Event Notification Report for October 31, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/30/2013 - 10/31/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
4949349489494904949149513
Agreement State
Event Number: 49493
Rep Org: KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: ST. FRANCIS HEALTH CENTER
Region: 4
City: TOPEKA State: KS
County:
License #: 19-B272-04
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID WHITFILL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: ST. FRANCIS HEALTH CENTER
Region: 4
City: TOPEKA State: KS
County:
License #: 19-B272-04
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID WHITFILL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 11/01/2013
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2013
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOPHARMACY WORKER EXTREMITY OVEREXPOSURE
The following report was received from the Kansas Department of Health and Environment via facsimile:
"Initial notification of an overexposure to the extremities of a radiopharmacy nuclear medicine technician at St. Francis Health Center, Topeka, KS, was made by the radiation safety officer.
"A Landauer report received 10/31/2013 indicated a right hand dosimeter [dose] at 55.85 rem and a left hand dosimeter [dose] at 54.29 rem. Whole body badge [dose] indicated 36 mrem. The tech has been removed from any job duties involving occupational radiation exposure. A more detailed report is being prepared [by the licensee]."
Kansas Report Number KS130009
The following report was received from the Kansas Department of Health and Environment via facsimile:
"Initial notification of an overexposure to the extremities of a radiopharmacy nuclear medicine technician at St. Francis Health Center, Topeka, KS, was made by the radiation safety officer.
"A Landauer report received 10/31/2013 indicated a right hand dosimeter [dose] at 55.85 rem and a left hand dosimeter [dose] at 54.29 rem. Whole body badge [dose] indicated 36 mrem. The tech has been removed from any job duties involving occupational radiation exposure. A more detailed report is being prepared [by the licensee]."
Kansas Report Number KS130009
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49489
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/31/2013
Notification Time: 05:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 02:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Notification Time: 05:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 02:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE NOT WITHIN LIMITS FOLLOWING TRIP OF EXHAUST FAN
"On October 31, 2013 at 0251, Secondary Containment Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) differential pressure was lost following a routine transfer of Reactor Protection System Power supplies. Upon restoration from the power supply transfer, one of the Reactor Building Equipment Compartment Exhaust Fans tripped. There were no obvious malfunctions associated with the equipment and fan was able to be restarted. Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) and III (Common Refuel Floor Area) ventilation remained in service and stable.
"Zone I differential pressure recovered within a few minutes and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered for both units at 0251 and exited at 0255. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge.
"There have been no further perturbations in differential pressure and secondary containment remains operable.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On October 31, 2013 at 0251, Secondary Containment Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) differential pressure was lost following a routine transfer of Reactor Protection System Power supplies. Upon restoration from the power supply transfer, one of the Reactor Building Equipment Compartment Exhaust Fans tripped. There were no obvious malfunctions associated with the equipment and fan was able to be restarted. Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) and III (Common Refuel Floor Area) ventilation remained in service and stable.
"Zone I differential pressure recovered within a few minutes and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered for both units at 0251 and exited at 0255. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge.
