Event Notification Report for December 13, 2013

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO FUEL OIL SPILL TO THE ENVIRONMENT

"At 1106 [CST], the control room was informed that a diesel fuel spill to the environment was a reportable event. Earlier in the day, a container tipped over in the bed of a truck eventually spilling diesel fuel onto the ground inside the owner controlled area. Approximately 2 and one half gallons spilled out. The lid of the container was apparently defective.

"No fuel oil made contact with any surface water.

"The area was cleaned up.

"The Kansas Department of Health and Environment and the National Response Center were notified.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

PART 21 REPORT - NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING DID NOT MEET PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

The following information was summarized from the report submitted by TriVis via facsimile:

David Bland, President of TriVis Inc. reported that two contract Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) Level II examiners, employed by TriVis, failed to meet NDE procedural requirements for weld testing on the Outer Top Cover Plate (OTCP) on six Transnuclear Model NUHOMS-61BTH Dry Shield Canisters (DSC) at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.

An NRC inspector observed part of this activity and questioned whether the dwell times for the penetrant and developer used by a NDE Level II employee of TriVis were sufficient to meet procedural requirements. Upon evaluating recorded video of the work location, it was determined that the dwell times for both the penetrant and the developer of the OTCP weld on DSC #16 were not in compliance with the TriVis NDE LPT [Liquid Penetrant Test] Procedure. An extent of condition review of previous LPT exams conducted on DSCs 11 through 16 revealed additional examinations that were not in compliance with the dwell times specified by the procedure as well as other procedural discrepancies.

All six DSCs were declared inoperable at the time of discovery. All work activities associated with dry fuel storage at Monticello were stopped. A timeline and corrective actions are being developed by TriVis and the licensee.

The two NDE Level II examiners were not previously employed by TriVis and did not perform any other NDE activities at Monticello.

Evaluations will be completed by January 31, 2014 or a follow-up interim report will be submitted.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE SOUTH TO DANIEL MILLS ON 1/29/14 AT 0945 EDT * * *

The following information was selected from the report submitted by TriVis via facsimile:

"TriVis has completed its evaluation of the activity and determined that it is limited to procedural non-compliance on DSCs 11 through 16 at [Monticello] only. Based on the results of the evaluation, TriVis believes the procedural non-compliance did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public and does not constitute a substantial safety hazard."

Notified R3DO (Sheldon), and NRR Part 21 Group (via email).

ELEVEN INDIVIDUALS NOT PROPERLY SUBJECTED TO THE RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAM

"In 2010, changes within the Dominion FFD [Fitness for Duty] program resulted in currently 11 individuals not being subjected to random FFD testing although required. Two individuals are actively badged at Surry Power Station and North Anna Power Station (NAPS). Both individuals accessed the protected area at NAPS recently. The other nine individuals were not badged but perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. The affected individuals are now within the random testing program.

"This event is reportable per 10CFR26.719(b)(4), 'Any programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program.'"

A work review will be conducted for the two actively badged individuals. The program error has been corrected.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Louisa County Administrator.

See similar Surry report EN #49630.

ELEVEN INDIVIDUALS NOT PROPERLY SUBJECTED TO THE RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAM

"In 2010, changes within the Dominion FFD [Fitness for Duty] program resulted in 11 supplemental personnel not being included in the current random FFD testing program. Two individuals are actively badged at Surry Power Station (SPS) and North Anna Power Station (NAPS). Both individuals accessed the protected area at SPS recently. The other nine individuals were not badged but perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. The affected individuals are now included in the random testing program. An extent of condition was performed and no other contractor records were found to be affected.

"This event is reportable per 10CFR26.719(b)(4), 'Any programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program."

The error occurred when, in 2010, it was decided that contract employees would no longer be placed in a select labor pool. When this occurred, FFD personnel no longer monitored that particular labor pool in the belief that it no longer existed. Upon discovery that the labor pool did, in fact, still exist the licensee determined that the eleven personnel should have been included in the random testing program.

See similar North Anna report EN #49629. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING FEED PUMP SWAP

"During a feed pump shift from the motor driven reactor feed pump to the 'A' turbine driven reactor feed pump during power ascension, reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level was approaching the Reactor Protective System (RPS) automatic scram set point when a manual reactor scram was inserted.

"All control rods fully inserted. RPV water level is being maintained by the normal condensate booster / feedwater systems. RPV pressure is being maintained via normal main steam system. There were no actuations of any Emergency Core Cooling System and no Safety Relief Valves actuations. All systems responded as expected."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

STOLEN CHEMICAL AGENT MONITORS

The US Army in Warren, Michigan, reported that 3 improved chemical agent monitors were stolen from a storage facility at Fort Bragg, NC. Each of the 3 detectors contained a sealed 15 mCi Ni-63 source. The detectors were stored in building N-5342 and the locks on the building, storage area, and storage locker were damaged. The Fort Bragg Criminal Investigation Unit is conducting an investigation.

The US Army has also notified NRC Region 3.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PACKAGE DELIVERED TO INCORRECT ADDRESS

The following report was received via e-mail:

"This morning we [Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality] were informed that a package containing a Siemens 20 mCi Ge-68 sealed source used for attenuation correction in a PET scanner was delivered to the wrong address by [a carrier] on Dec. 13. The package was signed for, but the person who signed is not an employee of the licensee: Tahlequah City Hospital (OK-15626-01). It is not presently known who the package was delivered to, but whoever it was realized that it was not intended for them and took it to the hospital where they left it on the loading dock without informing the hospital staff. The package remained on the loading dock until late afternoon on the 13th when it was noticed by shipping and receiving personnel who took it inside with the other deliveries. They did not notice the radiation labels on the package and did not inform radiology of its arrival. Instead it was placed in an unrestricted area until Dec. 20 when Siemens contacted the Nuclear Medicine staff to schedule a time to install the new source. The staff then searched Shipping/Receiving and found the package. The package was intact and had not been opened."