Event Notification Report for October 27, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/26/2013 - 10/27/2013
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49476
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW LEENERTS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW LEENERTS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 10/27/2013
Notification Time: 22:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2013
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2014
Notification Time: 22:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2013
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 1730 EDT on 10/27/2013, SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear] discovered that Unit 1 containment penetration X-108 had a maintenance flange installed with a service air connection attached. The service air connection was connected to a temporary air compressor supplying air to maintenance loads inside Unit 1 containment. Contrary to the requirements of the breaching permit, personnel were not stationed at the penetration to isolate the service air connection in the event of the air line rupturing inside Unit 1 containment or upon initiation of an auxiliary building isolation signal. Since the Unit 1 containment is open to the auxiliary building as part of outage activities, if the service air line had ruptured, the additional air into the Unit 1 containment could have exceeded the capacity of the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) and potentially have impacted the ability of the ABGTS to perform its design safety function. This resulted in both trains of the ABGTS being declared inoperable requiring Unit 2 to enter the action of LCO 3.0.3. The service air line was isolated immediately and Unit 2 exited the action of LCO 3.0.3 at 1732 EDT. At the time of the event, Unit 1 was defueled and did not require ABGTS to be operable. Unit 1 subsequently entered Mode 6 at 1904 EDT on 10/27/2013 and is currently conducting refueling operations. Unit 2 remains in Mode 1, 100% power and stable. There were no actual operational impacts to either unit."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BRUCE BUCH TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1428 EST ON 1/30/2014 * * *
"Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, are retracting the 8 hour non-emergency notification made on October 27, 2013 at 2229 EDT (EN# 49476).
"The notification on October 27, 2013, reported that if the service air line (associated with penetration X-108) had ruptured, the additional air into the Unit 1 containment could have exceeded the capacity of the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) and potentially have impacted both trains of ABGTS from performing its safety function(s).
"Subsequent engineering analysis concluded acceptable margin was available. Both trains of ABGTS would have remained operable and capable of performing its design function(s) at all times. The engineering analysis results are captured in the licensee's corrective action program. Based on the new analysis, the condition reported in EN #49476 did not result in a potential uncontrolled radioactive release. This event report is being retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the analysis results and informed of this retraction."
Notified R2DO (McCoy).
"At 1730 EDT on 10/27/2013, SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear] discovered that Unit 1 containment penetration X-108 had a maintenance flange installed with a service air connection attached. The service air connection was connected to a temporary air compressor supplying air to maintenance loads inside Unit 1 containment. Contrary to the requirements of the breaching permit, personnel were not stationed at the penetration to isolate the service air connection in the event of the air line rupturing inside Unit 1 containment or upon initiation of an auxiliary building isolation signal. Since the Unit 1 containment is open to the auxiliary building as part of outage activities, if the service air line had ruptured, the additional air into the Unit 1 containment could have exceeded the capacity of the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) and potentially have impacted the ability of the ABGTS to perform its design safety function. This resulted in both trains of the ABGTS being declared inoperable requiring Unit 2 to enter the action of LCO 3.0.3. The service air line was isolated immediately and Unit 2 exited the action of LCO 3.0.3 at 1732 EDT. At the time of the event, Unit 1 was defueled and did not require ABGTS to be operable. Unit 1 subsequently entered Mode 6 at 1904 EDT on 10/27/2013 and is currently conducting refueling operations. Unit 2 remains in Mode 1, 100% power and stable. There were no actual operational impacts to either unit."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BRUCE BUCH TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1428 EST ON 1/30/2014 * * *
"Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, are retracting the 8 hour non-emergency notification made on October 27, 2013 at 2229 EDT (EN# 49476).
"The notification on October 27, 2013, reported that if the service air line (associated with penetration X-108) had ruptured, the additional air into the Unit 1 containment could have exceeded the capacity of the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) and potentially have impacted both trains of ABGTS from performing its safety function(s).
"Subsequent engineering analysis concluded acceptable margin was available. Both trains of ABGTS would have remained operable and capable of performing its design function(s) at all times. The engineering analysis results are captured in the licensee's corrective action program. Based on the new analysis, the condition reported in EN #49476 did not result in a potential uncontrolled radioactive release. This event report is being retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the analysis results and informed of this retraction."
Notified R2DO (McCoy).
Agreement State
Event Number: 49485
Rep Org: NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ALLWEST TESTING & ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: HAYDEN State: ID
County:
License #: 11-27637-01
Agreement: N
Docket: 03035139
NRC Notified By: DAVID STRADINGER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: ALLWEST TESTING & ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: HAYDEN State: ID
County:
License #: 11-27637-01
Agreement: N
Docket: 03035139
NRC Notified By: DAVID STRADINGER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/30/2013
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2013
Event Time: 11:25 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2013
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2013
Event Time: 11:25 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PORTABLE MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED AT WORKSITE
The following report was received from the North Dakota Department of Health via e-mail:
"A portable moisture/density gauge possessed by ALLWEST Testing & Engineering, LLC of Hayden, Idaho containing a 10 mCi Cesium-137 sealed source and a 50 mCi Americium-241:Beryllium sealed source was crushed by a piece of heavy equipment (excavator bucket) at a temporary job site located southwest of Dickinson, North Dakota. The portable gauge user had failed to maintain constant surveillance of the gauge. Upon observing the heavy equipment running into the gauge, the user flagged down the heavy equipment operator to halt his activity. The operator lifted the bucket off the gauge and set it to the side. The gauge user instructed the operator to relocate to an area approximately 150 feet from the damaged gauge. Subsequently, he phoned his immediate supervisor and the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for guidance. An area at an approximate distance of 150 feet in three directions from the damaged gauge was roped off with 'Caution Radiation' tape. The fourth direction (east) consisted of a large hill of soil not readily accessible.
"1:02 PM (MST): The gauge user placed a call to the ND State Radio emergency response number to report the event.
"1:08 PM (MST): ND State Radio personnel notified the Stark County Emergency Manager (SCEM) who in turn notified the Southwestern District Health Unit Executive Officer (HUEO).
"1:10 pm (MST): The HUEO notified the ND Department of Health Radiation Control Program Manager (RCPM) of the event. The RCPM informed the HUEO the gauge should remain in place until radiation surveys had been performed and the site evaluated by his department.
"2:17 pm (MST): The HUEO and the SCEM were present at the event site. They met with the gauge user and the Westcon, Inc. HSE Coordinator for a briefing of the event. The HUEO performed an initial radiation survey using a calibrated SE International, Inc. Model Radiation Alert Inspector survey instrument (SN 35756). The survey was performed beginning at the outer boundary moving inwards toward the damaged gauge. The reading at a distance of 4 feet from the source was 0.063 mR/hr. The background reading was 0.013 mR/hr. The HUEO and SCEM instructed the gauge user to leave the gauge in place and wait for North Dakota Department of Health personnel to be on site the next morning to evaluate the site. Visual assessment of the gauge showed evidence of the two source housings to be physically intact.
"October 28, 2013:
"6:00 am (MST): As instructed by ALLWEST Testing & Engineering's RSO, the gauge user relocated the damaged gauge and associated fragments to the gauge transport case. The case was secured in the box of his pickup truck.
"9:00 am (MST): North Dakota Department of Health (NDDoH) personnel were on site to perform interviews, radiation surveys and evaluation of the site. Radiation surveys were performed by the NDDoH using a calibrated Ludlum Model 19 microR meter (SN 270378) and a Canberra Dineutron neutron meter (SN 18327). The background readings were 12 microR/hr and 0.027 mR/hr respectively. The highest gauge shipping container surface readings were 3.1 mR/hr (gamma) and 0.09 mR/hr (neutron). Surveys of the pathway from the initial impact of the bucket to the gauge's final resting spot revealed background readings. A leak test of the gauge was performed and shipped via overnight express for analysis. The leak test results demonstrated no leakage. The gauge was transported by licensee personnel back to their Idaho office to make arrangements for final disposal.
"Throughout the event, the gauge user had not worn personnel dosimetry. Exposure calculations will be performed by the RSO."
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID STRADINGER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1431 EDT ON 12/6/13 * * *
The North Dakota Department of Health has completed their investigation. Several non-compliances were identified during the reactive inspection. A letter of apparent non-compliance was sent to the licensee. Corrective actions will be required to be submitted in response to this letter. The North Dakota Department of Health is recommending the LER (License Event Report) for closure.
Notified the R4DO (Vasquez), R1DO (Cook), and FSME Events Resource via email.
The following report was received from the North Dakota Department of Health via e-mail:
"A portable moisture/density gauge possessed by ALLWEST Testing & Engineering, LLC of Hayden, Idaho containing a 10 mCi Cesium-137 sealed source and a 50 mCi Americium-241:Beryllium sealed source was crushed by a piece of heavy equipment (excavator bucket) at a temporary job site located southwest of Dickinson, North Dakota. The portable gauge user had failed to maintain constant surveillance of the gauge. Upon observing the heavy equipment running into the gauge, the user flagged down the heavy equipment operator to halt his activity. The operator lifted the bucket off the gauge and set it to the side. The gauge user instructed the operator to relocate to an area approximately 150 feet from the damaged gauge. Subsequently, he phoned his immediate supervisor and the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for guidance. An area at an approximate distance of 150 feet in three directions from the damaged gauge was roped off with 'Caution Radiation' tape. The fourth direction (east) consisted of a large hill of soil not readily accessible.
"1:02 PM (MST): The gauge user placed a call to the ND State Radio emergency response number to report the event.
"1:08 PM (MST): ND State Radio personnel notified the Stark County Emergency Manager (SCEM) who in turn notified the Southwestern District Health Unit Executive Officer (HUEO).
"1:10 pm (MST): The HUEO notified the ND Department of Health Radiation Control Program Manager (RCPM) of the event. The RCPM informed the HUEO the gauge should remain in place until radiation surveys had been performed and the site evaluated by his department.
"2:17 pm (MST): The HUEO and the SCEM were present at the event site. They met with the gauge user and the Westcon, Inc. HSE Coordinator for a briefing of the event. The HUEO performed an initial radiation survey using a calibrated SE International, Inc. Model Radiation Alert Inspector survey instrument (SN 35756). The survey was performed beginning at the outer boundary moving inwards toward the damaged gauge. The reading at a distance of 4 feet from the source was 0.063 mR/hr. The background reading was 0.013 mR/hr. The HUEO and SCEM instructed the gauge user to leave the gauge in place and wait for North Dakota Department of Health personnel to be on site the next morning to evaluate the site. Visual assessment of the gauge showed evidence of the two source housings to be physically intact.
"October 28, 2013:
"6:00 am (MST): As instructed by ALLWEST Testing & Engineering's RSO, the gauge user relocated the damaged gauge and associated fragments to the gauge transport case. The case was secured in the box of his pickup truck.
"9:00 am (MST): North Dakota Department of Health (NDDoH) personnel were on site to perform interviews, radiation surveys and evaluation of the site. Radiation surveys were performed by the NDDoH using a calibrated Ludlum Model 19 microR meter (SN 270378) and a Canberra Dineutron neutron meter (SN 18327). The background readings were 12 microR/hr and 0.027 mR/hr respectively. The highest gauge shipping container surface readings were 3.1 mR/hr (gamma) and 0.09 mR/hr (neutron). Surveys of the pathway from the initial impact of the bucket to the gauge's final resting spot revealed background readings. A leak test of the gauge was performed and shipped via overnight express for analysis. The leak test results demonstrated no leakage. The gauge was transported by licensee personnel back to their Idaho office to make arrangements for final disposal.
"Throughout the event, the gauge user had not worn personnel dosimetry. Exposure calculations will be performed by the RSO."
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID STRADINGER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1431 EDT ON 12/6/13 * * *
The North Dakota Department of Health has completed their investigation. Several non-compliances were identified during the reactive inspection. A letter of apparent non-compliance was sent to the licensee. Corrective actions will be required to be submitted in response to this letter. The North Dakota Department of Health is recommending the LER (License Event Report) for closure.
Notified the R4DO (Vasquez), R1DO (Cook), and FSME Events Resource via email.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 49475
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/27/2013
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2013
Event Time: 10:55 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2013
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2013
Event Time: 10:55 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(5) - ONLY ONE SAFETY ITEM AVAILABLE
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(5) - ONLY ONE SAFETY ITEM AVAILABLE
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
MARISSA BAILEY (NMSS)
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
MARISSA BAILEY (NMSS)
FAILURE OF A STEAM SUPPLY VACUUM BREAKER
"During performance of a preventive maintenance check of [Item Relied On For Safety] IROFS 3526 [Uranium Dioxide steam supply system], it was determined to have failed, that is, blocked preventing it to perform its safety function as a vacuum breaker. This vacuum breaker is in a steam line from an unfavorable geometry steam boiler to process service subsystems. This vacuum breaker is designed to prevent backflow from Tank TK-102 when the heat exchanger E-102 leaks internally and the steam supply is off, Accident Sequence 2.13, in E04-NCSA-070 version 11 for the ADU [Ammonium Diuranate] process. This vacuum breaker is also used in Accident Sequence 5.4, E04-NCSA-120 version 16 for the UNH [Uranal Nitrate Hydroxide] reprocessing Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). This sequence is the transfer of UNH from uranium powder dissolver to the unfavorable geometry steam boiler when the loss of its heat source causes a vacuum in the steam boiler. Additionally this IROFS is used in Accident Sequence 7.5, E04-NCSA-190 version 10 for the UO2 pellet dissolution process. The IROFS prevents UNH to backflow into the unfavorable geometry steam boiler. The UO2 steam boiler was shut down at the time of the finding and remains shutdown. The other IROFS 3527 in these sequences remained available during the time. This was verified when performing the PM.
"This determination was completed at 1055 PDT on 10/27/2013. The extent of condition to evaluate other potential uses of this type of vacuum breaker is underway. The safety significance is low as the independent IROFS 3527 was verified to be available and reliable via the testing. The system was shut down and remains shutdown for further evaluation, the failed vacuum breaker has been replaced and verified operable."
The licensee will notify Region II.
"During performance of a preventive maintenance check of [Item Relied On For Safety] IROFS 3526 [Uranium Dioxide steam supply system], it was determined to have failed, that is, blocked preventing it to perform its safety function as a vacuum breaker. This vacuum breaker is in a steam line from an unfavorable geometry steam boiler to process service subsystems. This vacuum breaker is designed to prevent backflow from Tank TK-102 when the heat exchanger E-102 leaks internally and the steam supply is off, Accident Sequence 2.13, in E04-NCSA-070 version 11 for the ADU [Ammonium Diuranate] process. This vacuum breaker is also used in Accident Sequence 5.4, E04-NCSA-120 version 16 for the UNH [Uranal Nitrate Hydroxide] reprocessing Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). This sequence is the transfer of UNH from uranium powder dissolver to the unfavorable geometry steam boiler when the loss of its heat source causes a vacuum in the steam boiler. Additionally this IROFS is used in Accident Sequence 7.5, E04-NCSA-190 version 10 for the UO2 pellet dissolution process. The IROFS prevents UNH to backflow into the unfavorable geometry steam boiler. The UO2 steam boiler was shut down at the time of the finding and remains shutdown. The other IROFS 3527 in these sequences remained available during the time. This was verified when performing the PM.
"This determination was completed at 1055 PDT on 10/27/2013. The extent of condition to evaluate other potential uses of this type of vacuum breaker is underway. The safety significance is low as the independent IROFS 3527 was verified to be available and reliable via the testing. The system was shut down and remains shutdown for further evaluation, the failed vacuum breaker has been replaced and verified operable."
The licensee will notify Region II.