Event Notification Report for October 14, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/13/2013 - 10/14/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
4979249441494424943549436494374943849472
Agreement State
Event Number: 49792
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: BLACK EAGLE CONSULTING, INC.
Region: 4
City: RENO State: NV
County:
License #: 00-11-0409-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: BLACK EAGLE CONSULTING, INC.
Region: 4
City: RENO State: NV
County:
License #: 00-11-0409-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 02/04/2014
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2014
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
SUSPECTED LOCKING MECHANISM FAILURE ON AN INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following was received from the State of Nevada via email:
"The plunger lock on Camera 880 D (SN: D9686) spun freely in the locked position and could not be unlocked. It was tagged as inoperable and locked away in the safe.
"On November 15, 2013, the camera was shipped to QSA Global, Inc., for repair. The camera was repaired on November 19, 2013 and returned to the licensee. It was then verified that all its parts including the plunger, lock and locking mechanism were working correctly. The camera was inspected and found to be fine on January 22, 2014, by one of our staff from the Radiation Control Program. The incident is closed."
Item Number: NV140004
The following was received from the State of Nevada via email:
"The plunger lock on Camera 880 D (SN: D9686) spun freely in the locked position and could not be unlocked. It was tagged as inoperable and locked away in the safe.
"On November 15, 2013, the camera was shipped to QSA Global, Inc., for repair. The camera was repaired on November 19, 2013 and returned to the licensee. It was then verified that all its parts including the plunger, lock and locking mechanism were working correctly. The camera was inspected and found to be fine on January 22, 2014, by one of our staff from the Radiation Control Program. The incident is closed."
Item Number: NV140004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49441
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GRANT FLYNN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GRANT FLYNN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 21:53 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 21:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 21:53 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 21:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JON LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
MICHELE EVANS (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
JON LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
MICHELE EVANS (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR SCRAM AND START OF EMERGENCY DIESELS DUE TO PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
"On Monday October 14, 2013 at 2121 hours [EDT], with the reactor critical at 100% core thermal power, the mode switch in RUN, and offsite power 345kV line 342 out of service for scheduled modification, a loss of offsite power occurred due to the loss of the second 345kV line 355. All control rods fully inserted, main steam isolation valves closed on the loss of power to the reactor protection system, emergency diesel generators automatically started supplying power to both 4160V safety buses. Following the scram, reactor water level lowered to +12 inches initiating the Primary Containment Isolation System (Group II, Reactor Building Isolation System (RBIS); and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System) automatically per design. A plant cool down is in progress with reactor water level being maintained in the normal post-scram band of +12 inches to +45 inches utilizing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems. Preliminary indication from the grid operator was that the line loss was due to a failure of an offsite tower support. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. This 4-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(8)."
Pilgrim is currently in Mode 3 and being cooled down to Mode 4.
"On Monday October 14, 2013 at 2121 hours [EDT], with the reactor critical at 100% core thermal power, the mode switch in RUN, and offsite power 345kV line 342 out of service for scheduled modification, a loss of offsite power occurred due to the loss of the second 345kV line 355. All control rods fully inserted, main steam isolation valves closed on the loss of power to the reactor protection system, emergency diesel generators automatically started supplying power to both 4160V safety buses. Following the scram, reactor water level lowered to +12 inches initiating the Primary Containment Isolation System (Group II, Reactor Building Isolation System (RBIS); and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System) automatically per design. A plant cool down is in progress with reactor water level being maintained in the normal post-scram band of +12 inches to +45 inches utilizing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems. Preliminary indication from the grid operator was that the line loss was due to a failure of an offsite tower support. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. This 4-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(8)."
Pilgrim is currently in Mode 3 and being cooled down to Mode 4.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49442
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WES FIANT
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WES FIANT
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 22:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 15:12 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 22:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 15:12 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 50 | Power Operation |
TRIP OF ONE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP
"On October 14, 2013 at 1512 PDT, Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1 experienced a low control oil pressure on Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) 1-1, which caused MFP 1-1 to trip offline. In response, the turbine control system initiated an automatic ramp from 100 percent to 50 percent turbine load. Operators entered Abnormal Operating Procedure (OP) AP-15, 'Loss of Feedwater Flow.' Procedure OP AP-15 directed operators to manually start both motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumps 1-2 and 1-3, based on existing plant conditions. The manual initiation of an AFW pump in response to actual plant conditions constitutes a valid actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
"Unit 1 is stable at 50 percent power.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed of this event."
"On October 14, 2013 at 1512 PDT, Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1 experienced a low control oil pressure on Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) 1-1, which caused MFP 1-1 to trip offline. In response, the turbine control system initiated an automatic ramp from 100 percent to 50 percent turbine load. Operators entered Abnormal Operating Procedure (OP) AP-15, 'Loss of Feedwater Flow.' Procedure OP AP-15 directed operators to manually start both motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumps 1-2 and 1-3, based on existing plant conditions. The manual initiation of an AFW pump in response to actual plant conditions constitutes a valid actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
"Unit 1 is stable at 50 percent power.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed of this event."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49435
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ABELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ABELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 10:47 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 04:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2013
Notification Time: 10:47 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 04:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"At approximately 0402 [EDT] on October 14, 2013, planned maintenance activities began on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The scope of the maintenance is to inspect and clean the Air Handler Units and Fans that support TSC ventilation. The planned work activity duration is expected to be approximately 43 hours.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees.
"An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 1418 EDT ON 10/16/13 FROM JOHN CAVES TO HUFFMAN * * *
The planned maintenance on the TSC HVAC system has been completed and the TSC returned to service.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Ernstes) notified.
"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"At approximately 0402 [EDT] on October 14, 2013, planned maintenance activities began on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The scope of the maintenance is to inspect and clean the Air Handler Units and Fans that support TSC ventilation. The planned work activity duration is expected to be approximately 43 hours.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees.
"An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 1418 EDT ON 10/16/13 FROM JOHN CAVES TO HUFFMAN * * *
The planned maintenance on the TSC HVAC system has been completed and the TSC returned to service.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Ernstes) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49436
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT ACQUARO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT ACQUARO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 09:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 09:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
J LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
J LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
VENTILATION PROCESS FLOW RADIATION MONITOR REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PRE-PLANNED TESTING
"The supplementary leak collection release system ventilation process flow radiation monitor 3HVR*RE19B has been removed from service for preplanned testing. The system will be returned to service in approximately 6 hours.
"Loss of assessment capability due to pre-planned testing affecting a radiation monitor. The ventilation process radiation monitor for supplementary leak collection release system (3HVR*RE19B) out of service is a reportable condition per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The supplementary leak collection release system ventilation process flow radiation monitor 3HVR*RE19B has been removed from service for preplanned testing. The system will be returned to service in approximately 6 hours.
"Loss of assessment capability due to pre-planned testing affecting a radiation monitor. The ventilation process radiation monitor for supplementary leak collection release system (3HVR*RE19B) out of service is a reportable condition per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 49437
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL ABEL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL ABEL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 09:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 09:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
UNPLANNED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL
"An employee reported to the on-site dispensary this morning [on 10/14/13,] after a chemical exposure to his face. The plant nurse administered treatment and then sent the employee to an off-site medical facility for further treatment. A whole body survey of the employee's plant clothing was performed; the maximum amount of contamination found was present on the employee's left boot, 32,000 dpm/100cm2. Prior to leaving the Restricted Area, the employee removed all plant clothing, changed into his personal clothing, and was whole body frisked out of the plant. The employee was free of contamination upon release."
"An employee reported to the on-site dispensary this morning [on 10/14/13,] after a chemical exposure to his face. The plant nurse administered treatment and then sent the employee to an off-site medical facility for further treatment. A whole body survey of the employee's plant clothing was performed; the maximum amount of contamination found was present on the employee's left boot, 32,000 dpm/100cm2. Prior to leaving the Restricted Area, the employee removed all plant clothing, changed into his personal clothing, and was whole body frisked out of the plant. The employee was free of contamination upon release."
