Event Notification Report for September 24, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/23/2013 - 09/24/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
49382495954938049582
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49382
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK MOEBES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK MOEBES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/24/2013
Notification Time: 23:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2013
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2013
Notification Time: 23:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2013
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO AN UNQUALIFIED ELECTRICAL SPLICE
"On 9/24/13 at 1530 CDT, the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable due to inoperability of the minimum flow valve (2-MVOP-073-0030). Engineering identified during review of EQ [Environment Qualification] WO [Work Order] # 113598388 that the motor leads for 2-MVOP-073-0030 were taped instead of terminated with a Raychem splice. The valve actuator is an EQ component and requires termination of the motor leads to the incoming power cable by Raychem splice or a Marathon 300 terminal block. Engineering evaluation was requested and operability of 2-MVOP-073-0030 could not be supported due to the tape being unanalyzed for harsh environmental conditions. The HPCI Minimum Flow valve has a required OPEN safety function to prevent overheating the HPCI pump and a CLOSED safety function to provide containment isolation. Technical Specification 3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling System-Operating, Condition C was entered for HPCI system inoperability. In addition, the actions of Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves, were entered due to the inoperability of the primary containment isolation function of the HPCI Minimum Flow valve.
"This incident is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. It also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"SR number associated with this report: 784462"
The licensee is in a 14-day LCO action statement to return HPCI to operable under TS 3.5.1. The LCO for TS 3.6.1.3 was satisfied.
"On 9/24/13 at 1530 CDT, the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable due to inoperability of the minimum flow valve (2-MVOP-073-0030). Engineering identified during review of EQ [Environment Qualification] WO [Work Order] # 113598388 that the motor leads for 2-MVOP-073-0030 were taped instead of terminated with a Raychem splice. The valve actuator is an EQ component and requires termination of the motor leads to the incoming power cable by Raychem splice or a Marathon 300 terminal block. Engineering evaluation was requested and operability of 2-MVOP-073-0030 could not be supported due to the tape being unanalyzed for harsh environmental conditions. The HPCI Minimum Flow valve has a required OPEN safety function to prevent overheating the HPCI pump and a CLOSED safety function to provide containment isolation. Technical Specification 3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling System-Operating, Condition C was entered for HPCI system inoperability. In addition, the actions of Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves, were entered due to the inoperability of the primary containment isolation function of the HPCI Minimum Flow valve.
"This incident is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. It also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"SR number associated with this report: 784462"
The licensee is in a 14-day LCO action statement to return HPCI to operable under TS 3.5.1. The LCO for TS 3.6.1.3 was satisfied.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49595
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: HOWARD MAHAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: HOWARD MAHAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/02/2013
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2013
Event Time: 08:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2013
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2013
Event Time: 08:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
OMID TABATABAI (NRO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
OMID TABATABAI (NRO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
| 4 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
DEFICIENCY IDENTIFIED IN QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
"This is a 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 & 4 construction project.
"In September 2013, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for deviations associated with sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified.
"This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Reference similar Summer Event (EN#49582).
"This is a 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 & 4 construction project.
"In September 2013, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for deviations associated with sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified.
"This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Reference similar Summer Event (EN#49582).
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 49380
Rep Org: CARROLL COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Licensee: CARROLL COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: CARROLLTON State: MO
County:
License #: NOT PROVIDED
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAELLE GAMBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: CARROLL COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: CARROLLTON State: MO
County:
License #: NOT PROVIDED
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAELLE GAMBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 09/24/2013
Notification Time: 13:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2013
Notification Time: 13:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(2) - EXTERNAL RAD LEVELS > LIMITS
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(2) - EXTERNAL RAD LEVELS > LIMITS
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
PACKAGE WITH EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION
The licensee's RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) reported that a package received from the pharmaceutical supplier was contaminated externally. Swipes from the outside of the package had counts of 91,500 cpm (counts per minute) with a background count reading of 588 cpm. Swipes from inside the package had counts of 1008 cpm. There were no indications of contamination to personnel or the surrounding area. The pharmaceutical supplier was contacted and has verified the driver was not contaminated. They will also check the delivery vehicle.
The package, containing Iodine-131 (18 mCi) and Technetium-99m (6 mCi) sources, has been placed in a secure location pending further investigation.
The licensee's RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) reported that a package received from the pharmaceutical supplier was contaminated externally. Swipes from the outside of the package had counts of 91,500 cpm (counts per minute) with a background count reading of 588 cpm. Swipes from inside the package had counts of 1008 cpm. There were no indications of contamination to personnel or the surrounding area. The pharmaceutical supplier was contacted and has verified the driver was not contaminated. They will also check the delivery vehicle.
The package, containing Iodine-131 (18 mCi) and Technetium-99m (6 mCi) sources, has been placed in a secure location pending further investigation.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49582
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: FINDLAY SALTER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: FINDLAY SALTER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/26/2013
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2013
Event Time: 08:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/26/2013
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2013
Event Time: 08:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/26/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.55(e) - CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
OMID TABATABAI (NRO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
OMID TABATABAI (NRO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Under Construction | 0 | Under Construction |
DEFICIENCY IDENTIFIED IN QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
"This is a 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub modules for the Virgil C. Summer Units 2 & 3 construction project.
"In September 2013, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for deviations associated with sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified.
"This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This is a 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub modules for the Virgil C. Summer Units 2 & 3 construction project.
"In September 2013, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for deviations associated with sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified.
"This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.