Event Notification Report for October 22, 2013

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A LICENSED EMPLOYEE

A licensed employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on hold.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

EMPLOYEE EXPERIENCING CHEST PAIN TRANSPORTED FOR OFFSITE MEDICAL TREATMENT

"An employee experiencing chest pains reported to the on-site dispensary this morning. The plant nurse administered first aid and then sent the employee to an off-site medical facility. A whole body survey of the employee's plant clothing was performed. The maximum amount of contamination found was present on the employee's right boot, 197,000 dpm/100cm2. Prior to leaving the Restricted Area, the employee's plant clothing was removed, and he was whole body frisked out of the plant. The employee was free of contamination upon release."

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO DECREASING CONDENSER VACUUM

"At 1144 EDT, Vogtle Unit Two was manually tripped in response to lowering Main Condenser vacuum. The Unit 2 Bravo Main Feed Pump was tagged out for scheduled maintenance and the casing was being removed when condenser vacuum started lower due to isolation valve not holding pressure. Main Condenser vacuum lowered to less than procedural limits for continued plant operation.

"All systems operated correctly in response to the reactor trip. All control rods fully inserted. AFW was placed in service to control Steam Generator levels. System response allowed for an uncomplicated reactor trip response. Plant is stable in Mode 3 while performing a cause investigation.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified and at plant site."

The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to the Main Condenser.

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PERSONNEL AIR LOCK DOOR INTERLOCK FAILURE

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'Event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.' An employee entered a secondary containment interlock and while the door was closing, another employee opened the other secondary containment interlock door thereby having two doors open. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the main control room supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 10 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the main control room, has remained satisfactory and less than -0.25 inches of H20 at all times. Initial investigation determined that a mechanical interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the mechanical interlock."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR A NON-LICENSED CONTRACT SUPERVISOR

A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of industry operating experience regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the control room has determined the described condition to be applicable to Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2 resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The original plant wiring design and associated analysis for the Class 1E batteries control room ampere indications do not include overcurrent protection features to limit the fault current.

"In the postulated event, a fire in the control room could cause one of the ammeter wires to short to the ground plane. Simultaneously, it is postulated that the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to the ground plane. This could cause a ground loop through the unprotected ammeter wiring. This event could result in excessive current flow (i.e., heating) in the ammeter wiring to the point of causing a secondary fire in the raceway system. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. This condition has been entered into the Nine Mile Point corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-2013-008747 (NMP1) and CR-2013-008749 (NMP2).

"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plants.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

PART 21 REPORT - CRACKING IN KCR-13 STANDBY BATTERY JARS

The following was received via facsimile:

"The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC a report in general conformity to the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.21 (a)(2). On October 22, 2013, C&D Technologies, Inc. (C&D) was informed by Entergy Nuclear Northeast that a KCR-13 battery installed at the Indian Point Nuclear Energy Center had developed a small crack in the polycarbonate jar material. The jar is a safety related component with the primary function of containing electrolyte. C&D does not believe that significant quantity of electrolyte was lost through this crack, because there was a normal level of electrolyte in the battery. This unit has been replaced, and the unit was sent by Entergy to an outside lab, Lucius Pitkin (LPI) of New York, NY, for analysis. As C&D did not have access to the components of the allegedly defective battery, and a report has not yet been issued by Lucius Pitkin, C&D cannot perform a root cause technical evaluation and affirm whether there is any defect in the component or manufacturing process, or whether the reported condition may have been due to user abuse of product, improper maintenance or other negligence or error. No formal report from Entergy or LPI Is expected before the expiration of the 60 day limit from the date C&D was notified of the issue. Thus, C&D is submitting this interim report to the NRC and notifying C&D's customers that use C&D KCR-13 batteries of this interim report. [C&D is also] initiating an action plan to evaluate the reported potential defect and determine whether it could pose a substantial safety hazard for any U.S. licensee using such batteries.

"Concurrent actions underway to complete the evaluation: a) On receipt of the final report by LPI/Indian Point by C&D, C&D shall evaluate the findings and the causes for failure. Maximum time 14 days from receipt of the report. b) In conjunction with the licensees identified in section vi, C&D will recommend maintenance assessment of all KCR-13 batteries at these locations to determine their status, and specifically the presence of any evidence of potential defects via visual examination. For any cells exhibiting the presence of potential defect, C&D shall further recommend that they be returned for analysis. Estimated completion date of analysis is thirty (30) days from the receipt of the returned batteries."

KCR-13 batteries are used in Indian Point and Monticello Nuclear Plants.

For further information contact:
Robert Malley
VP Quality and Process Engineering
Office Phone 215-619-7830
Email bmalley@cdtechno.com


* * * UPDATE AT 1110 EST ON 02/24/14 FROM CHRISTIAN RHEAULT TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *

The following updated information was received from C&D Technologies:

"Subject: Updated Interim Report - Inability to Complete 10CFR Part 21 Evaluation regarding cracking in KCR-13 Standby Battery Jars

"As previously stated, C&D did not have access to the components of the allegedly defective battery, and a report has not yet been issued by Lucius Pitkin. C&D cannot perform a root cause technical evaluation and affirm whether there is any defect in the component or manufacturing process, or whether the reported condition may have been due to user abuse of product, improper maintenance or other negligence or error until a final report Is issued by Lucius Pitkin. Although several requests to both Indian Point and Lucius Pitkin have been made, a receipt date for the analysis results is still indeterminate."

If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact:

Robert Malley
VP Quality and Process Engineering
Office Phone 215-619-7830
Email bmalley@cdtechno.com

Notified R1 (DeFrancisco), R3DO (Kunowski) and Part 21 Group (via email).


* * * UPDATE AT 0927 EDT ON 5/9/2014 FROM ROBERT MALLEY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following report was received via fax:

"C&D has recently received and is evaluating the report from Lucius Pitkin and will perform a root cause technical evaluation and affirm whether there is any defect in the component or manufacturing process, or whether the reported condition may have been due to user abuse of product, improper maintenance or other negligence or error. The planned final evaluation should be completed by May 31, 2014 at which time it is anticipated that a final report will be issued."

Notified the R1DO (Lilliendahl), R3DO (Riemer), and Part 21 Group (via e-mail).


* * * UPDATE AT 1640 ON 7/18/2014 FROM CHRISTIAN RHEAULT TO DONALD NORWOOD * * *

The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:

The information provided in the C&D facsimile serves as C&D's final analysis of the issue.

Conclusion: While the images do show indications of environment stress cracking (ESC) and fatigue, the lack of chemical evidence of the actual agent makes it difficult to determine the source of the material. Polycarbonate (the container material) has known stress cracking agents for example esters, aliphatic hydrocarbons, aromatic hydrocarbons, halogenated hydrocarbons, ketones, etc. and the C&D Installation and Operation Manual clearly states that the only approved material for contact with the jar and cover (other than materials used in the construction of the battery) for cleaning purposes is water and sodium bicarbonate. If one of the previously mentioned materials came into contact with the jar, it could have caused the ESC that was observed.

The standing recommendation to system operators is to limit any chemical that can come into contact with the battery to only approved materials. In the event that an unapproved material contacts the battery, the unit should be cleaned and observed for any subsequent damage caused by the agent.

Notified R1DO (Cahill), R3DO (Pelke), and Part 21 Group (via e-mail).