Event Notification Report for January 31, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/30/2014 - 01/31/2014
EVENT NUMBERS
49779497804978149782
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49779
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRED PERKINS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRED PERKINS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/31/2014
Notification Time: 04:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2014
Event Time: 03:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2014
Notification Time: 04:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2014
Event Time: 03:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 31 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO DEGRADATION OF THE PRESSURIZER PROPORTIONAL HEATERS GROUP 1
Operators commenced a Technical Specification required shutdown due a 480 volt supply breaker trip resulting in degradation of the Pressurizer Proportional Heaters Group 1. The licensee plans on making a containment entry to investigate the cause of the breaker trip.
The B-Emergency Diesel-Generator is currently inoperable for planned maintenance. Unit 2 is currently ramping down and proceeding to a shutdown. The plant is in a normal electrical configuration. There is no indication of any primary to secondary leakage. Unit 3 is unaffected.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Operators commenced a Technical Specification required shutdown due a 480 volt supply breaker trip resulting in degradation of the Pressurizer Proportional Heaters Group 1. The licensee plans on making a containment entry to investigate the cause of the breaker trip.
The B-Emergency Diesel-Generator is currently inoperable for planned maintenance. Unit 2 is currently ramping down and proceeding to a shutdown. The plant is in a normal electrical configuration. There is no indication of any primary to secondary leakage. Unit 3 is unaffected.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49780
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC POWELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC POWELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/31/2014
Notification Time: 11:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2014
Event Time: 10:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2014
Notification Time: 11:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2014
Event Time: 10:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP
"This 4-hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 has performed an unplanned manual reactor trip. The trip was initiated due to reactor coolant temperature approaching the minimum temperature for criticality, 543 degree F, due to boration to achieve shutdown margin requirements following identification of a misaligned control rod.
"All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] and ESF [Engineered Safety Features] systems functioned as expected with no equipment actuated. The 21 safety injection pump was out of service for scheduled maintenance during the event as was the 2R41 plant vent radiation monitor.
"Salem Unit 2 is currently in Mode 3. Reactor coolant system pressure is at 2235 psig and temperature is 547 degrees F with decay heat removal via the main steam dump and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown technical specification action statements in effect.
"There was no major secondary equipment tagged for maintenance prior to the event."
Prior to the event, the licensee was conducting their monthly control rod surveillance. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted during the transient. The electrical grid is stable and the plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. There was no effect on Unit 1.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of New Jersey, the State of Delaware and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
"This 4-hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 has performed an unplanned manual reactor trip. The trip was initiated due to reactor coolant temperature approaching the minimum temperature for criticality, 543 degree F, due to boration to achieve shutdown margin requirements following identification of a misaligned control rod.
"All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] and ESF [Engineered Safety Features] systems functioned as expected with no equipment actuated. The 21 safety injection pump was out of service for scheduled maintenance during the event as was the 2R41 plant vent radiation monitor.
"Salem Unit 2 is currently in Mode 3. Reactor coolant system pressure is at 2235 psig and temperature is 547 degrees F with decay heat removal via the main steam dump and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown technical specification action statements in effect.
"There was no major secondary equipment tagged for maintenance prior to the event."
Prior to the event, the licensee was conducting their monthly control rod surveillance. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted during the transient. The electrical grid is stable and the plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. There was no effect on Unit 1.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of New Jersey, the State of Delaware and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
Part 21
Event Number: 49781
Rep Org: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 01/31/2014
Notification Time: 13:39 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2014
Notification Time: 13:39 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION 50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION 50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
PART 21/50.55 - AP1000 UPDATED REACTOR COOLANT PUMP LOCKED ROTOR ANALYSIS
The following was received via facsimile:
"The purpose of this letter is to provide the Commission with the prescribed interim report as required per 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2) of a deviation identified by Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. This also will serve as an interim report under 10 CFR 50.55 (3)(ii) to the extent applicable.
