Event Notification Report for September 18, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/17/2013 - 09/18/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
493534935449355493564935949367
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49353
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHNATHAN ZARNDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHNATHAN ZARNDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 09/18/2013
Notification Time: 11:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 05:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2013
Notification Time: 11:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 05:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
BOROSCOPIC INSPECTION OF REACTOR VESSEL HEAD DETERMINED EVIDENCE OF BOUNDARY LEAKAGE
"Boroscopic inspection of the reactor head assembly during refuel outage A1R17 has determined that white powder residue observed at reactor head penetrations 41, 49, 61, 65, and 73 is evidence of past Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary leakage at one or more of these locations. This determination was made today at 0510 [CDT] after completion of boroscopic inspections and consultation with the reactor head vendor. These reactor head penetrations are control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetrations. The location of the identified leakage is suspected to be the omega seal welded threaded connection on one or more of these CRDM penetrations. Further inspections must be performed to confirm the exact leakage location. This condition will be repaired before U-1 returns to mode 4."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 9/27/13 AT 1529 EDT FROM MATTHEW HENSON TO DONG PARK * * *
"The purpose of this report is to retract ENS report #49353 (September 18, 2013). This report was made after boroscopic inspection of the Unit 1 reactor head assembly during refueling outage A1R17 determined that white powder residue observed at five Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) head penetrations was evidence of past Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage at one or more of these locations.
"At 1400 CDT on Wednesday, September 25, 2013, the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station (BNPS) concluded that the prior ENS notification could be retracted because the Plant Operations Review Committee had concluded that the white powder residue observed at five Unit 1 RPV head penetrations was not evidence of past RCS pressure boundary leakage. A detailed examination plan was implemented, which included a disassembly of the Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) and Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) coils for all five penetrations and a detailed visual examination using remote video equipments. The visual examinations used remote video equipments to inspect the lower and intermediate canopy seal weld areas for the five CRDMs. In addition, an examination of the upper canopy seal weld areas and a bare-metal inspection of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Head did not identify any evidence of boric acid leakage. Based on these inspections and a review of available photos from previous outages, BNPS concluded that the white residues were from incomplete cleaning in prior outages.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Dickson).
"Boroscopic inspection of the reactor head assembly during refuel outage A1R17 has determined that white powder residue observed at reactor head penetrations 41, 49, 61, 65, and 73 is evidence of past Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary leakage at one or more of these locations. This determination was made today at 0510 [CDT] after completion of boroscopic inspections and consultation with the reactor head vendor. These reactor head penetrations are control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetrations. The location of the identified leakage is suspected to be the omega seal welded threaded connection on one or more of these CRDM penetrations. Further inspections must be performed to confirm the exact leakage location. This condition will be repaired before U-1 returns to mode 4."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 9/27/13 AT 1529 EDT FROM MATTHEW HENSON TO DONG PARK * * *
"The purpose of this report is to retract ENS report #49353 (September 18, 2013). This report was made after boroscopic inspection of the Unit 1 reactor head assembly during refueling outage A1R17 determined that white powder residue observed at five Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) head penetrations was evidence of past Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage at one or more of these locations.
"At 1400 CDT on Wednesday, September 25, 2013, the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station (BNPS) concluded that the prior ENS notification could be retracted because the Plant Operations Review Committee had concluded that the white powder residue observed at five Unit 1 RPV head penetrations was not evidence of past RCS pressure boundary leakage. A detailed examination plan was implemented, which included a disassembly of the Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) and Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) coils for all five penetrations and a detailed visual examination using remote video equipments. The visual examinations used remote video equipments to inspect the lower and intermediate canopy seal weld areas for the five CRDMs. In addition, an examination of the upper canopy seal weld areas and a bare-metal inspection of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Head did not identify any evidence of boric acid leakage. Based on these inspections and a review of available photos from previous outages, BNPS concluded that the white residues were from incomplete cleaning in prior outages.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Dickson).
Agreement State
Event Number: 49354
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: BOSTON State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0055
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: BOSTON State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0055
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/18/2013
Notification Time: 16:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2013
Notification Time: 16:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERDOSE TO PATIENT'S LIVER
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts submitted the following information via email:
"A dose that likely differs from the prescribed dose by more than 50 rem to an organ, the liver, and the total dose delivered differs from the prescribed dose by 20% or more.
"The licensee's radiation safety officer reported to the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] on 9/18/2013 that on same date licensee administered yttrium-90 SIR-Spheres to patient's left lobe of liver for treatment of metastatic disease; that 16.8 millicuries of yttrium-90 was prescribed; and that 12.06 millicuries was administered resulting in an under dose of 28.1 percent.
"The licensee discovered the event upon measurement of waste material including dose vial as part of normal quality assurance.
"The licensee's radiation safety officer reported that the authorized user and the referring physician have been notified and it is unknown at time of the report whether the referring physician has elected to notify the patient.
"The licensee's radiation safety officer reported that medical staff does not believe that this error will adversely affect the patient treatment outcome.
"The licensee will submit a written report within 15 days in accordance with the [Massachusetts] requirements of 105 CMR 120.594(A)(4) to include why event occurred and actions to prevent recurrence.
"Root cause and corrective action are not known at this time and the Agency continues to investigate.
"System Name: Brachytherapy Product; Manufacturer: Sirtex Wilmington LLC"
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts submitted the following information via email:
"A dose that likely differs from the prescribed dose by more than 50 rem to an organ, the liver, and the total dose delivered differs from the prescribed dose by 20% or more.
"The licensee's radiation safety officer reported to the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] on 9/18/2013 that on same date licensee administered yttrium-90 SIR-Spheres to patient's left lobe of liver for treatment of metastatic disease; that 16.8 millicuries of yttrium-90 was prescribed; and that 12.06 millicuries was administered resulting in an under dose of 28.1 percent.
"The licensee discovered the event upon measurement of waste material including dose vial as part of normal quality assurance.
"The licensee's radiation safety officer reported that the authorized user and the referring physician have been notified and it is unknown at time of the report whether the referring physician has elected to notify the patient.
"The licensee's radiation safety officer reported that medical staff does not believe that this error will adversely affect the patient treatment outcome.
"The licensee will submit a written report within 15 days in accordance with the [Massachusetts] requirements of 105 CMR 120.594(A)(4) to include why event occurred and actions to prevent recurrence.
"Root cause and corrective action are not known at this time and the Agency continues to investigate.
"System Name: Brachytherapy Product; Manufacturer: Sirtex Wilmington LLC"
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49355
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES KRITZER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES KRITZER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/18/2013
Notification Time: 18:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 12:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Notification Time: 18:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 12:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO STEAM LEAK
"On 9/18/13, during performance of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pump operability surveillance, a minor steam leak was discovered on the governor valve inspection cover flange. Due to the leak, HPCI was declared inoperable.
"Actions taken: A 14-day LCO per TS 3.5.E.2 has been entered and corrective actions are in progress."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BENJAMIN EGNEW TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1341 EDT ON 10/31/13 * * *
"After further evaluation, the gasket leak at the flange was determined to have no impact on the operability of the HPCI system, and therefore the HPCI system was able to perform all safety functions with the identified condition. The immediate determination, made on September 18, 2013, that the HPCI system was inoperable was revised based on the results of an analysis of the HPCI room heat up rate. The heat up rate was modeled using a calculated steam leak rate based on actual measurements of the damaged gasket after removal from the HPCI turbine flange. The time to heat up was based on the first set point at which isolation due to a temperature increase would occur. It was determined that the existing gap in the gasket represented approximately one-tenth of the approximate size of a steam leak that would be expected to result in an isolation, therefore the existing flange leak had no impact on operability of the HPCI system or its ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The licensee has notified the NRC site Resident Inspector."
Notified R1DO (Krohn).
"On 9/18/13, during performance of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pump operability surveillance, a minor steam leak was discovered on the governor valve inspection cover flange. Due to the leak, HPCI was declared inoperable.
