Event Notification Report for December 07, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/06/2013 - 12/07/2013
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49614
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/07/2013
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2013
Event Time: 09:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2013
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2013
Event Time: 09:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT FAILS RETEST OF DRAWDOWN SURVEILLANCE TEST
"On December 7, 2013 at 0950 [EST], Susquehanna Steam Electric Station [SSES] Secondary Containment drawdown testing failed to meet acceptance criteria of Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement SR 3.6.4.1.5 due to inleakage flow rate exceeding the allowable value.
"SSES previously entered SR 3.0.3 at 0900 [EST] on 11/15/2013, due to not meeting the requirements of SR 3.6.4.1.4 and 3.6.4.1.5 because of an untested alignment of the Unit 1 Reactor Building Railroad Bay (101 bay). Corrective maintenance was performed on several boundary components (doors and hatches) along with multiple inspections. The test being performed on 12/7/2013 was to be a retest for the previously failed surveillance [performed on 11/20/13]. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered at 0950 [EST] in support of this test. During the test, it was determined that the maintenance performed did not produce the desired outcome. As a result, the retest was not successful.
"The 101 Bay ventilation was realigned to the previously known operable configuration. Upon completion of this realignment, LCO 3.6.4.1 was cleared at 1349 [EST] and operability restored. Note that SR 3.0.3 remains in effect for the unsuccessful, untested configuration.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."
See EN #49565 for the previous surveillance test failure, performed on 11/20/13.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On December 7, 2013 at 0950 [EST], Susquehanna Steam Electric Station [SSES] Secondary Containment drawdown testing failed to meet acceptance criteria of Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement SR 3.6.4.1.5 due to inleakage flow rate exceeding the allowable value.
"SSES previously entered SR 3.0.3 at 0900 [EST] on 11/15/2013, due to not meeting the requirements of SR 3.6.4.1.4 and 3.6.4.1.5 because of an untested alignment of the Unit 1 Reactor Building Railroad Bay (101 bay). Corrective maintenance was performed on several boundary components (doors and hatches) along with multiple inspections. The test being performed on 12/7/2013 was to be a retest for the previously failed surveillance [performed on 11/20/13]. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered at 0950 [EST] in support of this test. During the test, it was determined that the maintenance performed did not produce the desired outcome. As a result, the retest was not successful.
"The 101 Bay ventilation was realigned to the previously known operable configuration. Upon completion of this realignment, LCO 3.6.4.1 was cleared at 1349 [EST] and operability restored. Note that SR 3.0.3 remains in effect for the unsuccessful, untested configuration.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022, Rev. 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."
See EN #49565 for the previous surveillance test failure, performed on 11/20/13.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49615
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JASON DEPRIEST
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JASON DEPRIEST
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 12/08/2013
Notification Time: 06:09 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2013
Event Time: 23:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/08/2013
Notification Time: 06:09 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2013
Event Time: 23:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/08/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 60 | Power Operation | 60 | Power Operation |
AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITORS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO NON-CONSERVATIVE POWER VALUE
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of systems that are needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. A scheduled load reduction for surveillance testing and control rod sequence exchange was in progress. During the control rod sequence exchange, the core monitoring software system (3DMonicore) was used to obtain a 'case' which records various calculated and actual core parameters (i.e. core thermal power, Power Range Monitor indication). The 'case' data is used to evaluate the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) acceptance criteria for SR 3.3.1.1.2 to verify the absolute difference between the average power range monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated power is less than or equal to 2% rated thermal power (RTP) while operating at greater than or equal to 25% RTP. The 'case' showed that all 3 A RPS Trip System APRM channels exceeded the allowable 2% difference threshold in the non-conservative direction (i.e. APRM power reading less than calculated thermal power, difference of 2.9, 3.1, and 2.5% respectively). TS 3.3.1.1 requires at least 2 operable APRM channels per trip system (there are 2 RPS trip systems, A and B). At least 1 of 2 TS required APRM channels are required to maintain the Safety Function (i.e. SCRAM). In this situation, none of the A RPS TS required APRM channels met their SR and were declared inoperable. TS 3.3.1.1 allows delaying entry into the associated Condition and Required Action for this inoperability for up to 2 hours when the inoperability is solely due to APRM indication not within the 2% limit; therefore no TS Required Action tracking timeclocks were entered. A confirmatory 'case' was performed that validated that the subject SR was not met. Prompt action was taken to restore the APRM indications to within limits (this action took approximately 22 minutes to complete) and the subject APRMs were declared operable, restoring the A RPS Safety Function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of systems that are needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. A scheduled load reduction for surveillance testing and control rod sequence exchange was in progress. During the control rod sequence exchange, the core monitoring software system (3DMonicore) was used to obtain a 'case' which records various calculated and actual core parameters (i.e. core thermal power, Power Range Monitor indication). The 'case' data is used to evaluate the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) acceptance criteria for SR 3.3.1.1.2 to verify the absolute difference between the average power range monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated power is less than or equal to 2% rated thermal power (RTP) while operating at greater than or equal to 25% RTP. The 'case' showed that all 3 A RPS Trip System APRM channels exceeded the allowable 2% difference threshold in the non-conservative direction (i.e. APRM power reading less than calculated thermal power, difference of 2.9, 3.1, and 2.5% respectively). TS 3.3.1.1 requires at least 2 operable APRM channels per trip system (there are 2 RPS trip systems, A and B). At least 1 of 2 TS required APRM channels are required to maintain the Safety Function (i.e. SCRAM). In this situation, none of the A RPS TS required APRM channels met their SR and were declared inoperable. TS 3.3.1.1 allows delaying entry into the associated Condition and Required Action for this inoperability for up to 2 hours when the inoperability is solely due to APRM indication not within the 2% limit; therefore no TS Required Action tracking timeclocks were entered. A confirmatory 'case' was performed that validated that the subject SR was not met. Prompt action was taken to restore the APRM indications to within limits (this action took approximately 22 minutes to complete) and the subject APRMs were declared operable, restoring the A RPS Safety Function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency.