Event Notification Report for October 16, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/15/2013 - 10/16/2013
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49444
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/16/2013
Notification Time: 15:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2013
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2013
Notification Time: 15:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2013
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT
"At 1315 EDT, the VC Summer Nuclear Station determined that the following was an unanalyzed condition:
"As a result of recent industry operating experience (OE 305419, EN 49411, EN 49419) regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the Control Room, VC Summer performed a review of ammeter circuitry. The review determined the described condition to be applicable to VC Summer resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The wiring design for the ammeters contains a shunt in the current flow from each DC battery or charger. The ammeter wiring attached to the shunt does not contain fuses.
"It is postulated that a fire could cause one of the ammeter wires to hot short to ground. Concurrently, the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This would cause a ground loop through the unfused ammeter cable. The potential exists that the cable could heat-up causing a secondary fire in the ammeter raceway. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to safely shutdown per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 1315 EDT, the VC Summer Nuclear Station determined that the following was an unanalyzed condition:
"As a result of recent industry operating experience (OE 305419, EN 49411, EN 49419) regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the Control Room, VC Summer performed a review of ammeter circuitry. The review determined the described condition to be applicable to VC Summer resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The wiring design for the ammeters contains a shunt in the current flow from each DC battery or charger. The ammeter wiring attached to the shunt does not contain fuses.
"It is postulated that a fire could cause one of the ammeter wires to hot short to ground. Concurrently, the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This would cause a ground loop through the unfused ammeter cable. The potential exists that the cable could heat-up causing a secondary fire in the ammeter raceway. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to safely shutdown per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49445
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICK GIVENS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICK GIVENS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/16/2013
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2013
Event Time: 10:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2013
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2013
Event Time: 10:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE
"On 10/16/13 at 1032 CDT, the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to an inadvertent isolation that occurred during testing. During performance of surveillance procedure 1-SR-3.3.5.1.2(ATU D), an erroneous signal was induced causing actuation of primary containment isolation system group IV (i.e., HPCI Isolation). Technical Specification 3.5.1, ECCS-Operating, Condition C was entered as a result of the inoperable HPCI system. This constitutes an unplanned HPCI system inoperability and requires an 8-hour NRC notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The erroneous signal was cleared and the HPCI isolation was reset. Upon reset of the isolation signal, the HPCI system was returned to available status. The HPCI system was unavailable for 14 minutes. The HPCI system was returned to operable status at 1503 CDT following successful performance of the surveillance section affecting HPCI isolation logic.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"Service Request 794050 has been entered into the Licensee's Corrective Action Program to capture this event."
"On 10/16/13 at 1032 CDT, the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to an inadvertent isolation that occurred during testing. During performance of surveillance procedure 1-SR-3.3.5.1.2(ATU D), an erroneous signal was induced causing actuation of primary containment isolation system group IV (i.e., HPCI Isolation). Technical Specification 3.5.1, ECCS-Operating, Condition C was entered as a result of the inoperable HPCI system. This constitutes an unplanned HPCI system inoperability and requires an 8-hour NRC notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The erroneous signal was cleared and the HPCI isolation was reset. Upon reset of the isolation signal, the HPCI system was returned to available status. The HPCI system was unavailable for 14 minutes. The HPCI system was returned to operable status at 1503 CDT following successful performance of the surveillance section affecting HPCI isolation logic.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"Service Request 794050 has been entered into the Licensee's Corrective Action Program to capture this event."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49723
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE CONQUEST
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE CONQUEST
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/14/2014
Notification Time: 18:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2013
Event Time: 14:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2014
Notification Time: 18:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2013
Event Time: 14:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE
"On 10/16/2013 at 14:20 [CDT], the Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Makeup Filter Flow Control Damper (OVV145Y) was discovered degraded and non functional during planned maintenance activities. The degraded damper adversely impacted the TSC ventilation system function.
"On 10/16/2013 at approximately 15:00 [CDT], administrative actions were developed and briefed to isolate instrument air to the degraded nonfunctional damper OVV 145Y providing the capability to restore TSC Emergency Makeup Filter functionality. Isolating instrument air to the degraded damper places the damper in the failed open position, thereby restoring TSC Emergency Makeup Filter functionality.
"On 10/16/2013 at 20:25 [CDT], instrument air was isolated to the degraded damper OVV 145Y under administrative controls restoring TSC Emergency Makeup Filter functionality. This action was taken after determining no adverse affects on system operation.
"On 10/30/2013, degraded damper OVV145Y was repaired, instrument air restored and post maintenance testing completed, thereby restoring the degraded TSC emergency Makeup Filter Unit flow control damper functionality. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability because the emergent degraded TSC flow control damper OVV145Y adversely impacted the function of TSC Emergency Makeup Filter and was not restored within the TSC activation time (60 minutes).
"This event was originally determined not reportable because the capability to restore within the TSC activation time (60 minutes) existed from the time of discovery. Upon further review it was determined to be reportable because the degraded damper 0VV145Y was not restored to service within the TSC activation time (60 minutes).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On 10/16/2013 at 14:20 [CDT], the Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Makeup Filter Flow Control Damper (OVV145Y) was discovered degraded and non functional during planned maintenance activities. The degraded damper adversely impacted the TSC ventilation system function.
"On 10/16/2013 at approximately 15:00 [CDT], administrative actions were developed and briefed to isolate instrument air to the degraded nonfunctional damper OVV 145Y providing the capability to restore TSC Emergency Makeup Filter functionality. Isolating instrument air to the degraded damper places the damper in the failed open position, thereby restoring TSC Emergency Makeup Filter functionality.
"On 10/16/2013 at 20:25 [CDT], instrument air was isolated to the degraded damper OVV 145Y under administrative controls restoring TSC Emergency Makeup Filter functionality. This action was taken after determining no adverse affects on system operation.
"On 10/30/2013, degraded damper OVV145Y was repaired, instrument air restored and post maintenance testing completed, thereby restoring the degraded TSC emergency Makeup Filter Unit flow control damper functionality. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability because the emergent degraded TSC flow control damper OVV145Y adversely impacted the function of TSC Emergency Makeup Filter and was not restored within the TSC activation time (60 minutes).
"This event was originally determined not reportable because the capability to restore within the TSC activation time (60 minutes) existed from the time of discovery. Upon further review it was determined to be reportable because the degraded damper 0VV145Y was not restored to service within the TSC activation time (60 minutes).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."