Event Notification Report for November 28, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/27/2013 - 11/28/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
49590
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49590
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KYLE KOLLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KYLE KOLLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 11/28/2013
Notification Time: 10:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2013
Event Time: 02:58 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2013
Notification Time: 10:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2013
Event Time: 02:58 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE WHILE TWO SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DOORS WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY OPEN
"At 0258 CST on November 28, 2013, two individuals were removing materials from the main steam isolation valve room (X-Area) and defeated an interlock which allowed them to open two secondary containment doors simultaneously. The X-Area personnel access doors connect secondary containment to the turbine building and are part of the secondary containment boundary.
"At the time of this event, Dresden Unit 2 was in Mode 4 and secondary containment was not required. However, Dresden Unit 3 was in Mode 1 which requires secondary containment to be operable. Throughout this event, secondary containment differential pressure was maintained within technical specifications surveillance requirement 3.6.4.1.1 limits, and the individuals remained in the area with the capability to close the personnel access doors.
"This condition represents a failure to meet surveillance requirement 3.6.4.1.2, since both doors in a singular access opening were allowed to open. As a result, entry into technical specification 3.6.4.1 condition A was made, for Unit 3, due to secondary containment being inoperable. The doors were secured at 0311 and secondary containment was declared operable. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 0258 CST on November 28, 2013, two individuals were removing materials from the main steam isolation valve room (X-Area) and defeated an interlock which allowed them to open two secondary containment doors simultaneously. The X-Area personnel access doors connect secondary containment to the turbine building and are part of the secondary containment boundary.
"At the time of this event, Dresden Unit 2 was in Mode 4 and secondary containment was not required. However, Dresden Unit 3 was in Mode 1 which requires secondary containment to be operable. Throughout this event, secondary containment differential pressure was maintained within technical specifications surveillance requirement 3.6.4.1.1 limits, and the individuals remained in the area with the capability to close the personnel access doors.
"This condition represents a failure to meet surveillance requirement 3.6.4.1.2, since both doors in a singular access opening were allowed to open. As a result, entry into technical specification 3.6.4.1 condition A was made, for Unit 3, due to secondary containment being inoperable. The doors were secured at 0311 and secondary containment was declared operable. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."