Event Notification Report for October 21, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/20/2013 - 10/21/2013
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49641
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: J D SELLERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: J D SELLERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/17/2013
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2013
Event Time: 04:19 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2013
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2013
Event Time: 04:19 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60 OPTIONAL REPORT - INVALID PARTIAL REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION
"Invalid partial Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation results in; Closure of Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs) in multiple systems, including isolation of the Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) System.
"On October 21, 2013, at 0419 EST, Unit 2 received a Reactor Auto SCRAM System 'B' trip signal in the main control room. Initial investigations at the local RPS Motor-Generator (MG) set room discovered breaker 52-3D tripped in cabinet 2C71-P003D. This resulted in a half-scram and the closure of CIVs in multiple systems, including closure of the RWCU system outboard isolation valve, 2G31-F004. These trips are normal responses to the loss of the 'B' RPS. The operating crew entered abnormal operating procedures, including those for loss of RPS and for loss of the RWCU system, and confirmed that all isolations and trips occurred as expected. Additionally, the crew restored the 'B' RPS bus from its alternate source, reset the half scram, returned the CIVs to their normal positions, and placed RWCU in service.
"Upon investigation, the determination was made that the trip and reset setpoints for under-voltage relay 2C71 -K752D had drifted. Consequently, once the drift reached the trip setpoints during the event, breaker 52-3D tripped, resulting in the loss of the 'B' RPS bus. Because a malfunctioning subcomponent caused the partial RPS trip rather than a valid CIV actuation signal, the resulting isolation is considered an invalid actuation.
"Further evaluation into the cause of the drift revealed solder joint cracks in the relay circuit board and an inadequate previous refurbishment of the subject relay. The drifting relay was removed and a refurbished relay was installed in location 2C71-K752D. Plans are to replace both units' RPS Power Monitoring relays with a different design. Until that design change is implemented, the frequency of calibration for these relays is being increased from every 182 days to every 91 days."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Invalid partial Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation results in; Closure of Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs) in multiple systems, including isolation of the Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) System.
"On October 21, 2013, at 0419 EST, Unit 2 received a Reactor Auto SCRAM System 'B' trip signal in the main control room. Initial investigations at the local RPS Motor-Generator (MG) set room discovered breaker 52-3D tripped in cabinet 2C71-P003D. This resulted in a half-scram and the closure of CIVs in multiple systems, including closure of the RWCU system outboard isolation valve, 2G31-F004. These trips are normal responses to the loss of the 'B' RPS. The operating crew entered abnormal operating procedures, including those for loss of RPS and for loss of the RWCU system, and confirmed that all isolations and trips occurred as expected. Additionally, the crew restored the 'B' RPS bus from its alternate source, reset the half scram, returned the CIVs to their normal positions, and placed RWCU in service.
"Upon investigation, the determination was made that the trip and reset setpoints for under-voltage relay 2C71 -K752D had drifted. Consequently, once the drift reached the trip setpoints during the event, breaker 52-3D tripped, resulting in the loss of the 'B' RPS bus. Because a malfunctioning subcomponent caused the partial RPS trip rather than a valid CIV actuation signal, the resulting isolation is considered an invalid actuation.
"Further evaluation into the cause of the drift revealed solder joint cracks in the relay circuit board and an inadequate previous refurbishment of the subject relay. The drifting relay was removed and a refurbished relay was installed in location 2C71-K752D. Plans are to replace both units' RPS Power Monitoring relays with a different design. Until that design change is implemented, the frequency of calibration for these relays is being increased from every 182 days to every 91 days."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49458
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GEORGE CURTIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GEORGE CURTIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/21/2013
Notification Time: 18:21 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2013
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2013
Notification Time: 18:21 [ET]
Event Date: 10/21/2013
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO RELEASE OF PETROLEUM FROM AN UNREGULATED SOURCE
"This is a non-emergency event notification.
"During planned outage work, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit #2 personnel encountered soils with a petroleum odor in an area excavated for inspection of Emergency Diesel Generator fuel oil piping. The inspections were being performed as part of the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program.
"Pressure testing of the fuel oil underground piping on 10/14/13 was satisfactorily completed. Additionally, ultrasonic testing (UT) performed on the exposed diesel fuel oil pipes confirmed piping integrity. These fuel oil lines are typically pressure tested on a two year frequency and were previously tested in 2012 with similar results. The release was determined to be historical and transient in nature.
"The soil that was removed was replaced with uncontaminated soil. Any future actions will be coordinated with SC DHEC.
"HBRSEP, Unit #2 personnel are notifying SC DHEC in accordance with reporting guidance regarding the release of petroleum from an unregulated source.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as described in NUREG-1022, based on an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made.
"The health and safety of the public was not affected.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"This is a non-emergency event notification.
"During planned outage work, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit #2 personnel encountered soils with a petroleum odor in an area excavated for inspection of Emergency Diesel Generator fuel oil piping. The inspections were being performed as part of the Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program.
"Pressure testing of the fuel oil underground piping on 10/14/13 was satisfactorily completed. Additionally, ultrasonic testing (UT) performed on the exposed diesel fuel oil pipes confirmed piping integrity. These fuel oil lines are typically pressure tested on a two year frequency and were previously tested in 2012 with similar results. The release was determined to be historical and transient in nature.
"The soil that was removed was replaced with uncontaminated soil. Any future actions will be coordinated with SC DHEC.
"HBRSEP, Unit #2 personnel are notifying SC DHEC in accordance with reporting guidance regarding the release of petroleum from an unregulated source.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as described in NUREG-1022, based on an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made.
"The health and safety of the public was not affected.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."