Event Notification Report for October 03, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/02/2013 - 10/03/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
49404494064940749408
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49404
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: STEVE JOHNSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: STEVE JOHNSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 10/03/2013
Notification Time: 09:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2013
Event Time: 06:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2013
Notification Time: 09:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2013
Event Time: 06:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DURING STARTUP
"At 0643 EDT [on 10/03/13], during reactor startup, with the reactor critical and power in the intermediate range, an automatic reactor scram occurred due to an invalid (noise) intermediate range monitor (IRM) scram signal processed on both RPS trip systems. All control rods fully inserted and plant response was as expected. This notification is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The reactor is currently subcritical."
When the reactor scram occurred, reactor power was below the Point of Adding Heat and had minimal effect on the plant. Normal offsite power is being maintained. Decay heat is being maintained via normal shutdown cooling.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0643 EDT [on 10/03/13], during reactor startup, with the reactor critical and power in the intermediate range, an automatic reactor scram occurred due to an invalid (noise) intermediate range monitor (IRM) scram signal processed on both RPS trip systems. All control rods fully inserted and plant response was as expected. This notification is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The reactor is currently subcritical."
When the reactor scram occurred, reactor power was below the Point of Adding Heat and had minimal effect on the plant. Normal offsite power is being maintained. Decay heat is being maintained via normal shutdown cooling.
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49406
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/03/2013
Notification Time: 21:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2013
Event Time: 15:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2013
Notification Time: 21:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2013
Event Time: 15:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INADEQUATE SHIFT STAFFING TO SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN INSTRUCTIONS
"The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) minimum Operations shift staffing was evaluated for response to a fire in the Control Bay that ultimately leads to entry into Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instructions (SSIs). The result of this evaluation revealed that the minimum Operations shift staffing does not provide sufficient staffing to support SSI required staffing levels. In the event of an Appendix R fire, one BFN unit would be without a Senior Reactor Operator to direct the implementation of the time critical manual actions specified in the SSI procedures.
"On October 3, 2013, this condition was determined to be an 8 hour non-emergency report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) since sufficient shift staffing levels to implement the SSI procedures in the event of an Appendix R fire were not provided.
"Compensatory measures have been implemented to ensure sufficient shift staffing is provided to implement Appendix R SSIs.
"The event was entered into the licensee corrective action program as Service Request number 788812.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) minimum Operations shift staffing was evaluated for response to a fire in the Control Bay that ultimately leads to entry into Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instructions (SSIs). The result of this evaluation revealed that the minimum Operations shift staffing does not provide sufficient staffing to support SSI required staffing levels. In the event of an Appendix R fire, one BFN unit would be without a Senior Reactor Operator to direct the implementation of the time critical manual actions specified in the SSI procedures.
"On October 3, 2013, this condition was determined to be an 8 hour non-emergency report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) since sufficient shift staffing levels to implement the SSI procedures in the event of an Appendix R fire were not provided.
"Compensatory measures have been implemented to ensure sufficient shift staffing is provided to implement Appendix R SSIs.
"The event was entered into the licensee corrective action program as Service Request number 788812.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49407
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK BRIDGES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK BRIDGES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/04/2013
Notification Time: 02:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2013
Event Time: 20:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2013
Notification Time: 02:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2013
Event Time: 20:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNIT 2 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABLE DUE TO DRAIN LINE LEAK
"On October 3, 2013, at 2045 [CDT] hours, a defect (pinhole through-wall leak) was identified on the drain line for the LS 2-2365, HPCI TURBINE INLET DRAIN POT LEVEL SWITCH. The defect was identified during investigation of leakage near LS 2-2365. The LS 2-2365, HPCI TURBINE INLET DRAIN POT LEVEL SWITCH, is provided to detect a failure of the HPCI steam trap during standby line-up. The location of the defect, is in Class 2 Safety related piping. HPCI is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The instrument isolations for LS 2-2365 have been close and the leak has been isolated."
There is no increase to plant risk and RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) is available.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/7/13 AT 1412 EST FROM JEFFERY JACOBSON TO DONG PARK * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS report made on October 4, 2013, at 0212 EDT (ENS Report # 49407).
"Upon further investigation the pinhole through-wall leak discovered in the Unit 2 HPCI room was in a weld at a 'Tee' downstream of the Unit 2 HPCI turbine inlet drain pot level switch (LS 2-2365) on drain line 2-2386B-1-B. The defect was characterized as a 1/16-inch rounded hole due to gas porosity (with no evidence of cracking).
