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Event Notification Report for November 25, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/24/2013 - 11/25/2013

EVENT NUMBERS
4957949577495844967049631

Part 21
Event Number: 49579
Rep Org: ABB INC
Licensee: ABB INC
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE   State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAY LAVRINC
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 11/25/2013
Notification Time: 14:52 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
Event Text
PART 21 REPORT - PRIMARY CLOSE LATCH FAILED TO MEET SPECIFICATION IN K-LINE CIRCUIT BREAKERS

The following is a summary of a fax received from ABB Inc.:

"[ABB Inc. is reporting a] failure to comply with specifications associated with primary close latch, part number 716611K02, used in K-Line 225 to 2000 amp continuous current low voltage electrically operated Model 7 circuit breakers. It does not affect previous models of these same breakers that have not been upgraded to include the interlocking primary and secondary close latches. It does not affect manually operated K-Line breakers or K3000/4000 circuit breakers."

* * * UPDATE FROM JAY LAVRINC TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 12/18/13 AT 1324 EST * * *

The following report was received via facsimile:

This is an amended report to identify the affected customers and complete the one outstanding action from the Part 21 Notification of 11/25/2013.

Affected customers are: APS, Detroit Edison, Dominion, Duke Energy Progress, Entergy, Exelon, Crystal River and Nextera.

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R2DO (Freeman), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Lantz), and Part 21 Group via email.


Agreement State
Event Number: 49577
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: NORFOLK DREDGING
Region: 1
City: FIRE ISLAND   State: NY
County:
License #: GL-1290
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 11/25/2013
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/25/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEMBER OF PUBLIC EXPOSURE EXCEEDING LIMITS

The following was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia via email:

"An individual (non-radiation worker) performing a pipe inspection on a Norfolk Dredging barge received a dose from a Vega America Model SR-2 fixed gauge source while crawling through the pipe. Initial dose estimates to the individual are that he received 146 mrem. Norfolk Dredging sent an e-mail to the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program on Saturday the 23rd and discussions were held on Monday the 25th. Norfolk Dredging is working on an event report to submit, and the RMP will perform an investigation with the licensee. Virginia is providing the event report as the barge is home based in Virginia and is registered as a General License. The barge was operating at a temporary jobsite in New York. The New York State Program and NRC Region 1 was notified of the event."

Virginia Report Number: VA-13-10


Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 49584
Rep Org: HARRISON STEEL CASTINGS
Licensee: HARRISON STEEL CASTINGS
Region: 3
City: ATTICA   State: IN
County:
License #: 13-02141-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVE HOLLANDER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 11/26/2013
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2013
Event Time: 19:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/27/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
Event Text
RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA LOCKING MECHANISM FAILURE

After the licensee completed an exposure and was retracting the source, the radiographer noticed that he did not hear the click of the posi-lock. The radiographer finished retracting the source using the hand crank.

The radiographer then entered the room using a radiac to ensure the source was in the safe position. He found that the spring for the posi-lock had broken. He manually locked the source in the camera and took it out of service.

The licensee will send the camera to the manufacturer for repair.

There were no overexposures to personnel as a result of this event.

* * * UPDATE AT 1043 ON 11/27/2013 FROM DAVE HOLLANDER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The projector (camera) is an Amersham 680BE, S/N BE132.

Notified the R3DO (Peterson) and FSME Event Resources via e-mail.


Agreement State
Event Number: 49670
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: ROCKINGHAM MEMORIAL
Region: 1
City: HARRISONBURG   State: VA
County: HARRISONBURG
License #: 660-182-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 12/20/2013
Notification Time: 14:57 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE HOLDER GRIPPER MALFUNCTION

The following information was submitted by the Commonwealth of Virginia via email:

"On November 25th, the Virginia Department of Health Radiological Duty Officer received a call from the General Electric (GE) service provider representative that a PET/CT machine at Rockingham Memorial failed. The representative responded and found that the source holder was open exposing the source. The representative troubleshot the holder and found that the gripper was not functioning properly. The source was removed and the coach was sent back to Wisconsin for service at GE's facility.

"The Virginia Radioactive Materials Program has been working with GE regarding the cause for the failure. At this time, GE is reviewing service reports to evaluate whether this is an isolated incident.

"The unit was repaired and returned to Rockingham Memorial."

Virginia Event Report ID: VA-13-12


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49631
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4     State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUOC VO
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 12/13/2013
Notification Time: 19:44 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2013
Event Time: 15:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
BREACH SIZES EXCEEDED FOR CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE

"On December 13, 2013 it was determined that a reportable condition has existed at Columbia Generating Station since 1500 hours [PST] on November 25, 2013.

"At 1500 hours on November 25, 2013, the Control Room Envelope (CRE) was declared inoperable based on the inability to ensure that the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System would be able to maintain a positive differential pressure with all areas surrounding the CRE boundary. Columbia does not have the installed instrumentation to directly monitor the differential pressure between the Main Control Room (MCR) and certain areas adjacent to the MCR. The pressure in the adjacent areas is controlled by placing conservative limits on allowed breach size for these adjacent areas.

"On November 25, 2013, it was identified that the combined breach size associated with several doors in these adjacent spaces resulted in exceeding the allowed limit. Based on exceeding the allowed breach size limit to the adjacent areas, the Control Room Envelope was declared inoperable, and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.3.B.1 was entered.

"An additional breach was discovered on 12/05/13 from a hole in ductwork passing through the cable spreading room, which is one of the adjacent areas to the CRE boundary, and that condition was added to the existing action statement 3.7.3.B.1. These are conditions that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and are reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM BRIAN HEAVILIN TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/21/2014 AT 1720 EST* * *

"In the case of this event, the Control Room Envelope (CRE) was declared inoperable and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.3.B.1 was entered conservatively based upon limited knowledge at the time of discovery. There is no installed differential pressure indication between the CRE and this area adjacent to the Main Control Room (MCR), therefore conservatively this adjacent area is included in the CRE, and leakage is administratively controlled. The leakage between the MCR and the adjacent area included in the CRE exceeded this administrative limit.

"Testing performed on November 20, 2013, prior to the December 13, 2013 reported events, as well as testing after the event, January 10, 2014, has demonstrated that the leakage identified does not prevent the Control Room Envelope (CRE) from establishing and maintaining the required differential pressure to ensure fulfillment of its required safety function for Control Room Habitability.

"The ability of the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system to perform its function of pressurizing and maintaining the Main Control Room positively pressurized with respect to its surroundings was not lost due to the leaking doors and duct specified in the event. Performance of the surveillance without these breaches sealed validated this conclusion.

"The event described above should not have been reported, as the Control Room Envelope was always operable and capable of fulfilling its safety function with the existing breaches and did not constitute a reportable event as conditions that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R4DO (Spitzberg).