"There have been no further perturbations in differential pressure and secondary containment remains operable.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49490
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILLY HERZOG
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILLY HERZOG
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/31/2013
Notification Time: 19:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 17:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Notification Time: 19:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 17:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POSTULATED FIRE EVENT COULD RESULT IN A HOT SHORT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"While performing a review of industry OE [operating experience] concerning unfused ammeter circuits on station batteries, it was discovered that the ammeter circuits for all of the non-1E batteries are of a similar design to that described in the OE. Also, while reviewing additional DC circuits, it was discovered that the control circuit for the Turbine Generator Emergency Lube Oil pump is unfused, protected only by the motor circuit breaker with a trip setting of 350 amps. The concern is that under the fire safe shutdown rules it is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage these circuits and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cables and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10CFR50 Appendix R. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"While performing a review of industry OE [operating experience] concerning unfused ammeter circuits on station batteries, it was discovered that the ammeter circuits for all of the non-1E batteries are of a similar design to that described in the OE. Also, while reviewing additional DC circuits, it was discovered that the control circuit for the Turbine Generator Emergency Lube Oil pump is unfused, protected only by the motor circuit breaker with a trip setting of 350 amps. The concern is that under the fire safe shutdown rules it is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage these circuits and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cables and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10CFR50 Appendix R. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49491
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/31/2013
Notification Time: 20:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 17:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Notification Time: 20:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 17:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POSTULATED FIRE EVENT COULD RESULT IN A HOT SHORT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"Per review of OE INPO ICES-305419, 'Unfused remote DC ammeter circuit could result in a secondary fire due to multiple fire induced faults' from Davis-Besse and Cooper Condition Report CR CNS-2013-07413; it has been determined that JAF [James A. Fitzpatrick] is potentially susceptible to the same condition.
"The condition in the Davis-Besse OE is described as follows:
"The wiring design for the ammeters contains a shunt in the current flow from each direct current (DC) battery or charger. Bolted on the shunt bar are two IEEE 383 qualified leads to a current meter in the main control room (MCR). The small difference in voltage between the two taps on the shunt is enough to deflect the current gauge in the MCR when current flows from the battery or charger through the shunt. The ammeter wiring attached to the shunt does not have fuses. It is postulated that a fire could cause one of these ammeter wires to short to ground at the same time the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This would cause a ground loop through the unfused ammeter cable. With enough current going through the cable, the potential exists that the cable could self-heat to the point of causing a secondary fire in the electrical tray at some point along the path of the cable (including the Control Room) or possibly heat up to the point of causing damage to adjacent cables that may be required for safe shutdown.
"TRM 3.7.M, Fire Barrier Penetrations, is applicable. The functional integrity of the fire barrier penetration seals ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. The issue identified is with the potential of a fire starting in another location other than the original fire location bypassing fire barriers due to a fire induced electrical short. Per engineering, the areas with the deficient fire barriers are the DC Switchgear Rooms A and B, Cable Spreading Room, Relay Room and Control Room. An active LCO will track the TRM action for the non-functionality of those fire barriers.
"This condition is being reported under 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition which significantly degrades plant safety.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"Per review of OE INPO ICES-305419, 'Unfused remote DC ammeter circuit could result in a secondary fire due to multiple fire induced faults' from Davis-Besse and Cooper Condition Report CR CNS-2013-07413; it has been determined that JAF [James A. Fitzpatrick] is potentially susceptible to the same condition.
"The condition in the Davis-Besse OE is described as follows:
"The wiring design for the ammeters contains a shunt in the current flow from each direct current (DC) battery or charger. Bolted on the shunt bar are two IEEE 383 qualified leads to a current meter in the main control room (MCR). The small difference in voltage between the two taps on the shunt is enough to deflect the current gauge in the MCR when current flows from the battery or charger through the shunt. The ammeter wiring attached to the shunt does not have fuses. It is postulated that a fire could cause one of these ammeter wires to short to ground at the same time the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This would cause a ground loop through the unfused ammeter cable. With enough current going through the cable, the potential exists that the cable could self-heat to the point of causing a secondary fire in the electrical tray at some point along the path of the cable (including the Control Room) or possibly heat up to the point of causing damage to adjacent cables that may be required for safe shutdown.
"TRM 3.7.M, Fire Barrier Penetrations, is applicable. The functional integrity of the fire barrier penetration seals ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. The issue identified is with the potential of a fire starting in another location other than the original fire location bypassing fire barriers due to a fire induced electrical short. Per engineering, the areas with the deficient fire barriers are the DC Switchgear Rooms A and B, Cable Spreading Room, Relay Room and Control Room. An active LCO will track the TRM action for the non-functionality of those fire barriers.