"A postulated reactor coolant pump (RCP) locked rotor (LR) transient has been explicitly analyzed for the AP1000 steam generator (SG) structural design, as documented in the latest AP1000 Design Control Document (DCD), Revision 19. This includes the calculation of LR hydrodynamic forces (HF) on the SG using the BANG UP code. This activity was performed based upon the unique features of the AP1000 design. However, the other AP1000 reactor coolant system (RCS) structural component analyses have not considered the locked rotor transient for hydrodynamic forces, even though a determination has been made that the effects of these loads could be more bounding than the limiting design-basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) hydrodynamic forces (based on the BANG UP calculation of pressure pulsations through the RCS).
"Westinghouse has not yet completed its evaluation as to whether there is a reportable condition as defined in 10 CFR 21 (or 10 CFR 50.55 to the extent applicable) if the deviation is left uncorrected.
"Westinghouse expects to complete this evaluation by September 30, 2014. We will inform the staff if there are any changes to this schedule, prior to that date."
The following was received via facsimile:
"The purpose of this letter is to provide the Commission with the prescribed interim report as required per 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2) of a deviation identified by Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. This also will serve as an interim report under 10 CFR 50.55 (3)(ii) to the extent applicable.
"A postulated reactor coolant pump (RCP) locked rotor (LR) transient has been explicitly analyzed for the AP1000 steam generator (SG) structural design, as documented in the latest AP1000 Design Control Document (DCD), Revision 19. This includes the calculation of LR hydrodynamic forces (HF) on the SG using the BANG UP code. This activity was performed based upon the unique features of the AP1000 design. However, the other AP1000 reactor coolant system (RCS) structural component analyses have not considered the locked rotor transient for hydrodynamic forces, even though a determination has been made that the effects of these loads could be more bounding than the limiting design-basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) hydrodynamic forces (based on the BANG UP calculation of pressure pulsations through the RCS).
"Westinghouse has not yet completed its evaluation as to whether there is a reportable condition as defined in 10 CFR 21 (or 10 CFR 50.55 to the extent applicable) if the deviation is left uncorrected.
"Westinghouse expects to complete this evaluation by September 30, 2014. We will inform the staff if there are any changes to this schedule, prior to that date."
Agreement State
Event Number: 49782
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEXAS GAMMA RAY LLC
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: 05561
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Licensee: TEXAS GAMMA RAY LLC
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: 05561
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 01/31/2014
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2014
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE COULD NOT BE RETRACTED
The following was received from the state of Texas via email:
"On January 31, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that while performing radiography at a field location a radiography crew was unable to retract a 19 curie iridium - 192 source into a SPEC 150 exposure device. The radiographers were testing a pipe when a second pipe fell on the guide tube and crimped it enough that the source could not pass by it. The radiographers contacted their manager and informed them of the problem. Two individuals qualified to retrieve sources went to the location. They were able to reshape the guide tube enough to retract the source. The work was being conducted in a shielded shooting bay, therefore there was no exposure to any member of the general public. The highest exposure to anyone involved with the event was 60 millirem. No overexposure occurred. The guide tube was disposed of. The exposure device was tested with a new guide tube and functioned normally. The exposure device was returned to service. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas incident # I-9152
The following was received from the state of Texas via email:
"On January 31, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that while performing radiography at a field location a radiography crew was unable to retract a 19 curie iridium - 192 source into a SPEC 150 exposure device. The radiographers were testing a pipe when a second pipe fell on the guide tube and crimped it enough that the source could not pass by it. The radiographers contacted their manager and informed them of the problem. Two individuals qualified to retrieve sources went to the location. They were able to reshape the guide tube enough to retract the source. The work was being conducted in a shielded shooting bay, therefore there was no exposure to any member of the general public. The highest exposure to anyone involved with the event was 60 millirem. No overexposure occurred. The guide tube was disposed of. The exposure device was tested with a new guide tube and functioned normally. The exposure device was returned to service. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas incident # I-9152