Event Notification Report for February 10, 2014

PART 21 REPORT - FAILED PRESSURE REGULATOR DURING POST-INSTALLATION EDG PRESSURE TESTING

"Component: Starting air pressure regulator (Nordberg P/N 1776 506).

"Summary: Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 12/13/13 upon completion of a failure analysis performed on a pressure regulator part number 1776 506 (S/N 20776487) that was returned by Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP) following a failure that occurred during post-installation pressure testing on their emergency diesel generator [EDG] set. The downstream pressure would not maintain its set point and began to equalize to the inlet pressure.

"This evaluation was concluded on 02/10/14 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR Part 21. The failure to regulate downstream pressure is attributed to an o-ring within the piston guide assembly of the pressure regulating valve that was improperly installed at the factory. Failure of the o-ring's pressure boundary allows inlet pressure to leak to the outlet pressure side eventually causing equalization to occur. This equalization is undesirable since it could lead to pressures that exceed the capabilities of the engine's downstream air start solenoid valve; thereby potentially preventing the diesel engine from starting during an emergency event and performing its safety related function."

SOURCE LOST DURING SHIPMENT

"A shipment of licensed material was shipped from our CBRNE Analytical and Remediation Activity, CARA, located in Pine Bluff, AR on 3 February 2014 was not received by the consignee, Frontier Technology Corporation, 1641 Burnett Drive, Xenia, OH 45385, [Ohio license # - 03214290000]

"The source, a 1.3 mCi Frontier Model 100 Cf-252 source Serial Number 4151, was shipped in a DOT Spec 7A Type A container. The transportation index on the package was 2.

"This was one of two items shipped from CARA, Pine Bluff, AR [scheduled to arrive on February 10, 2014]. The second source, serial number 4152, was received by Frontier Technology Corporation today along with an unrelated package containing what appeared to be environmental samples in a combination package."

Common Carrier has not claimed that they have lost physical control.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

PART 21 REPORT - INSTRUCTION LEAFLET FOR SUBJECT RELAYS MAY BE DEFICIENT

The following Part 21 Report was received via facsimile:

"On December 12, 2013, ABB determined that that its Instruction Leaflet 41-682.11 (effective September 2002) for the subject relays may be deficient with regards to the external diagram connection.

"With the relay connected per the typical connections shown in the instruction leaflet and the relay having verified a synchronous condition for a period of time ranging from several minutes to hours, the main element contact identified as 'CVX-1' may become stuck in the closed position. Again, this situation is dependent on each customer's control power connection scheme and may be more prevalent in certain applications, such as fast bus transfer or tie breaker applications. In cases where the contact remains closed, it may result in an unwanted connection of two asynchronous systems when the command to connect them is issued, leading to equipment damage and possible bodily injury or death. We will be updating our instruction leaflet in February 2014, to reflect the addition of an interposing contact in the control circuit to prevent this condition.

"ABB's records indicate that 15 relays were supplied to Exelon (Clinton Nuclear Station), 4 relays were supplied to Duke Energy (Oconee Nuclear Station) and 10 relays were supplied to ABB d.o.o. (Slovenia).

"ABB has determined, as of the date of this notification, that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 CFR 21.2l(b), is making this notification simultaneously to our customers so they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, in accordance with 10 CFR 21(a)."

SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY AFFECTING EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY

The licensee also reported an additional 8 hour Non-emergency report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)

"On February 10, 2014, [at 1650 CST] Monticello station personnel identified a vulnerability where a single failure could result in the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) picking up load on the essential busses in a time frame longer than what is required by Monticello Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement [TS SR] 3.8.1.12. This surveillance requires that on a simulated or actual loss of off-site power signal in conjunction with an actual or simulated ECCS initiation signal, the Emergency Diesel Generators auto-start from standby condition and energize permanently connected loads in approximately 10 seconds. The single failure vulnerability could result in the EDGs energizing the connected loads in a slightly longer time period based upon actual test data (< 11 seconds).

"As a result, Technical Specification SR 3.8.1.12 was declared not met and both EDGs were declared inoperable. Monticello has subsequently isolated the single failure vulnerability and declared the EDGs operable. The station remained in a safe condition during the discovery of this vulnerability. Both EDGs remain available and functional [and operable], off-site power remains available, and the plant continues to operate in a normal condition with no initiating events present."

The single failure vulnerability was associated with the 1AR 13.8KV transformer logic. The 1AR transformer is one of three off-site power sources. 1R and 2R meet the TS requirements for Off-site power.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Minnesota Duty Officer.