"A subsequent evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station considering the defect size, location, and characterization confirmed the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system would have performed its safety function when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report # 49407 is being retracted.
"Note: On October 3, 2013, at 1155 CDT the Unit 2 HPCI drain line leak was isolated and HPCI was declared operable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Lipa).
"On October 3, 2013, at 2045 [CDT] hours, a defect (pinhole through-wall leak) was identified on the drain line for the LS 2-2365, HPCI TURBINE INLET DRAIN POT LEVEL SWITCH. The defect was identified during investigation of leakage near LS 2-2365. The LS 2-2365, HPCI TURBINE INLET DRAIN POT LEVEL SWITCH, is provided to detect a failure of the HPCI steam trap during standby line-up. The location of the defect, is in Class 2 Safety related piping. HPCI is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The instrument isolations for LS 2-2365 have been close and the leak has been isolated."
There is no increase to plant risk and RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) is available.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/7/13 AT 1412 EST FROM JEFFERY JACOBSON TO DONG PARK * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS report made on October 4, 2013, at 0212 EDT (ENS Report # 49407).
"Upon further investigation the pinhole through-wall leak discovered in the Unit 2 HPCI room was in a weld at a 'Tee' downstream of the Unit 2 HPCI turbine inlet drain pot level switch (LS 2-2365) on drain line 2-2386B-1-B. The defect was characterized as a 1/16-inch rounded hole due to gas porosity (with no evidence of cracking).
"A subsequent evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station considering the defect size, location, and characterization confirmed the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system would have performed its safety function when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report # 49407 is being retracted.
"Note: On October 3, 2013, at 1155 CDT the Unit 2 HPCI drain line leak was isolated and HPCI was declared operable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Lipa).
Agreement State
Event Number: 49408
Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: BP-COOPER RIVER PLANT
Region: 1
City: WANDO State: SC
County:
License #: 252
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: BP-COOPER RIVER PLANT
Region: 1
City: WANDO State: SC
County:
License #: 252
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 10/04/2013
Notification Time: 11:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2013
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2013
Notification Time: 11:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2013
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOUCE (E-MA)
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOUCE (E-MA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILED RETRACTION MECHANISM ON FIXED GAUGE DEVICE
The following Agreement State Report was received via facsimile:
"Event Description: The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified by the licensee at 2:00 p.m. [EDT] on October 3, 2013, that a source on a gauging device would not retract into the holder as designed. This licensee also stated, 'steam is leaking from the top of the right hand side source holder where the pulley is. The source tube is welded to the vessel. At the present time the cable is stuck, so the source will not retract into the holder.
"The [South Carolina] Department [of Health and Environmental Control] responded to this event and found that an Ohmart Model SHLM-C-2 fixed gauging device containing two 200 mCi Cs-137 sources (s/n 2667/2668) had incurred a failure of the shutter/retraction mechanism. There was no evidence of steam being released from the gauge housing but water was dripping very slowly from the top of the gauge housing. Surveys indicated background readings of 0.03 mR/hr as the source has now been locked in place in the vessel.
"The area is roped off to prevent unauthorized access. Vega Americas, Inc. is scheduled to perform repair of the shutter/retraction mechanism on October 8, 2013. Notifications and updates will be made through the NMED system."
The following Agreement State Report was received via facsimile:
"Event Description: The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified by the licensee at 2:00 p.m. [EDT] on October 3, 2013, that a source on a gauging device would not retract into the holder as designed. This licensee also stated, 'steam is leaking from the top of the right hand side source holder where the pulley is. The source tube is welded to the vessel. At the present time the cable is stuck, so the source will not retract into the holder.
"The [South Carolina] Department [of Health and Environmental Control] responded to this event and found that an Ohmart Model SHLM-C-2 fixed gauging device containing two 200 mCi Cs-137 sources (s/n 2667/2668) had incurred a failure of the shutter/retraction mechanism. There was no evidence of steam being released from the gauge housing but water was dripping very slowly from the top of the gauge housing. Surveys indicated background readings of 0.03 mR/hr as the source has now been locked in place in the vessel.
"The area is roped off to prevent unauthorized access. Vega Americas, Inc. is scheduled to perform repair of the shutter/retraction mechanism on October 8, 2013. Notifications and updates will be made through the NMED system."