Event Notification Report for November 01, 2013

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING NI-63 SOURCE

"The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control [DHEC] was notified on Friday, November 1, 2013, at 0902 hrs. [EDT], that during routine wipe testing of a Shimadzu GC14A gas chromatograph, an ECD containing 10 milliCuries of Ni-63 was found to have removable contamination exceeding 0.005 microCuries. The chromatograph was being tested in preparation for disposal when wipes of the inside of the chamber indicated contamination. The source was removed and properly bagged to prevent the spread of any further contamination. The chromatograph and source are secured in the Radiation Safety Laboratory awaiting disposal by a licensed vendor. The Radiation Safety Officer stated that wipes of the laboratory where the chromatograph had been located were analyzed and no removal contamination had been detected.

"The Radiation Safety Officer was advised by Mark L. Windham [South Carolina DHEC] to submit a written report detailing this event to the Department within 30 days. The event is open and pending the licensee's investigation and report to the Department. Updates will be made through the national NMED system."

BOTH TRAINS OF AUXILIARY BUILDING SPECIAL VENTILATION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE

"During Unit 2 refueling outage [currently defueled] preventative maintenance on CV-31117, Loop B Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), an opening in the valve was discovered without direct administrative controls to ensure the opening could be closed within 6 minutes following a Loss of Coolant Accident on Unit 1. Addition of this opening to other openings created a total of greater than 10 square feet of non-closable openings and required declaring the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System (ABSVS) boundary inoperable. The inoperable ABSVS boundary caused both trains of ABSVS to be declared inoperable and required entry into Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.12, Condition B. This could have prevented the ability to control the release of radioactive material and is considered a potential loss of safety function per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C).

"Administrative controls in the ABSVS Boundary were re-established by installing a closure device in the opening on CV-31117 at 1246 CDT. The ABSVS boundary and both trains of ABSVS were declared operable at that time."

During the time that the ventilation system was out of service, no evolutions were in progress that could have resulted in an unmonitored release.

* * * RETRACTION ON 11/14/13 AT 1648 EST FROM STEPHEN SEILHYMER TO NESTOR MAKRIS * * *

"After further evaluation, the non-closable boundary openings for the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Zone (ABSVZ) including CV-31117, Loop B Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), at the time of discovery is calculated to be 9.48 square feet. This is below the 10 square feet required in TS 3.7.12, thus both trains of ABSVS were operable and no loss of safety function existed.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified the R3DO (Cameron).

CAMERA SOURCE FAILED TO RETURN TO THE LOCKED POSITION

An 880D radiography camera source was retracted back to the camera but failed to lock in the stored position because of ice. The supervisor and foreman removed the guide tube and thawed out the camera in the back of the radiography truck. The source was then able to be manually locked in the stored position.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DURING SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM TESTING

"At 2147 CDT on 11/1/2013, Unit 2 Reactor tripped during Solid State Protection System Slave Relay Testing. This test utilizes a blocking circuit to verify the operability of the slave relay which trips the Main Turbine and both Main Feedwater pump turbines, on a Hi-Hi Steam Generator level or Safety Injection. No valve actuation is expected to occur. While positioning the Slave Relay switch in a testing lineup, the relay actutated. The Unit 2 Turbine tripped as well as both Main Feedwater Pumps. The Turbine Trip actuated the Reactor Trip since power was above 50%. The trip of both Main Feedwater Pumps started both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. The Steam Generator Lo Lo Levels started the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump. All systems responded as expected.

"Currently, Unit 2 is being maintained in Hot Standby (Mode 3) in accordance with Integrated Plant Operating Procedure IPO-007B and the Emergency Response Guideline Procedure Network has been exited. Decay Heat is being rejected to the Main Condenser via Steam Dump Valves (Turbine Bypass Valves)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE NOT WITHIN LIMITS FOLLOWING TRIP OF EXHAUST FAN

"On November 1, 2013 at 0309 EDT, Secondary Containment Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) differential pressure was lost following a routine transfer of Reactor Protection System Power supplies. Upon restoration from the power supply transfer, one of the Reactor Building Exhaust Fans tripped. There were no obvious malfunctions associated with the equipment and fan was able to be restarted. Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) and III (Common Refuel Floor Area) ventilation remained in service and stable.

"Zone I differential pressure recovered within a few minutes and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered for both units at 0309 EDT and exited at 0315 EDT. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge.

"There have been no further perturbations in differential pressure and secondary containment remains operable.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. See similar event number #49489.