Event Notification Report for November 17, 2013

ALERT DUE TO STORM DAMAGE ON SITE

"On 11/17/13, at 1417 CST, an alert was declared at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant due to an apparent tornado strike/severe weather event. Multiple facilities were damaged with no injuries and no hazardous material released. No damage to the security fence was observed and the protected area remained secured during the event.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(a)(4) where an emergency condition has been declared an Alert.

"NRC Branch Chief has been notified. PGDP has no NRC Resident Inspector.

"PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2013-08."

Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID PETTY TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1746 EST ON 11/17/13 * * *

"On 11 /17/13, at 1638 CST, the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant decided to issue press releases describing the Alert issued by the plant that afternoon. The Alert was declared due to an apparent tornado strike/severe weather event on 11/17/13 at 1417 CST.

"This event is reportable under Criteria P in Appendix D of USEC procedure CP2-RA-RE 1 030 as any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.

"NRC Branch Chief has been notified. PGDP has no resident inspector.

"PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2013-08."

Notified RA (McCree), NMSS EO (Damon), R2DO (Desai), IRD (Gott), NMSS (Haney), DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID PETTY TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1910 EST ON 11/17/13 * * *

The Alert was terminated at 1806 CST on 11/17/13 after a complete security check of the site perimeter and a compilation of the damages sustained by the site. There were no personnel injuries and no releases (HAZMAT or radiological).

Notified RA (McCree), NMSS EO (Damon), R2DO (Desai), IRD (Gott), NMSS (Haney), DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email.

LOSS OF DRYWELL SAMPLING CAPABILITY

"This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability. At 0955 (PST) on 11/17/2013,
it was discovered that the CMS-SR-13 sample valves would not align to allow monitoring the drywell. The redundant sample rack, CMS-SR-14, is already out of service due to an issue with the sample pump, which is currently awaiting replacement parts. The capability to monitor the drywell for H2 and O2 remotely is non-existent if an emergency situation were to arise because of these two issues. The only method currently available to sample the drywall for H2 and O2 is manually via chemistry procedures. This method would be unavailable in accident conditions because the sample point isolation valves isolate on an accident signal (F or A). Even if the sample points were not isolated, the Chemist would be unable to draw a sample safely during an accident due to radiation levels in the Reactor Building and/or H2 and O2 levels in containment. PPM 13.1.1 Table 6 specifies DW/WW (Drywell/Wetwell) hydrogen and oxygen measurements as a method for determining potential loss of Primary Containment. PPM 13.14.11 does not specify an alternative method for the loss of CMS-SR-13 & 14. Based on this information and discussions with Licensing and Emergency Preparedness, the station has determined this issue is a loss of emergency assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HOLICK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0159 EST ON 11/19/13 * * *

"At 1351 PST on 11/18/13, repairs on CMS-SR-13 were completed, returning the monitor to operable status of being able to sample both the drywell and wetwell for hydrogen and oxygen as required for emergency assessment capability.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R4DO (PROULX).

ALL CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS IN ALARM

"A station annunciator system malfunction caused all Control Room annunciator indications to be in alarm status. This condition resulted in a loss of normal audible and visual plant condition assessment capabilities and was assessed as being a significant loss of assessment capabilities. Backup assessment capability existed and was dependent upon redundant assets as described in existing station documentation and/or functionality of the Control Room Alarm Typer.

"At 1659 EST full annunciator capability was restored following cleaning of a disconnect switch.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

State and local officials will be notified.

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY MOMENTARILY DECLARED INOPERABLE

"Station personnel simultaneously opened the inner and outer air lock doors from the reactor building to the reactor control enclosure (Reactor Building 23 foot elevation North West airlock). Reactor Building secondary containment integrity was declared INOPERABLE per TS 3.5.B.2 due to both containment airlock doors being momentarily open at the same time. Reactor Building D/P (differential pressure) remained less than negative 0.25 inches water column.

"Reactor Building secondary containment integrity was declared OPERABLE following verification that at least one airlock door to each access of secondary containment was closed per TS 3.5.B.2. Total LCO time was approximately 10 seconds."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

REMOTELY OPERATED ISOLATION VALVE FAILED TO CLOSE

"At approximately 1400 (CDT on 11/17 /2013) the facility suspended operations due to a tornado warning. Located on the first floor of the Feed Materials Building, it was determined that a remotely operated valve closing mechanism at the #2 fill spot failed to close a UF6 cylinder valve. The cylinder valve was then closed manually by operations personnel. There was no damage, no release, or employee exposure due to this event."

"NRC Region II informed: Richard Gibson"

60-DAY REPORT FOR INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS

"The following 60-day report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of the Unit 2, Division 1 and Division 2, Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) that occurred on November 17, 2013, at 1000 CST. As allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) this notification is being made via telephone.

"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.

"On November 17th, during the required twenty-two year replacement of the ATWS [anticipated transient without scram] level transmitters, the Unit 2, Division 1 and Division 2, Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) auto-started as a result of maintenance activities. The failure to remove trip relays, in addition to the sequence for the timing of the replacements, resulted in an unexpected and invalid low water level trip. Subsequently, this resulted in an automatic initiation of the Unit 2, Division 1 and 2, EDGs.

"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.

"Upon receiving the invalid low water level signal, both divisions of EDGs responded as expected for existing plant conditions. Therefore, the actuation was considered a complete actuation of both Division 1 and Division 2 EDGs.

"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.

"Both Divisions of EDGs auto-started, achieved rated speed, and idled based upon offsite power being available to the safety related busses. Therefore, this is being considered a successful actuation of the Division 1 and Division 2 EDGs.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."