Event Notification Report for February 07, 2014

SINGLE DRYWELL TO TORUS VACUUM BREAKER NOT GOING FULLY CLOSED DURING SURVEILLANCE TEST

"After cycling AO-2382A (Drywell to Torus Vacuum Breaker) for surveillance testing, it did not indicate fully closed. The procedure for this condition was entered and after cycling the valve several times, the vacuum breaker indicated full closed. During the approximately eight minutes that the indication showed that it was not closed, the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requirement was not met. After validation that the vacuum breaker had opened as required, and was closed successfully, the safety function was restored. The health and safety of the public was not jeopardized as the plant was in a normal condition and an initiating event was not in progress.

"The USAR [Updated Safety Analysis Report] assumes all eight vacuum breakers to be closed. This condition therefore put the nuclear power plant in an unanalyzed condition and is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"This condition, at time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Minnesota Duty Officer, and the local counties.

PART 21 INTERIM REPORTING REGARDING TRICENTRIC TRIPLE OFFSET BUTTERFLY VALVES

The following is a summary of information provided via facsimile:

"Based on recent testing conducted on a 24 inch Class 150 TRICENTRIC [triple offset butterfly valve] to evaluate bearing coefficients of friction (COF), it has been determined that there exists an unseating load that has not been accounted for on our TRICENTRIC Triple Offset Product Line.

"Weir has not experienced a field failure of the product, but recent testing by a customer indicated anomalies that required review by Weir. The review of the unseating anomaly relates to two inputs; the inputted seating torque and increases in differential pressure across the disc after initial closure. Weir has developed a conservative approach for calculating this additional loading.

"Weir has reviewed data from customers for several recent orders, and has determined that there is a minimal risk of failure of an item to perform its safety function. However, based on the safety related functions of these items, Weir cannot provide absolute assurance of operability on items in service without confirming with the end user. Weir will be releasing an industry notice that will address our initial findings, continue with the detailed investigation, and advise customers concerning the recommended corrective actions."

Known customer - PSEG

UNAVAILABILIITY OF TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM DUE TO SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE

"At 03:00 EST on Friday, February 7, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems will be removed from service for scheduled maintenance.

"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary.

"TSC ventilation system maintenance and post maintenance testing is scheduled to be completed by 16:00 EST on
Friday, February 7.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY BRAD LEWIS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1605 ON 02/07/2014 * * *

"TSC ventilation system was returned to service following successful maintenance and post maintenance testing at 14:30 EST on Friday, February 7, 2014. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified R3DO (Orlikowski)

PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE OVER LEAK RATE LIMIT

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'Initiation of a Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications.'

"At 2043 hours [EST] on February 06, 2014, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant entered Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs), action C.1, due to leakage identified during local leak rate testing of the containment penetration for the Containment and Drywell Purge system. Leakage was identified on the outboard containment isolation valve resulting in the plant exceeding the limit for secondary containment bypass leakage. The Containment and Drywell Purge system penetration is normally isolated and remains isolated in accordance with Technical Specifications. Action C.1 requires restoration of the leakage rate within four hours. At 0043 hours on February 7, 2014, the plant entered Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, 'Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)', action E as the leakage rate was not restored. Action E requires the plant be in Mode 3 in 12 hours and Mode 4 in 36 hours.

"At 0600 hours on February 07, 2014, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant initiated a shutdown in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, action E. Repairs to restore the penetration leakage to within allowable limits are in progress."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY DAVE ODONNELL TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1220 EST ON 02/07/2014 * * *

"At 0943 hours [EST] the reactor shutdown to comply with Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 action E was terminated [with the reactor at 42% power]. A blind flange was installed downstream of the outboard containment isolation valve. Local leak rate testing of the containment penetration for the Containment and Drywell Purge system verified that leakage was within the limits for secondary containment bypass leakage.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee has commenced increasing reactor power.

Notified R3DO (Orlikowski)

SHIELD BUILDING VENT GAS RADIATION MONITOR FAILURE

"At 0620 CST on February 7, 2014, 1R-22 Shield Building Vent Gas Radiation Monitor failed and was declared nonfunctional. This monitor has no compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels (EALs); NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert classifications when out of service. It is also used for offsite dose projection calculations. This results in a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability while 1R-22 is out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"Unit 1 Shield Building Ventilation Stack is also monitored by high range monitor, 1R-50, which is used for the same purpose in Site Area or General Emergency classifications. 1R-50 is being monitored and is indicating normal values. There are no radioactive leaks that will impact the Shield Building as evidenced by normal readings on 1R-22 prior to its failure. Corrective maintenance is in progress and will continue until the monitor is
returned to service. Maintenance will not result in the unplanned release of radioactivity to the environment and will not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNKNOWN RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DISCOVERED IN GARBAGE TRUCK AT LANDFILL

The following is a summary of information provided via email from the State of Arkansas:

On February 7, 2014, the Environmental Manager of Republic Services, Inc. contacted the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) to inform the State that a gate radiation monitor at a landfill near Bauxite, AR had alarmed for an incoming garbage truck. ADH sent three health physicists to inspect the truck. Initial surveys indicated the highest reading on contact on the bottom of the truck of 3.7 mR/hr. ADH was unable to identify the specific isotope. The truck was isolated and ADH returned on February 10, 2014 to survey and evaluate the material on the truck. ADH observed removal of the trash from the truck and identified a vacuum cleaner bag inside a bag of trash that contained the radioactive material. The vacuum cleaner bag was removed and placed in a five gallon plastic bucket which was posted and securely stored in a storage room at the landfill. The survey readings on the side of the bucket were 20 mR/hr.

ADH returned on February 12, 2014 to survey the vacuum cleaner bag and evaluate for radioactive decay. The plastic bucket continued to read 20 mR/hr on contact. Further radiation surveys showed highest reading on contact with the plastic bucket were 42 mR/hr and 200 mR/hr localized near the bottom of the vacuum cleaner bag. ADH notified Republic Services, Inc. of the necessity to hire a consultant for identification and disposal of the radioactive material. ADH plans to be present when the consultant is onsite.

Arkansas Report Number: AR-2014-002

* * * UPDATE FROM KAYLA AVERY TO DANIEL MILLS VIA EMAIL ON 6/25/14 AT 1107 EDT * * *

"On March 7, 2014, Chase Environmental Group arrived at the Saline County Landfill, owned by Republic Services, Inc. that is located in Bauxite, Arkansas. The vacuum cleaner bag was opened and the Radioactive Waste Specialists attempted to analyze the material. However, the Exploranium meter could not identify the radionuclide. The material was packaged and transported by Chase Environmental Group to Teledyne Brown Engineering in Knoxville, Tennessee for sampling and disposal. A report from Chase Environmental Group was received on June 20, 2014, which stated that the material contained Cobalt-56, but the activity could not be determined. The Department [ADH] was also not able to determine where this radioactive material came from or how the material got into the public domain.

"The Arkansas Department of Health considers this incident to be closed."

Notified R4DO (Allen) and FSME Events Resource email.