Event Notification Report for January 21, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/20/2014 - 01/21/2014
EVENT NUMBERS
497524975349754497484974649942
Agreement State
Event Number: 49752
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: THE QUAKER OATS COMPANY
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: 01878
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: THE QUAKER OATS COMPANY
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: 01878
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 15:24 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 15:24 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
MEXICO (FAX)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
MEXICO (FAX)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST PROCESS GAUGE
"On January 21, 2014, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee that while conducting a routine source inventory, it could not find a beverage fill device containing a 100 millicurie americium-241 source. The licensee stated the unit was removed from the production line several years ago and placed in storage. The licensee stated the source shutter on the device was locked in the closed position when it was placed in storage. The licensee stated the unit has the appropriate labels on it. The licensee does not believe the lost source presents a risk of exposure to any individual as long as the device is not altered.
"The licensee is interviewing employees and contractor personnel in an attempt to locate the source. The licensee stated the source was inventoried in 2013, but could not provide a specific date. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: I-9147
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
"On January 21, 2014, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee that while conducting a routine source inventory, it could not find a beverage fill device containing a 100 millicurie americium-241 source. The licensee stated the unit was removed from the production line several years ago and placed in storage. The licensee stated the source shutter on the device was locked in the closed position when it was placed in storage. The licensee stated the unit has the appropriate labels on it. The licensee does not believe the lost source presents a risk of exposure to any individual as long as the device is not altered.
"The licensee is interviewing employees and contractor personnel in an attempt to locate the source. The licensee stated the source was inventoried in 2013, but could not provide a specific date. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: I-9147
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49753
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN J. LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN J. LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 21:14 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 13:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 21:14 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 13:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
VENT STACK RADIATION MONITORS OUT OF SERVICE
"At 1340 [EST] on 1/21/2014, Susquehanna Control Room Operators received an alarm due to the lockup of a monitoring panel utilized for Vent Stack Radiation Monitors (known as SPINGs - System Particulate, Iodine, and Noble Gas). There are two monitor panels, one in the control room and one in the Technical Support Center (TSC). Both panels are fully redundant. At the time, the control room panel was out of service for maintenance.
"This event rendered all five SPINGs inoperable. Additionally, control room alarm capability was not available. The associated Technical Requirement (TROs) were entered for this inoperability. In order to clear the lockup, the TSC terminal needed to be powered down and rebooted.
"The TSC monitoring terminal was restored to operable status at 1352 and the associated TROs were cleared. The SPING function and control room alarm functions were inoperable for a total of 12 minutes.
"In accordance with the guidance of NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Item 3.2.13, this event is being reported as an 8 hour ENS notification due to a loss of emergency assessment capability. The loss of the Stack Monitoring System was not part of a pre-planned evolution. This equipment is relied upon by control room operators and emergency response personnel to implement procedures addressing classification, assessment, and protective actions associated with the emergency plan."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1340 [EST] on 1/21/2014, Susquehanna Control Room Operators received an alarm due to the lockup of a monitoring panel utilized for Vent Stack Radiation Monitors (known as SPINGs - System Particulate, Iodine, and Noble Gas). There are two monitor panels, one in the control room and one in the Technical Support Center (TSC). Both panels are fully redundant. At the time, the control room panel was out of service for maintenance.
"This event rendered all five SPINGs inoperable. Additionally, control room alarm capability was not available. The associated Technical Requirement (TROs) were entered for this inoperability. In order to clear the lockup, the TSC terminal needed to be powered down and rebooted.
"The TSC monitoring terminal was restored to operable status at 1352 and the associated TROs were cleared. The SPING function and control room alarm functions were inoperable for a total of 12 minutes.
"In accordance with the guidance of NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Item 3.2.13, this event is being reported as an 8 hour ENS notification due to a loss of emergency assessment capability. The loss of the Stack Monitoring System was not part of a pre-planned evolution. This equipment is relied upon by control room operators and emergency response personnel to implement procedures addressing classification, assessment, and protective actions associated with the emergency plan."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49754
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: KENT MILLS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: KENT MILLS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/22/2014
Notification Time: 00:33 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 21:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2014
Notification Time: 00:33 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 21:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
DUAL UNIT TRIP ON THE LOSS OF THE "21" 13KV BUS
"Dual Unit Trip due to loss of '21' 13 KV bus . All safety functions are met for both units. Unit 1 remained with normal heat removal. Unit 2 lost power to its normal heat sink and is stable on Auxiliary Feed water and Atmospheric Dump Valves for temperature control. Both trips were automatic trips. Due to loss of power a Under Voltage actuation occurred on both units ('14' and '24' 4Kv bus). Due to loss of main feed on Unit 2 a Auxiliary Feed water Actuation System [AFW] actuation occurred on Unit 2. Cause is under investigation."
All control rods fully inserted on the loss of power to the Control Rod Drive Mechanisms [CRDMs]. Both Units Reactor Coolant Pumps [RCPs] remained running during the transient. The normal Unit 2 heat sink was unavailable due to the loss of the operating circulating water pumps resulting in a loss of condenser vacuum. The Unit 2 AFW actuation included one of two steam-driven pumps and the motor-driven pump. Both Units Emergency Diesel Generators started and loaded and have since been secured. Both Units are stable and will remain in mode 3 (Hot Standby) pending the results of the investigation.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Dual Unit Trip due to loss of '21' 13 KV bus . All safety functions are met for both units. Unit 1 remained with normal heat removal. Unit 2 lost power to its normal heat sink and is stable on Auxiliary Feed water and Atmospheric Dump Valves for temperature control. Both trips were automatic trips. Due to loss of power a Under Voltage actuation occurred on both units ('14' and '24' 4Kv bus). Due to loss of main feed on Unit 2 a Auxiliary Feed water Actuation System [AFW] actuation occurred on Unit 2. Cause is under investigation."
