Event Notification Report for February 18, 2014

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On March 7, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that one of its vehicles had been stolen on February 18, 2014. The vehicle contained a moisture density gauge, Troxler model 3340, serial number 17909, containing 1.48 GBq of Americium-241/Beryllium serial number 4713350 and 0.30 GBq of Cesium-137 serial number 507394. A local police report was filed. No recovery of vehicle or gauge. One violation cited for not reporting incident within regulatory timeframe. Any further information will be reported within SA 300 guidelines."

Texas Incident #: I-9162

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

RADIATION MONITORS WILL BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PRE-PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"The four Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors 3MSS*RE75, 3MSS*RE76, 3MSS*RE77 and 3MSS*RE78 along with Terry Turbine Aux Feedwater Steam Exhaust Radiation Monitor 3MSS*RE79 will be removed from service to support a scheduled design change.

"This condition is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"This equipment is expected to be restored to service within 72 hours."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

MOMENTARY LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

"At 0944 CST, on February 18, 2014, both doors in the Secondary Containment Airlock were opened concurrently. The doors being open at the same time caused a failure to meet SR 3.6.1.4.2 to verify that either the outer door(s) or the inner door(s) in each Secondary Containment access opening are closed. The identified condition caused Secondary Containment to be considered inoperable per TS LCO 3.6.1.4. Upon discovery, immediate action was taken to close the doors. This action allowed SR 3.6.4.1.2 to be met, and restored Secondary Containment to operable status.

"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

MOMENTARY LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Control the Release of Radioactive Material. An employee entered a secondary containment [airlock] interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 3 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room, has remained less than -0.25 inches H2O at all times. Initial investigation determined that a mechanical interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the mechanical interlock."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.