Event Notification Report for October 09, 2013

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On October 9, 2013 at approximately 1445 CDT, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice by phone that the licensee had lost a Troxler 3430 (sn 28350) moisture/density gauge near the Donna International Bridge near Donna, Texas. The sources contained within are an 8 mCi Cs-137 source (QSA Global X1218 sn 7502362) and a 40 mCi Am-241/Be source (QSA Global AX1 X.1 X.1/2 sn 47-25061). The gauge had been left on a tailgate out of its transport container when the truck left the temporary job site at approximately 0930 CDT. Upon reaching the first light in town approximately 5 miles away, the driver/technician noticed the down tailgate and missing gauge. A search is still underway."

Texas Report # I 9123

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

POSTULATED FIRE EVENT COULD RESULT IN A HOT SHORT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of industry operating experience regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the control room has determined that the condition described below to be applicable to Callaway Nuclear Plant resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The original plant wiring design and associated analysis for the Class 1E Train B batteries and chargers (including the B Swing charger) control room ampere indications do not include overcurrent protection features to limit the fault current.

"In the postulated event, a fire in the control room could cause one of the ammeter wires to hot short to the ground plane; simultaneously, the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also hot short to the ground plane. This would cause a ground loop through the unprotected ammeter wiring. This event could result in excessive current flow (heating) in the ammeter wiring to the point of causing a secondary fire in the raceway system. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10CFR50 Appendix R.

"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Similar Events: EN #49411 and EN #49419

POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"A review of industry operating experience with respect to fire induced damage to unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the control room has determined that the condition described below is applicable to Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station. This condition results in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10CFR50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The original plant wiring design did not include overcurrent protection features to limit the fault current in these circuits. The wiring design for the ammeters contains a shunt in the current flow from each NK direct current (DC) battery or charger. Two leads run from the shunt to a current meter in the main control room (MCR). These leads are tied to the positive polarity of the NK battery system. The ammeter wiring attached to the shunt is not overcurrent protected. It is postulated that a fire could cause one of these ammeter wires to short to ground at the same time the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This would cause a ground loop through the unfused ammeter cable. This event could result in excessive current flow (heating) in the ammeter wiring to the point of causing a secondary fire in the raceway system. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment. Reference Palo Verde plant event #49411. A Breech Authorization with compensatory Control Room hourly fire watch for this issue is in place and will remain in effect until this deficiency is resolved.

"This condition has been discussed with the Resident Inspector."

Similar Events #49422 and #49419

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BROKEN SOURCE HOLDER CABLE

The following information was submitted by the Commonwealth of Virginia via email:

"On October 9th, the PET/CT unit reported a problem with the pin source holder indicating the holder was open. The licensee closed the scan room door and contacted General Electric (GE) service provider to provide emergency service. On October 10th, a GE representative investigated the unit and found the source holder cable was broken. A new cable was ordered and replaced on October 11th. The source was replaced, and the unit was tested and placed back in service. The Virginia Radioactive Materials Program has been working with GE regarding the cause for the failure. At this time, GE is reviewing service reports to evaluate whether this is an isolated incident."

Virginia Event Report ID: VA-13-11

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"On October 17, 2013 ICE-RAM [Inspections Compliance and Enforcement - Radioactive Materials Branch] received a letter dated October 14, 2013, from the RSO at NMG Geotechnical, Inc. (NMG), reporting that, on October 9, 2013, one of their moisture density gauge (CPN MC-1DRP, S/N M60408283, 10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am:Be-241) was discovered to be lost or stolen at an apartment complex at 1601 W. MacArthur Blvd., Santa Ana, CA, after the gauge operator was on a lunch break. The gauge was placed in the vehicle after using the gauge at the apartment complex just prior to starting lunch. The gauge operator discovered that the gauge and transport box were missing from the rear of the Jeep Cherokee SUV. There were no indications that the vehicle was broke into, making it most likely that the gauge and case were left in the vehicle while it was unlocked and the gauge case was not secured to the frame of the vehicle. The operator contacted the RSO and then filed a report with the Santa Ana Police and notified the Irvine Police afterwards.

"On October 17, 2013, an ICE RAM-South inspector contacted the RSO to confirm the information in the letter. The inspector inquired if the operator had searched the complex for the gauge prior to reporting the gauge stolen and the RSO confirmed that they had. The RSO also noted that the operator returned to the complex later to give the apartment management fliers to distribute to residents. The gauge has not been recovered to date. This RSO was informed that they will be cited for loss of control of the gauge and failure to immediately report the loss of the gauge as required. The investigation will continue to determine if any other items of non-compliance are identified."

California 5010 Number: 101713

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

PART 21 - FAILURE OF RELAY LOGIC CARD MODULES IN 2 OUT OF 4 VOTERS FOR POWER RANGE MONITORS

The observed aging characteristics of the Solid State Relays on two particular Voter Relay Logic Cards Modules present a future challenge to the Power Range Neutron Monitoring System's ability to reliably insert the Average Power Range Monitor High-High/INOP scram and/or the Oscillating Power Range Monitor Scram to the Reactor Protection System in plant conditions warrant such action.

For Relay Logic Cards that have been in operation for over 10 years, Relay Logic Card Module replacement should be scheduled and accomplished at the first reasonable opportunity.

For Relay Logic Cards in operation for less than 10 years, a program should be implemented to replace Relay Logic Card Modules before the 10 years is reached.

Plant affected; Nine Mile Point 2, Fermi 2, Grand Gulf, Limerick 1 & 2, Peach Bottom 2 & 3, Susquehanna 1&2, Brunswick 1 & 2, Hatch 1 & 2, Browns Ferry 1, 2, & 3, Monticello, and Columbia.