"This condition is being reported under 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition which significantly degrades plant safety.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Agreement State
Event Number: 49513
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: COATESVILLE State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH M. MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: COATESVILLE State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH M. MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 11/07/2013
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2013
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ORPHAN SEALED SOURCE RECOVERED AT A SCRAP YARD
The following Agreement State Report was received via facsimile:
"Notifications: The Southeast Regional (SER) Office was contacted by Coatesville Scrap on October 31, 2013 regarding a radiation alarm on an outbound trailer load. The event is reportable within 24 hours per 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i).
"Event Description: On Thursday, October 31, 2013, a radioactive source was detected when a radiation alarm sounded on an outbound trailer load. The alarm was caused by a small metal object. It was located, placed in a lead pipe, crimped and moved to a remote area of the scrapyard behind a large steel piece of equipment. A SER inspector was sent to the site to determine the isotope and activity. It was identified as cesium-137 and a measurement on the surface of the lead pipe was 320 mR/hr. On Wednesday, November 6th the activity was estimated at approximate 10 mCi. It was determined that three members of the public were involved in locating the source, however one had the longest contact with the source; approximately 2.5 hours on and off. It took site staff some time to find the material via shoveling through the solid material and metal of the load. When found, the radioactive source was carried by a shovel approximately 150 to 200 feet away. An individual then carried the source by hand to an adjoining property and placed it in a lead pipe, which was crimped. This took approximately 10 to 15 minutes. A whole body dose documented from the uncalibrated dosimetry that was being worn by this individual was 364 micro-roentgens (microR). SER staff estimate a possible 10 rad dose to this individual's hand. Hands and feet of all parties were surveyed, with no contamination found. Caution tape was used to create a boundary to help notify other employees to stay away from the area. Meter readings at the caution tape boundary were approximately 60 microR/hr.
"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: Loss of control of a Cs-137 sealed source.
"ACTIONS: The DEP [Department of Environmental Protection] plans a full investigation of this event. The scrap yard has hired a consultant health physicist to assist with this event and Cs-137 source. The DEP will recommend that the individual who handled the source have their hands photographed and be examined by a physician."
Event Report ID No: PA130026
The following Agreement State Report was received via facsimile:
"Notifications: The Southeast Regional (SER) Office was contacted by Coatesville Scrap on October 31, 2013 regarding a radiation alarm on an outbound trailer load. The event is reportable within 24 hours per 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i).
"Event Description: On Thursday, October 31, 2013, a radioactive source was detected when a radiation alarm sounded on an outbound trailer load. The alarm was caused by a small metal object. It was located, placed in a lead pipe, crimped and moved to a remote area of the scrapyard behind a large steel piece of equipment. A SER inspector was sent to the site to determine the isotope and activity. It was identified as cesium-137 and a measurement on the surface of the lead pipe was 320 mR/hr. On Wednesday, November 6th the activity was estimated at approximate 10 mCi. It was determined that three members of the public were involved in locating the source, however one had the longest contact with the source; approximately 2.5 hours on and off. It took site staff some time to find the material via shoveling through the solid material and metal of the load. When found, the radioactive source was carried by a shovel approximately 150 to 200 feet away. An individual then carried the source by hand to an adjoining property and placed it in a lead pipe, which was crimped. This took approximately 10 to 15 minutes. A whole body dose documented from the uncalibrated dosimetry that was being worn by this individual was 364 micro-roentgens (microR). SER staff estimate a possible 10 rad dose to this individual's hand. Hands and feet of all parties were surveyed, with no contamination found. Caution tape was used to create a boundary to help notify other employees to stay away from the area. Meter readings at the caution tape boundary were approximately 60 microR/hr.
"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: Loss of control of a Cs-137 sealed source.
"ACTIONS: The DEP [Department of Environmental Protection] plans a full investigation of this event. The scrap yard has hired a consultant health physicist to assist with this event and Cs-137 source. The DEP will recommend that the individual who handled the source have their hands photographed and be examined by a physician."
Event Report ID No: PA130026