All control rods fully inserted on the loss of power to the Control Rod Drive Mechanisms [CRDMs]. Both Units Reactor Coolant Pumps [RCPs] remained running during the transient. The normal Unit 2 heat sink was unavailable due to the loss of the operating circulating water pumps resulting in a loss of condenser vacuum. The Unit 2 AFW actuation included one of two steam-driven pumps and the motor-driven pump. Both Units Emergency Diesel Generators started and loaded and have since been secured. Both Units are stable and will remain in mode 3 (Hot Standby) pending the results of the investigation.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49748
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: SAM GOLDSMITH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: SAM GOLDSMITH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 08:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 06:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 08:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 06:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"On Tuesday, January 21 at 0640 CST, the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location.
"The ventilation system is expected to be out of service approximately 8 hrs.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM SAM GOLDSMITH TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1347 EST ON 1/21/14 * * *
The TSC system maintenance is complete and returned to service as of 1140 CST on 1/21/14.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
Notified R3DO (Valos).
"On Tuesday, January 21 at 0640 CST, the Kewaunee Power Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location.
"The ventilation system is expected to be out of service approximately 8 hrs.
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM SAM GOLDSMITH TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1347 EST ON 1/21/14 * * *
The TSC system maintenance is complete and returned to service as of 1140 CST on 1/21/14.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
Notified R3DO (Valos).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49746
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID DUESING
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID DUESING
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 02:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 01:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Notification Time: 02:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 01:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO TRITIUM DISCOVERED IN GROUNDWATER
"This notification is being made pursuant to [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(2)(xi), notification of other government agency. Notification to other government agency, State of Ohio, was made at 0140 [EST] on 1/21/14.
"At 1310 on 1/20/2014, a leak was identified on a feed water Venturi. In response to the water leak, samples were taken to check for the spread of tritium. A positive result for tritium was identified in the under drain system in the Auxiliary Building which requires communications as part of the NEI ground water protection initiative. The positive sample results were obtained at 2330 on 1/20/14. Actions are in progress stop the leak (perform leak injection)."
The EPA limit for groundwater is 20,000 pCi/l. The samples taken by the licensee indicated 46,000 pCi/l.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify local counties.
"This notification is being made pursuant to [10 CFR] 50.72(b)(2)(xi), notification of other government agency. Notification to other government agency, State of Ohio, was made at 0140 [EST] on 1/21/14.
"At 1310 on 1/20/2014, a leak was identified on a feed water Venturi. In response to the water leak, samples were taken to check for the spread of tritium. A positive result for tritium was identified in the under drain system in the Auxiliary Building which requires communications as part of the NEI ground water protection initiative. The positive sample results were obtained at 2330 on 1/20/14. Actions are in progress stop the leak (perform leak injection)."
The EPA limit for groundwater is 20,000 pCi/l. The samples taken by the licensee indicated 46,000 pCi/l.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify local counties.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49942
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 03/21/2014
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 07:46 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2014
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 07:46 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60 DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"On January 21, 2014, at 0746 hours Central Standard Time (CST), during performance of the 3C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) post modification test instructions, the EDG was supplying a shutdown board in isochronous mode when the 3B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump was started causing the voltage to drop to 2100 volts. At this time, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 3, received a half scram and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals as a result of losing the 3B Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) set due to a time delay relay failure on under voltage. The PCIS groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system, Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A', and the Refuel fans tripped and isolated. Operations personnel responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured all equipment operated as designed, and placed affected systems back in service.
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"The apparent cause for this condition was a failure of a 3B RPS MG set time delay relay due to lack of a preventive maintenance strategy. The vendor manual for the time delay relay did not specify a qualified life. The replacement relay specified a replacement schedule of 10 years. The relay that failed was installed for approximately 13 years. To address this condition, preventive maintenance is being developed for MG set time delay relays. In addition, the only remaining relay, similar to the failed relay, is scheduled be replaced on August 25, 2014, for the 2A RPS MG set."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"On January 21, 2014, at 0746 hours Central Standard Time (CST), during performance of the 3C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) post modification test instructions, the EDG was supplying a shutdown board in isochronous mode when the 3B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump was started causing the voltage to drop to 2100 volts. At this time, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 3, received a half scram and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals as a result of losing the 3B Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) set due to a time delay relay failure on under voltage. The PCIS groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system, Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A', and the Refuel fans tripped and isolated. Operations personnel responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured all equipment operated as designed, and placed affected systems back in service.
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"The apparent cause for this condition was a failure of a 3B RPS MG set time delay relay due to lack of a preventive maintenance strategy. The vendor manual for the time delay relay did not specify a qualified life. The replacement relay specified a replacement schedule of 10 years. The relay that failed was installed for approximately 13 years. To address this condition, preventive maintenance is being developed for MG set time delay relays. In addition, the only remaining relay, similar to the failed relay, is scheduled be replaced on August 25, 2014, for the 2A RPS MG set."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.