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 49438
Rep Org: EQ DETROIT
Licensee: EQ DETROIT
Region: 3
City: DETROIT State: MI
County:
License #: GENERAL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KRISTEN ROCHWALL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: EQ DETROIT
Region: 3
City: DETROIT State: MI
County:
License #: GENERAL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KRISTEN ROCHWALL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
PAMELA HENDERSON (FSME)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
PAMELA HENDERSON (FSME)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
SURFACE CONTAMINATION DISCOVERED ON SEALED SOURCE DURING BIANNUAL WIPE TEST
A general license holder reported a leaking Nickel-63 source that is used in an Agilent Electron Capture Detector. The source was wipe tested and discovered to have a surface contamination of 0.011 micro-curies. The Ni-63 source for the detector has a rated source strength of 15 micro-curies. The company sent the source to a contractor for further determination if the source is leaking or can be cleaned and returned to service.
A general license holder reported a leaking Nickel-63 source that is used in an Agilent Electron Capture Detector. The source was wipe tested and discovered to have a surface contamination of 0.011 micro-curies. The Ni-63 source for the detector has a rated source strength of 15 micro-curies. The company sent the source to a contractor for further determination if the source is leaking or can be cleaned and returned to service.
Agreement State
Event Number: 49472
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: LTI GROUP/SMART GLASS DIVISION
Region: 1
City: PITTSFIELD State: MA
County:
License #: G0350
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOUG CULLEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: LTI GROUP/SMART GLASS DIVISION
Region: 1
City: PITTSFIELD State: MA
County:
License #: G0350
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOUG CULLEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 10/25/2013
Notification Time: 14:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2013
Notification Time: 14:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
MATTHEW HAHN (ILTA)
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
MATTHEW HAHN (ILTA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING STATIC ELIMINATORS
The following Agreement State Report was received via facsimile:
"Two static eliminators each initially containing 10 mCi, Po-210, were misplaced during the departmental move from one [licensee] facility to another. Each alpha emitting device is identified as a static eliminator manufactured by NRD, LLC of Grand Island, NY, Model No. P.2021.8203, with corresponding Serial No.'s of A2GF745 and A2HD506. The devices were reported missing subsequent to an inventory check.
"Calculated device activity with Po-210 half-life = 138 days.
"Device Serial No. A2GF745 was shipped by NRD to LTI on June 6, 2008 thus the original activity of 10 mCi is currently calculated to be 0.5 uCi.
"Device Serial No. A2HD506 was shipped by NRD to LTI on April 7, 2010 thus the original activity of 10 mCi is currently calculated to be 15 uCi.
"The aggregate activity exceeds the threshold of 1.0 uCi (i.e.10 X 0.1 uCi), per CMR 120.297 Appendix C.
"The Agency [Commonwealth of Massachusetts] will continue to investigate this matter.
"Cause: It is believed that during departmental moves from the Lenox, MA facility to a new location in Pittsfield, MA, that two static eliminators were misplaced."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following Agreement State Report was received via facsimile:
"Two static eliminators each initially containing 10 mCi, Po-210, were misplaced during the departmental move from one [licensee] facility to another. Each alpha emitting device is identified as a static eliminator manufactured by NRD, LLC of Grand Island, NY, Model No. P.2021.8203, with corresponding Serial No.'s of A2GF745 and A2HD506. The devices were reported missing subsequent to an inventory check.
"Calculated device activity with Po-210 half-life = 138 days.
"Device Serial No. A2GF745 was shipped by NRD to LTI on June 6, 2008 thus the original activity of 10 mCi is currently calculated to be 0.5 uCi.
"Device Serial No. A2HD506 was shipped by NRD to LTI on April 7, 2010 thus the original activity of 10 mCi is currently calculated to be 15 uCi.
"The aggregate activity exceeds the threshold of 1.0 uCi (i.e.10 X 0.1 uCi), per CMR 120.297 Appendix C.
"The Agency [Commonwealth of Massachusetts] will continue to investigate this matter.
"Cause: It is believed that during departmental moves from the Lenox, MA facility to a new location in Pittsfield, MA, that two static eliminators were misplaced."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf