Event Notification Report for December 19, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/18/2013 - 12/19/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
4966149662496634966549666
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49661
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: GREG KNUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: GREG KNUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 12/19/2013
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2013
Event Time: 08:38 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2013
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2013
Event Time: 08:38 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH DIVISIONS OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OXYGEN AND HYDROGEN ATMOSPHERIC MONITORS INOPERABLE FOR MAINTENANCE
"This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0838 PST on 12/19/2013, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was removed from service for planned maintenance activities. The Division 1 sample rack is expected to be out of service for 14 hours. The redundant Division 2 sample rack was previously removed from service for maintenance and remains out of service for repairs. Compensatory measures to monitor primary containment for hydrogen and oxygen are available via grab samples using chemistry procedures.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM QUOC VO TO VINCE KLCO AT 0130 EST ON 12/20/13 * * *
"Following completion of surveillance activities, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was returned to operable status at 2114 PST on 12/19/2013, restoring its required emergency assessment capability.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R4DO (Lantz).
"This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0838 PST on 12/19/2013, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was removed from service for planned maintenance activities. The Division 1 sample rack is expected to be out of service for 14 hours. The redundant Division 2 sample rack was previously removed from service for maintenance and remains out of service for repairs. Compensatory measures to monitor primary containment for hydrogen and oxygen are available via grab samples using chemistry procedures.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM QUOC VO TO VINCE KLCO AT 0130 EST ON 12/20/13 * * *
"Following completion of surveillance activities, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was returned to operable status at 2114 PST on 12/19/2013, restoring its required emergency assessment capability.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R4DO (Lantz).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49662
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TIM MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TIM MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 12/19/2013
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2013
Event Time: 13:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2013
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2013
Event Time: 13:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION AFFECTING UNIT 2 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS
"At 1320 ET on December 19, 2013, Florida Power and Light identified that atmospheric conditions that had sustained high winds exceeding approximately 50 miles per hour from the ENE direction could result in inadequate heat removal to support continuous operation of the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators. Upon identification of this condition, an adverse condition monitoring plan was issued requiring implementation of compensatory measures to assure adequate emergency diesel generator cooling to support continuous operation of the U2 emergency diesel generators, should weather forecasts identify conditions that would likely result in this condition.
"This condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition."
"At 1320 ET on December 19, 2013, Florida Power and Light identified that atmospheric conditions that had sustained high winds exceeding approximately 50 miles per hour from the ENE direction could result in inadequate heat removal to support continuous operation of the Unit 2 emergency diesel generators. Upon identification of this condition, an adverse condition monitoring plan was issued requiring implementation of compensatory measures to assure adequate emergency diesel generator cooling to support continuous operation of the U2 emergency diesel generators, should weather forecasts identify conditions that would likely result in this condition.
"This condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49663
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL CRUZEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL CRUZEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 12/19/2013
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2013
Event Time: 07:52 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2013
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2013
Event Time: 07:52 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TWO OF THREE EMERGENCEY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE AT THE SAME TIME
"On 12/19/13 Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-2 was inoperable for scheduled maintenance.
"During an operational walk-down of the Unit 1 EDG 1-3, the associated fuel oil priming pump discharge fitting and pump housing were inadvertently damaged.
"Pacific Gas and Electric Company declared EDG 1-3 inoperable on 12/19/13 at 0752 PST.
"Since both Unit 1 EDGs were inoperable at the same time, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On 12/19/13 Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-2 was inoperable for scheduled maintenance.
"During an operational walk-down of the Unit 1 EDG 1-3, the associated fuel oil priming pump discharge fitting and pump housing were inadvertently damaged.
"Pacific Gas and Electric Company declared EDG 1-3 inoperable on 12/19/13 at 0752 PST.
"Since both Unit 1 EDGs were inoperable at the same time, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49665
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 12/19/2013
Notification Time: 19:18 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2013
Event Time: 15:11 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2014
Notification Time: 19:18 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2013
Event Time: 15:11 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION
"At 1511 [EST] on December 19, 2013, bus 10A404 (D channel 4 kv 1E vital bus) deenergized while transferring infeed breakers after degraded voltage testing. Reactor building ventilation fans tripped resulting in a loss of secondary containment negative pressure. Filtration Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS) was manually started and secondary containment negative pressure was restored at 1525 [EST].
"Secondary containment pressure is stable with differential pressure negative.
"The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at a negative pressure for secondary containment integrity. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The standby reactor building ventilation fans did not automatically start and [the reason for that] is being investigated."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek township.
* * * UPDATE AT 1326 EST ON 2/14/14 FROM LINDSAY KOBERLEIN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1, is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on December 19, 2013, at 1918 EST (EN# 49665).
"The notification on December 19, 2013, reported that secondary containment was declared inoperable when reactor building ventilation system (RBVS) fans tripped resulting in the loss of secondary containment negative pressure.
