to plug the lodged location and place a deflection device to continue their work. The request was granted.

"Event description: On March 17, 2014, Baker Hughes contacted LDEQ reporting that two well-logging sources became stuck down hole; a QSA Global 2.5 Ci Cs-137 source, SR# 90652B and a QSA Global 5 Ci Am/Be neutron source, SR# 77860B. A request to continue work was granted after a cement plug and a whip stock deflection device was placed at the location of the lodged sources. This incident was reported and will be abandoned and maintained by the requirements of LAC 33:XV.2051 and 2099 Appendix B.

"The Department [LDEQ] considers this event closed."

Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA-140003