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Event Notification Report for December 04, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/03/2013 - 12/04/2013

EVENT NUMBERS
496094960649607

Power Reactor
Event Number: 49609
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2     State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/05/2013
Notification Time: 11:07 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2013
Event Time: 13:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Under Construction 0 Under Construction
Event Text
FITNESS FOR DUTY - ALCOHOL FOUND IN PROTECTED AREA

"On December 4, 2013, at approximately 1335 EST with Watts Bar Nuclear Unit 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 under construction, a small whiskey bottle was found by a Unit 2 construction employee within the protected area. Site Security took possession of the bottle and it was removed from the protected area. The seal on the container did not appear to have been broken. An investigation has been initiated by Site Security. This condition has been documented in TVA's corrective action program as Service Request 818776. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719 (b)(1) based on the presence of alcohol within the protected area.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Unit 2 does share the same protected area boundary as Unit 1.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 49606
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4     State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT KARL
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 12/04/2013
Notification Time: 15:14 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2013
Event Time: 13:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2013
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
JENNIFER UHLE (NRR)
MARK DAPAS (R4RA)
MARK KING (NRR)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF STARTUP POWER DUE TO A CUT CABLE

"At 1343 CST on 12/04/2013, Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant experienced a loss of safeguards electrical power when 345KV transformer XST2 lost power from offsite while 138KV transformer XST1 was out of service for maintenance. Non-Safeguards electrical power remained energized. Both Units remain at power in Mode 1. Both units Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and all safeguards busses were re-energized from the Emergency Diesel Generators. All ESF systems functioned as expected and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump automatically started as designed. Operators reduced reactor power to maintain reactor power less than 100 percent rated thermal power."

At 1350 CST, the licensee declared an Unusual Event due to losing both startup transformers. The cause of the loss of the second start up transformer was a cut cable. No one was injured during this event.

The licensee informed State and Local Government Agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified other Federal Agencies (DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA via email).

* * * UPDATE AT 1718 EST ON 12/4/2013 FROM MATT KARL TO STEPHEN SANDIN * * *

Correction to initial event report description; actual loss of electrical power time was 1341 CST.

Include 8-HR Non-Emergency report for Specified System Actuation for automatic start of Auxiliary Feedwater and Emergency Diesel Generators.

Notified the R4DO (Vasquez).

* * * UPDATE FROM DAVE BUTLER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1840 EST ON 12/05/13 * * *

Comanche Peak terminated from the Unusual Event at 1717 CST on 12/05/13. Offsite power has been restored to both safeguard busses on both units via the transformer XST2. Work continues on transformer XST1. Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2 continue to operate at 100% power.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Vasquez), NRR EO (Bahadur), IRD MOC (Gott), and DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA via email.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 49607
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2     State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/04/2013
Notification Time: 21:32 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2013
Event Time: 15:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
A POTENTIAL ELECTRICAL HOT SHORT IN THE RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING CONTROL CABLE COULD RESULT IN AN INTER-SYSTEM LOCA

"As a result of questions raised by inspectors as part of the 2013 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection, a vulnerability from a postulated fire in the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room was identified. This vulnerability involved the assumption of a fire occurring in Fire Area 0024A (Cable Spreading Room) which would create an inter-cable vulnerability that could result in an inter-system LOCA [Loss of Coolant Accident]. Hatch's licensing basis included credit for the use of disconnect or remote shutdown panel 'Emergency' switches located on the respective remote shutdown panels to isolate the circuits in the cable spreading room thereby eliminating this vulnerability. However, the presence of these switches does not fully address this vulnerability. The Unit 1 RHR [Residual Heat Removal] shutdown cooling isolation valves 1E11-F008 and 1E11-F009 need to be de-energized in order to preclude the opening of these valves should this vulnerability occur on Unit 1. Since the Unit 2 RHR shutdown cooling isolation valves 2E11-F008 and 2E11-F009 are already closed and deactivated, they are not presently impacted by this additional vulnerability.

"Immediate actions were taken to de-energize the valves in the 'closed' position which removed the vulnerability. The postulated intersystem LOCA represents an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.