"Actions taken: A 14-day LCO per TS 3.5.E.2 has been entered and corrective actions are in progress."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BENJAMIN EGNEW TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1341 EDT ON 10/31/13 * * *
"After further evaluation, the gasket leak at the flange was determined to have no impact on the operability of the HPCI system, and therefore the HPCI system was able to perform all safety functions with the identified condition. The immediate determination, made on September 18, 2013, that the HPCI system was inoperable was revised based on the results of an analysis of the HPCI room heat up rate. The heat up rate was modeled using a calculated steam leak rate based on actual measurements of the damaged gasket after removal from the HPCI turbine flange. The time to heat up was based on the first set point at which isolation due to a temperature increase would occur. It was determined that the existing gap in the gasket represented approximately one-tenth of the approximate size of a steam leak that would be expected to result in an isolation, therefore the existing flange leak had no impact on operability of the HPCI system or its ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The licensee has notified the NRC site Resident Inspector."
Notified R1DO (Krohn).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49356
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LT. IHLENFELDT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LT. IHLENFELDT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 09/19/2013
Notification Time: 03:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 22:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 03:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 22:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ACCESS DOORS BRIEFLY OPENED SIMULTANEOUSLY
"While performing the secondary containment airlock door interlock surveillance, the interlock to the main plenum room did not prevent the opening of both doors to the plenum room airlock (DOOR-85 and DOOR-86). The plenum room airlock doors were immediately closed. The time both doors were opened is estimated to be approximately one (1) second.
"When both doors open, Technical Specification surveillance requirement SR 3.6.4.1.3 was not met and secondary containment was declared inoperable. Secondary containment was declared operable after independently verifying at least one secondary containment access door was closed.
"There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM KIM HOFFMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1753 EDT ON 9/20/13 * * *
"This update provides additional information on the initial notification of the event. On 9/18/13, while testing secondary containment airlock doors, the interlocks did not prevent opening of both doors simultaneously. With the outer door to the main plenum room open, the inner door was able to be opened. At this point, Technical Specification SR 3.6.4.1.3 was not met and secondary containment was inoperable. The inner door was closed immediately. While in this condition, the inner door was then opened, and the interlock did not prevent the opening of the outer door. The outer door was closed immediately.
"Secondary containment was declared operable after verifying at least one of the airlock doors was closed.
"There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "
Notified R3DO (Reimer).
"While performing the secondary containment airlock door interlock surveillance, the interlock to the main plenum room did not prevent the opening of both doors to the plenum room airlock (DOOR-85 and DOOR-86). The plenum room airlock doors were immediately closed. The time both doors were opened is estimated to be approximately one (1) second.
"When both doors open, Technical Specification surveillance requirement SR 3.6.4.1.3 was not met and secondary containment was declared inoperable. Secondary containment was declared operable after independently verifying at least one secondary containment access door was closed.
"There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM KIM HOFFMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1753 EDT ON 9/20/13 * * *
"This update provides additional information on the initial notification of the event. On 9/18/13, while testing secondary containment airlock doors, the interlocks did not prevent opening of both doors simultaneously. With the outer door to the main plenum room open, the inner door was able to be opened. At this point, Technical Specification SR 3.6.4.1.3 was not met and secondary containment was inoperable. The inner door was closed immediately. While in this condition, the inner door was then opened, and the interlock did not prevent the opening of the outer door. The outer door was closed immediately.
"Secondary containment was declared operable after verifying at least one of the airlock doors was closed.
"There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "
Notified R3DO (Reimer).
General Information
Event Number: 49359
Rep Org: DUKE ENERGY
Licensee: DUKE ENERGY
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JULIE OLIVIER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: DUKE ENERGY
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JULIE OLIVIER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/19/2013
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 16:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2013
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 16:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
APPARENT FALSE NEGATIVE INDICATED ON A BLIND PERFORMANCE TEST
"Per 10 CFR 26.719 section (c)(3), Duke Energy is making this notification of an apparent false negative error that has occurred on a blind performance test sample submitted to the Health and Human Services (HHS)-certified laboratory used for drug testing. On September 18, 2013, Duke Energy was notified that a drug sample that was part of a blind performance test package provided by El Solhy and submitted to LabCorp tested negative. Duke Energy will investigate the issue and report to the NRC as required by part 26.719(c)(1). El Solhy and LabCorp are contracted by Duke Energy as required by NRC regulations to provide fitness for duty services. Duke Energy has notified the NRC Branch Chief for the Fitness for Duty program [Paul Harris], which advised that Duke needs to notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center."
