Event Notification Report for February 06, 2014

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCONNECT AND RETRIEVAL

The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:

"On February 7, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) a source disconnect had occurred on February 6, 2014. The disconnect occurred while radiographers were working at a field location using a QSA model 880D exposure device with a 39 curie iridium-192 source.

"The radiographers were working in a shooting bay and had been working for about five hours when the problem occurred. The RSO stated the radiographer had extended the source to the collimator and was attempting to retract the source when the source moved a few inches and then could not be moved in any direction. The radiographer contacted the RSO who directed them to secure the area and wait for his arrival.

"The RSO and an assistant arrived at the facility and attempted to retract the source, but could not. The RSO stated the guide tube had a sharp bend near the area of the collimator and believed that could have damaged the guide tube causing the hang-up. The RSO disconnected the guide tube from the exposure device and using a remote handling tool, slid the guide tube down the drive cable. When the end of the drive cable was exposed, the RSO noted the source was not attached. He then shook the source from the guide tube and onto the ground. The source was covered with bags of lead shot.

"The RSO connected the source to the drive cable and was able to retract the source into the exposure device. The exposure device and drive cable connectors were tested using a go-no-go device and both passed. The highest exposure received from the source retrieval was 38 millirem. No overexposures occurred and no member of the general public was exposed due to this event. The RSO stated the guide tube would be returned to the manufacturer for inspection. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

TX Incident: I-9155

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER GAUGE STOLEN FROM TRUCK AT RESIDENCE

The State of Florida was notified at 0630 EST on 2/6/14, that the cab of a gauge user's truck was broken into and the case containing a Troxler Moisture-Density Gauge was stolen overnight at the gauge user's residence located in West Palm Beach, FL. The gauge, a model 3440, was properly stowed and locked in its case.

This gauge contained 5.7 mCi of Cs-137, and 39.1 mCi of Am-241:Be.

Local Law Enforcement is on-scene conducting an investigation.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE

"At approximately 0730 CST on February 6, 2014, 1R-22 Shield Building Vent Gas Radiation Monitor will be removed from service for planned maintenance. This monitor has no compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels (EALs), NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert classifications when out of service. It is also used for offsite dose projection calculations. This results in a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability while 1R-22 is out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"Unit 1 Shield Building Ventilation Stack is also monitored by high range monitor, 1R-50, which is used for the same purpose in Site Area or General Emergency classifications. 1R-50 is being monitored and is indicating normal values. There are no radioactive leaks that will impact the Shield Building as evidenced by normal readings on 1R-22 prior to removing it from service. This planned maintenance will not result in the unplanned release of radioactivity to the environment and will not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT COOLING WATER IN MANUAL OVERRIDE DUE TO HUMAN PERFORMANCE ERROR

"At 1254 [EST] on February 6, 2014, while shutting down Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW), a human performance error occurred resulting in the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch being placed in manual override. Division 2 EECW remained running and continued to operate normally. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. With the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch in manual override, Division 2 EECW may have been prevented from performing its safety function during a loss of power event. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to the Division 2 EECW inoperability which may have prevented HPCI from performing its safety function. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via T.S. LCO 3.5.1 and subsequently exited 36 seconds later upon returning the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch to normal. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee reported that the individuals involved have been removed from licensee duties pending further investigation.


* * * RETRACTION FROM PAUL GRESH TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0931 EDT ON 4/4/14 * * *

"The Fermi 2 Engineering staff has completed a comprehensive evaluation of the momentary mispositioning of the Division 2 EECW system overide switch initially reported on February 6, 2014.

"The evaluation determined that HPCI room temperature would remain below the HPCI room steam leak detection isolation logic setpoint in the unlikely event that the momentary mispositioning resulted in the temporary interruption of the cooling water flow to the HPCI system room cooler. Over the brief period of time for which EECW would have been unavailable to support the effective operation of the room cooler, its function was not necessary for HPCI to perform its required safety functions. Therefore, event notification 49801 is retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl).

UNANTICIPATED AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP START AFTER SECURING EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation.

"The monthly surveillance on 31 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was conducted on 6 February 2014. The EDG was unloaded and its output breaker opened at 1553 [EST]. At this time, the Non-SI Blackout Logic Defeated indication in the control room changed state from 'not illuminated' (logic defeated) to 'illuminated' (logic not defeated) without operator action. The steam-driven 32 Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump (ABFP) auto started but did not inject water into the steam generators. The discharge valves are normally closed. Operators verified normal steam generator levels and level control and that all 480VAC Safeguards buses remained energized, then secured 32 ABFP and placed it back into AUTO.

"Indian Point 3 remains at full power in Mode 1. This event did not cause any change in power.

"The Senior NRC Resident and the NY State Public Service Commission have been informed."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAS CHROMATOGRAPH

The following information was received from the State of New York via email:

"On October 19, 2015, the New York State Department of Health was informed by a representative from Zebra Environmental Corp., that between 2/5/2014 and 2/6/2014 a Hewlett Packard model 5890 Gas Chromatograph [GC] containing an electron capture detector with a 15 mCi Ni-63 source was stolen by forced entry. Several items, including the gas chromatograph, were stolen at a temporary job site [in] Asheville, North Carolina. The GC was stored in a locked trailer which was within a locked fenced in area. The local county police were notified and a report was submitted. The licensee failed to notify the New York State Department of Health at the time of the theft. The Department only learned of the incident on October 19, 2015 as part of the license renewal process. New York State Department of Health specifically licenses companies that use gas chromatographs at temporary job sites. A violation letter will be issued to the company for a number of code violations including failure to notify the Department immediately of the theft of licensed material."

NY Event Report ID No. NYDOH-15-10

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

The following was received from the State of Louisiana via fax:

"A general licensed device gauge, containing [decay] corrected 30.47 mCi of Cs-137, serial number B-0187 was improperly disposed of. A recycling company had with a torch burned into the gauge and had come within one (1) mm of the source capsule. The Department of Energy had exercised eminent domain and taken over the oil well next to a strategic reserve for their use during November 2011 from Boardwalk LA Midstream, LLC. The gauge was not leaking and the source capsule was still intact. QSA Global has accepted the gauge for disposal. The Department [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] considers this matter closed."

Louisiana report # LA-140004

INVALID ACTUATION OF A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to the invalid actuation of a containment isolation signal.

"On February 6, 2014, at 1143 [EST], with the plant in Mode 6 and fuel moves in-progress, an invalid containment isolation actuation signal was generated that affected containment isolation valves in more than one system and caused both trains of the control room heating, ventilation and cooling systems to swap from normal to emergency mode of operation. For both occurrences, all necessary follow-up actions were taken in accordance with the abnormal operating procedure for a spurious containment isolation event. All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design.

"The invalid actuation signal was caused by spurious upscale spikes in fuel handling area radiation monitor, RIA-2316. Actual radiation levels in the vicinity of RIA-2316 were verified to be normal and below the alarm set point. The indication on RIA-2316 spiked momentarily above the high alarm set point and then returned to normal levels. No alarms were received from the redundant fuel handling area radiation monitor, RIA-2317.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."