Event Notification Report for March 13, 2014

CONTAMINATED PLANT EMPLOYEE RECEIVED MEDICAL TREATMENT INSIDE THE RESTRICTED AREA

"An employee with a wooden splinter in his right hand reported to the on-site dispensary this afternoon. The plant nurse administered first aid. A whole body survey of the employee in his plant clothing was performed; the maximum amount of contamination present was on the employee's right pant leg, 12,550 dpm/100cm2. The plant nurse allowed the employee to return to work. The employee remained inside the Restricted Area over the course of the event."

The licensee will inform R2 (Hartland).

POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of industry Operating Experience identified that there were unprotected DC control circuits for non safety-related DC motors which are routed from the turbine building to other separate fire areas. Fuses used to protect the motor power conductors appear to be inadequate to protect the control conductors. The concern is that under fire safe shutdown conditions, it is postulated that a fire in one area can cause short circuits potentially resulting in secondary fires or cable failures in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis.

"This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
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STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM SAMPLE CONCENTRATION OUTSIDE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS

"On March 13, 2014 at 0631 EDT, sample analysis of the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System tank yielded a sodium pentaborate concentration outside the technical specification [TS] limits, rendering both subsystems inoperable. The sodium pentaborate concentration was found to be 4 parts per million low, at 13.598% by weight, below the required concentration of 13.6% by weight. The Standby Liquid Control System tank concentration was diluted during restoration activities following planned maintenance of the B Standby Liquid Control System pump. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Chemical addition to the Standby Liquid Control System tank is in progress to restore the sodium pentaborate concentration to within Technical Specification limits."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

* * * RETRACTION FROM KEN BRESLIN TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/14/2014 AT 1329 EDT * * *

"A subsequent review of the analytical data has determined that the SLC tank sample met the Technical Specification requirement for operability (13.6 weight percent) and therefore, there was no reportable condition.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified the R1DO (Burritt).

APPARENT SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK DOOR INTERLOCK MALFUNCTION

"At 0937 EDT on March 13, 2014, Operations determined that both the inner and outer secondary containment airlock doors, on the 50 foot elevation of the reactor building, had been simultaneously opened for approximately one minute. This event occurred while an employee was exiting secondary containment at the same time when an employee was attempting to enter secondary containment. Upon recognition of the condition, the employees took action to secure both doors. The apparent cause of this event was malfunction of the secondary containment airlock door interlock. However, upon investigation no failures of the interlock could be identified. The interlock was satisfactorily tested multiple times following the event.

"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. With both doors open, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.3 of Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Secondary Containment, was not met, rendering secondary containment inoperable. At the time at the time of the condition, Unit 1 was engaged in Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) and was crediting Secondary Containment as Operable.

"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.

"The safety significance of this is minimal. Secondary containment was only inoperable for approximately one minute. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.

"The door interlock was investigated and tested multiple times with no abnormalities noted.

"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified."

The licensee is establishing a door watch as a compensatory measure.

WELDING PROGRAM DEVIATIONS DURING CONSTRUCTION

"This is a 10CFR50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project.

"In March, 2014, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for welding program deviations associated with the fabrication of sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified.

"This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10CFR50.55(e)(5)(i)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

WELDING PROGRAM DEVIATIONS DURING CONSTRUCTION

"This is a 10CFR50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub modules for the Virgil C. Summer Units 2 and 3 construction project.

"In March, 2014, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for welding program deviations associated with the fabrication of sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified.

"This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10CFR50.55(e)(5)(i)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.