"Per 10 CFR 26.719 section (c)(3), Duke Energy is making this notification of an apparent false negative error that has occurred on a blind performance test sample submitted to the Health and Human Services (HHS)-certified laboratory used for drug testing. On September 18, 2013, Duke Energy was notified that a drug sample that was part of a blind performance test package provided by El Solhy and submitted to LabCorp tested negative. Duke Energy will investigate the issue and report to the NRC as required by part 26.719(c)(1). El Solhy and LabCorp are contracted by Duke Energy as required by NRC regulations to provide fitness for duty services. Duke Energy has notified the NRC Branch Chief for the Fitness for Duty program [Paul Harris], which advised that Duke needs to notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center."
Agreement State
Event Number: 49367
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: EQUISTAR CHEMICALS LP
Region: 3
City: MORRIS State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01737-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: EQUISTAR CHEMICALS LP
Region: 3
City: MORRIS State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01737-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON PROCESS GAUGE
The following was received by the State of Illinois via email:
"On September 18, 2013, Equistar Chemical's Radiation Safety Officer contacted the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] to report that a shutter on a fixed gauge could not be closed at their Morris, Illinois facility. The shutter on the fixed level gauge, manufactured by Vega America, could not be closed during a routine shutter check. The gauge is located on a vessel that is not routinely accessible to personnel due to temperatures on their hot particle line. The gauge normally operates in the constant 'open' position. It remains in its normal operational configuration at this time. This situation does not pose an immediate threat to health or safety unless an emergency shutdown condition were necessary requiring access to the vessel. At the time of discovery, a consultant was on-site performing the shutter checks and he immediately performed a dose rate survey of the device with no unusual measurements noted. This device was last checked and found to be operational in June 2013. The manufacturer was contacted to arrange service of the device on-site.
"The next day, the Radiation Safety Officer reported that following several additional attempts, they had been able to close the shutter. Per the manufacturer, the gauge shutter and handle shaft were sprayed with a light penetrating oil and after some time spent partially rotating the shutter, it will now rotate 90 degrees and allow the licensee to close the gauge if necessary. Arrangements were made with the manufacturer's field engineering group to have a shutter repair kit sent to the site within the next week when a field technician can perform the necessary repairs. The licensee believes that since all of the symptoms were very similar to previous device issues at the facility in the same area of the plant, water and resulting corrosion are inside of the gauge housing which is binding the shutter."
Illinois NMED Number: IL13029
The following was received by the State of Illinois via email:
"On September 18, 2013, Equistar Chemical's Radiation Safety Officer contacted the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] to report that a shutter on a fixed gauge could not be closed at their Morris, Illinois facility. The shutter on the fixed level gauge, manufactured by Vega America, could not be closed during a routine shutter check. The gauge is located on a vessel that is not routinely accessible to personnel due to temperatures on their hot particle line. The gauge normally operates in the constant 'open' position. It remains in its normal operational configuration at this time. This situation does not pose an immediate threat to health or safety unless an emergency shutdown condition were necessary requiring access to the vessel. At the time of discovery, a consultant was on-site performing the shutter checks and he immediately performed a dose rate survey of the device with no unusual measurements noted. This device was last checked and found to be operational in June 2013. The manufacturer was contacted to arrange service of the device on-site.
"The next day, the Radiation Safety Officer reported that following several additional attempts, they had been able to close the shutter. Per the manufacturer, the gauge shutter and handle shaft were sprayed with a light penetrating oil and after some time spent partially rotating the shutter, it will now rotate 90 degrees and allow the licensee to close the gauge if necessary. Arrangements were made with the manufacturer's field engineering group to have a shutter repair kit sent to the site within the next week when a field technician can perform the necessary repairs. The licensee believes that since all of the symptoms were very similar to previous device issues at the facility in the same area of the plant, water and resulting corrosion are inside of the gauge housing which is binding the shutter."
Illinois NMED Number: IL13029