"Subsequent engineering evaluation concluded that the safety function of secondary containment was not lost. The Hope Creek post-LOCA Exclusion Area Boundary, Low Population Zone, and Control Room dose calculation assumes that primary containment leakage is released directly to the environment with no credit for hold up or filtration for the first 375 seconds after the accident, i.e., the Hope Creek accident analysis does not assume that secondary containment is under vacuum at the start of an accident. In addition, the accident analysis relies upon the operation of the safety related Filtration Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS), which was fully operable. Upon receipt of an accident signal, FRVS would have automatically started and restored secondary containment negative pressure within the time limits of the design assumptions. The trip of the non-safety related RBVS and the failure of the stand-by RBVS fans to start did not result in an adverse impact on the dose consequence analysis. Although secondary containment was declared inoperable, the safety function was not lost and secondary containment was capable of performing its design function of minimizing any ground level release of radioactive material by providing a leak tight boundary so that FRVS may draw a vacuum In the Reactor Building and filter radioactive material at all times. The engineering evaluation is captured In the licensee's corrective action program. Based on the engineering evaluation, the condition reported in EN #49665 did not result in the loss of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. This event report is being retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the evaluation results and informed of this retraction."
Notified R1DO (Powell).
"At 1511 [EST] on December 19, 2013, bus 10A404 (D channel 4 kv 1E vital bus) deenergized while transferring infeed breakers after degraded voltage testing. Reactor building ventilation fans tripped resulting in a loss of secondary containment negative pressure. Filtration Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS) was manually started and secondary containment negative pressure was restored at 1525 [EST].
"Secondary containment pressure is stable with differential pressure negative.
"The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at a negative pressure for secondary containment integrity. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The standby reactor building ventilation fans did not automatically start and [the reason for that] is being investigated."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek township.
* * * UPDATE AT 1326 EST ON 2/14/14 FROM LINDSAY KOBERLEIN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1, is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on December 19, 2013, at 1918 EST (EN# 49665).
"The notification on December 19, 2013, reported that secondary containment was declared inoperable when reactor building ventilation system (RBVS) fans tripped resulting in the loss of secondary containment negative pressure.
"Subsequent engineering evaluation concluded that the safety function of secondary containment was not lost. The Hope Creek post-LOCA Exclusion Area Boundary, Low Population Zone, and Control Room dose calculation assumes that primary containment leakage is released directly to the environment with no credit for hold up or filtration for the first 375 seconds after the accident, i.e., the Hope Creek accident analysis does not assume that secondary containment is under vacuum at the start of an accident. In addition, the accident analysis relies upon the operation of the safety related Filtration Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS), which was fully operable. Upon receipt of an accident signal, FRVS would have automatically started and restored secondary containment negative pressure within the time limits of the design assumptions. The trip of the non-safety related RBVS and the failure of the stand-by RBVS fans to start did not result in an adverse impact on the dose consequence analysis. Although secondary containment was declared inoperable, the safety function was not lost and secondary containment was capable of performing its design function of minimizing any ground level release of radioactive material by providing a leak tight boundary so that FRVS may draw a vacuum In the Reactor Building and filter radioactive material at all times. The engineering evaluation is captured In the licensee's corrective action program. Based on the engineering evaluation, the condition reported in EN #49665 did not result in the loss of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. This event report is being retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the evaluation results and informed of this retraction."
Notified R1DO (Powell).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49666
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT J. LANE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT J. LANE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/20/2013
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2013
Event Time: 22:33 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2013
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/19/2013
Event Time: 22:33 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
VALID ACTUATION OF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES THAT WAS NOT PART OF A PREPLANNED SEQUENCE
"While in Mode 3 in preparing the Unit 2 secondary plant for startup, conditions occurred where it became necessary to break vacuum on the main condenser. Procedures directed closing of the main steam isolation valves. Instead of shutting each main steam isolation valve individually, a manual main steam isolation actuation was initiated through the solid state protection system (SSPS) to close the valves. This actuation of SSPS was a valid signal. The actuation was not part of a preplanned sequence.
"This notification is supported by the guidance of NUREG-1022, Revision 3, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73.' In part, the guidance states: 'The Commission is interested in both events in which a system was needed to mitigate the consequences of an event (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events in which a system actuated unnecessarily.'
"The manual actuation was not initiated to mitigate the consequences of an actual event. However, the method of closing the main steam valves for this condition did not specifically require that the valves should be closed by initiating a main steam isolation signal and therefore, the safety system was unnecessarily actuated.
"Therefore, this notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) that was not part of preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The system listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) is (2) main steam isolation valves."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"While in Mode 3 in preparing the Unit 2 secondary plant for startup, conditions occurred where it became necessary to break vacuum on the main condenser. Procedures directed closing of the main steam isolation valves. Instead of shutting each main steam isolation valve individually, a manual main steam isolation actuation was initiated through the solid state protection system (SSPS) to close the valves. This actuation of SSPS was a valid signal. The actuation was not part of a preplanned sequence.
"This notification is supported by the guidance of NUREG-1022, Revision 3, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73.' In part, the guidance states: 'The Commission is interested in both events in which a system was needed to mitigate the consequences of an event (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events in which a system actuated unnecessarily.'
"The manual actuation was not initiated to mitigate the consequences of an actual event. However, the method of closing the main steam valves for this condition did not specifically require that the valves should be closed by initiating a main steam isolation signal and therefore, the safety system was unnecessarily actuated.
"Therefore, this notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) that was not part of preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The system listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) is (2) main steam isolation valves."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.